State v. Mann

• Decision Date: 05 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 362A97.,362A97.
• Citation: 560 S.E.2d 776
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Leroy Elwood MANN.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

560 S.E.2d 776

STATE of North Carolina v. Leroy Elwood MANN.

No. 362A97.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 5, 2002.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by John H. Watters, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Lemuel W. Hinton, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

BUTTERFIELD, Justice.

On 12 December 1995, the grand jury sitting in Wake County returned indictments against defendant Leroy Elwood Mann for financial transaction card theft, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree murder. On 23 April 1996, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant was tried capitally at the 23 June 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Wake County, and was convicted of first-degree murder upon the theory of felony murder. The jury also found defendant guilty of all the remaining crimes charged. Following a capital sentencing proceeding held pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended the death penalty for the murder conviction. On 15 July 1997, the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The trial court arrested judgment on the kidnapping conviction, as it was the basis of defendant's felony murder conviction. The trial court joined the remaining convictions for purposes of sentencing and imposed a term of 80 to 105 months imprisonment. For the reasons herein given, we conclude that as to the guilt-innocence phase and the capital sentencing proceeding, defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error, and that the sentence of death was not disproportionate. However, for errors committed, we vacate the sentence imposed on defendant's convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and financial transaction card theft, and we remand these matters for a new sentencing hearing.

At trial, the State presented evidence tending to show that the victim, Janet Noble Hauser, was defendant's co-worker at Advanced Plastics, Inc. (API). On Sunday, 3 December 1995, API notified defendant that, because of a general reduction in the work force, he was being laid off from his employment and need not report to work the following day. On Monday, 4 December 1995, defendant called Hauser, the executive assistant and bookkeeper at API, and asked her to meet him for lunch to discuss his unemployment benefits. Hauser agreed and, at 12:15 p.m., left the office to meet defendant at the Fresh Market in Falls Village, across the street from the apartment complex where defendant resided with his wife and her daughter.

At approximately 1:00 p.m., Ronald Van Goor, the occupant of the apartment directly below defendant's, heard loud thumping noises coming from defendant's apartment. Van Goor testified that there was also an inordinate amount of vibration emanating from the upstairs apartment, the force of which caused a picture to fall from Van Goor's bedroom wall. According to Van Goor, the ruckus was so intense that it prevented him from taking a nap, and the commotion continued well over an hour.

Sometime between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., Donna Timm, a receptionist at API, received a telephone call from Hauser, during which she stated, "This is Jan. I went to Chi-Chi's and had lunch. I'm not feeling well, I'm not coming back to work." The call originated from defendant's telephone number. Shortly thereafter, another call was placed from that number to defendant's wife, Cynthia Mota Mann, at her place of employment, the Department of Labor. After receiving the call, Mrs. Mann complained that she was not feeling well and asked a co-worker to drive her home. Mrs. Mann returned home at or around 2:15 p.m.

Minutes later, a series of financial transactions involving Hauser's credit and bank accounts began. At 2:26 p.m., someone purchased gasoline at the Tower Texaco gas station with Hauser's credit card. Video surveillance of the gas station revealed defendant as the person who used Hauser's card. Then, at 2:55 p.m., a $100.00 withdrawal was made from Hauser's account at the State Employees' Credit Union, using her ATM card. In the hour that followed, six additional withdrawals of varying amounts were attempted, three of which were completed successfully, at ATM machines located at Beacon Hill Plaza and Knightdale Crossing Shopping Center. Video surveillance of the ATM locations showed defendant in Hauser's presence when several of the transactions were made.

When Hauser failed to return home on the evening of 4 December 1995, her husband reported her missing to the Raleigh Police Department. Proceeding on information that Hauser had left work to meet defendant for lunch, the officers investigating her disappearance went to defendant's home to question him. Upon entering the apartment, the investigators detected a strong odor of bleach and what they believed to be paint or paint thinner. At the request of the officers, defendant voluntarily accompanied them to the police station for questioning. While at the station, defendant told the investigators that Hauser never showed up for their lunch appointment, that he had not seen her, and that he had no idea what had happened to her.

On the afternoon of 5 December 1995, Hauser's body, wrapped in a blanket, was discovered at the bottom of a ravine below the Falls Lake dam. An autopsy of the body revealed a gunshot wound to Hauser's chest, which the medical examiner determined to be the cause of death. Hauser's body also exhibited various facial bruises and lacerations, swelling around the eyes, and a broken nose. The medical examiner could not pinpoint the time of death, but concluded that it had occurred within twenty-four hours of her discovery.

Upon a search of defendant's apartment, officers discovered that one wall of the master bedroom had been freshly painted and that the carpet had been recently cleaned with a chemical solution. Using an alternative forensic light source, the officers saw blood spattered on the wall underneath the new paint. A crime scene specialist testified that the pattern of the bloodstains was consistent with someone of Hauser's stature sustaining a severe beating about the head. A subsequent search of the car belonging to defendant's wife revealed a carpet-cleaning machine, cleaning chemicals, and a loaded nine-millimeter pistol.

Hauser's car was later discovered in a subdivision near Falls Lake. Investigators found a bullet hole inside the trunk of the car and recovered bullet fragments later determined to have been fired from the pistol found in Mrs. Mann's vehicle. They also found fingerprints on the underside of the trunk's lid at an angle suggesting that the owner of the prints was inside the trunk when they were left. The prints were later identified as Hauser's.

GUILT-INNOCENCE

By assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the charges of financial transaction card theft, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree murder. Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he perpetrated any of these offenses against Hauser. We readily disagree.

The applicable law is well-defined. "In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the defendant is the perpetrator." State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 417, 508 S.E.2d 496, 518 (1998). Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion. State v. Frogge, 351 N.C. 576, 584, 528 S.E.2d 893, 899, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 994, 121 S.Ct. 487, 148 L.Ed.2d 459 (2000). As to whether substantial evidence exists, the question for the trial court is not one of weight, but of the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548 S.E.2d 712, 721 (2001). In resolving this question, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most advantageous to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State's case. Id. Moreover, "[c]ircumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence." State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988); see also Frogge, 351 N.C. at 585, 528 S.E.2d at 899.

With regard to the charge of financial transaction card theft, N.C.G.S. § 14-113.9 provides that a person is guilty of the offense if "[h]e takes, obtains or withholds a financial transaction card from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder's consent and with the intent to use it." N.C.G.S. § 14-113.9(a)(1) (1999). Within the meaning of this provision, a financial transaction card includes "any instrument or device whether known as a credit card ... or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder ... [i]n obtaining money, goods, services, or anything else of value on credit." N.C.G.S. § 14-113.8(4)(a) (1999).

Here, the indictment alleged that defendant unlawfully withheld Hauser's Texaco credit card from her control and possession without her consent and for an improper purpose. In support of this charge, the State presented a segment of the surveillance videotape of the Tower Texaco gas station and a credit-card receipt for the purchase of gasoline at approximately 2:26 p.m. on the afternoon of 4 December 1995. The tape showed defendant at the Texaco station at the time of the purchase, and according to the testimony of Hauser's supervisor at API, the signature on the receipt was not that of Hauser. This evidence, when considered in the light most beneficial to the State, furnished substantial evidence of each element of the crime of financial transaction card theft. Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge was properly denied.

We turn now to the charge of firstdegree kidnapping. Under N.C.G.S. § 14-39...