State v. Mann

• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 22402.,22402.
• Citation: 76 Conn.App. 48,818 A.2d 122
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut, v. Jason MANN.

818 A.2d 122

76 Conn.App. 48

STATE of Connecticut, v. Jason MANN.

No. 22402.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 17, 2002.

Decided April 1, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

LAVERY, C. J., and SCHALLER and BISHOP, Js.

Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Michael T. Morley, law student intern for the appellant (defendant).

Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Maura K. Coyne, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

LAVERY, C.J.

The defendant, Jason Mann, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), possession of a controlled substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (c) and possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress the crack cocaine and marijuana seized from a search of his person during a warrantless police entry into his apartment¹ in violation of his fourth amendment rights.² We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not disputed. At approximately 4:25 a.m. on October 3, 2000, three uniformed New Haven police officers, Christopher Rubino, Julie Esposito and Victor Fuentes, responded to a call that a dispute was taking place on Stevens Street near Sylvan Avenue in New Haven. When the officers arrived in the area, they spoke to a woman who identified herself as Tina Jones. Jones admitted having been part of the dispute on Stevens Street and volunteered information about drug activity in the area. She told the officers that an apartment at 130 Sylvan Avenue had just received a shipment of drugs, that the recipient of the drugs was a black male, that "they dealt everything out of that apartment" and that she was unsure as to whether there were weapons in the apartment. Jones described the apartment as being on the first floor, last door on the left, when the building is entered from the rear.

After receiving the information from Jones, the officers proceeded to the apartment at 130 Sylvan Avenue. They entered 130 Sylvan Avenue from the unlocked rear door. At approximately 5 a.m., Rubino knocked on the door of the apartment described by Jones. Although in uniform, the officers did not at anytime announce themselves as police. The defendant responded by opening the door one-and-one-half to two feet, which was wide enough for the defendant's entire body to be visible. Upon opening the door and seeing the police, the defendant attempted to close the door using his left hand and the left side of his body. Simultaneously, the defendant placed his right hand into his right pocket. When Rubino saw the defendant place his right hand in his pocket, he drew his gun, entered the apartment, placed the defendant against a wall and conducted what he described as "a Terry patdown" for weapons.³ No weapons were found, but Rubino did, in conducting the patdown, determine that the defendant's right pants pocket "had a quantity of plastic baggies with little rocklike things in them," which Rubino identified as possible narcotics. After completing the patdown and assuring himself that the defendant had no weapons, Rubino reached into the defendant's right pocket and withdrew its contents, which included fifty small bags containing crack cocaine and four small bags containing marijuana. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged with various offenses relating to his possession of the crack cocaine and the marijuana.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the crack cocaine and the marijuana. After hearing evidence on the defendant's motion, the court issued an oral ruling denying the motion because it found that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement permitted the officers warrantless entry into the apartment. The court also found that the police had no probable cause with respect to the defendant, that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment at 130 Sylvan Avenue and that normally, a warrant would have been required to justify the officers' entry.

The defendant was convicted of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of a controlled substance and possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school. The court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years imprisonment and five years probation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that his motion to suppress was denied improperly. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly determined that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement justified the officers' warrantless entry into his apartment.⁴ We agree.

We first set forth our standard of review. "Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 279, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001); see also State v. Smith, 257 Conn. 216, 222, 777 A.2d 182 (2001).

We note first that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Moreover "[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brosnan, 221 Conn. 788, 806-807, 608 A.2d 49 (1992), quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

"In Payton v. New York, supra, [445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371] the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the overarching significance, under the fourth amendment, of the sanctity of the home.... The court stated ... The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated. That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that [a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brosnan, supra, 221 Conn. at 806, 608 A.2d 49, quoting Payton v. New York, supra, at 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The United States Supreme Court also made it clear that "[i]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New York, supra, at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371.

"It is [thus] a fundamental principle of search and seizure law that, in the absence of exigent circumstances and probable cause for arrest, a person's house may not be entered without a warrant, and that warrantless searches and seizures inside a house are presumptively unreasonable." State v. Gant, 231 Conn. 43, 63, 646 A.2d 835 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038, 115 S.Ct. 1404, 131 L.Ed.2d 291 (1995), citing Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371; see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, ___, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 2459, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002).

In the present case, it is undisputed that Rubino, upon observing the defendant reach his hand into his pocket while attempting to close the door, pushed the defendant further inside the apartment and against an interior wall. Rubino thus crossed the threshold of the defendant's apartment and physically seized the defendant inside his apartment.⁵ In its oral decision, the court concluded that the police did not, at any time, have probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.⁶ The court also concluded, however, that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement justified the officers' entry into the defendant's apartment and, therefore, it denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The court's conclusions are inconsistent because warrantless searches and seizures conducted under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement are constitutionally impermissible unless supported by probable cause. United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 553 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied sub nom. Impemba v. United States, 486 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 2033, 100 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988); see also Kirk v. Louisiana, supra, 536 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. 2459; State v. Gant, supra, 231 Conn. at 63-64, 646 A.2d 835.

Because it is undisputed that the officers did not have probable cause with respect to the defendant,⁷ we conclude that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable to the present case and did not justify the officers' entry into the defendant's apartment. The state, nevertheless, contends that the officers' warrantless entry into ...