State v. Manning

• Decision Date: 23 March 1935
• Docket Number: 42641.
• Citation: 259 N.W. 213,220 Iowa 525
• Parties: STATE v. MANNING. STATE v. DISBROW. STATE v. DAVIES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

259 N.W. 213

220 Iowa 525

STATE v. MANNING.

STATE v. DISBROW.

STATE v. DAVIES.

No. 42641.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 23, 1935

MITCHELL, J., dissenting.

Appeal from District Court, Wapello County; A. O. Wakefield, Judge.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Edward L. O'Connor, Atty. Gen., E. J. Grier, Co. Atty., of Ottumwa, J. R. Jaques, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Joe N Wagner, of Ottumwa, for the State.

Merrill C. Gilmore, R. R. Ramsell, City Sol., L. L. Duke, Burn Bannister, and Carl Davies, all of Ottumwa, for appellees.

HAMILTON Justice.

The pleadings, evidence, and exhibits in this case are quite voluminous, and it will serve no useful purpose and would be impractical to attempt, except in a general way, to incorporate the same in this opinion. There were three separate and distinct actions in equity brought against Edwin C. Manning as mayor, W. L. Disbrow, as commissioner, and John L. Davies as commissioner, respectively, of the city of Ottumwa, Iowa, asking for the removal from office of each of said officials for alleged willful and habitual neglect maladministration, and corruption in office, and alleged failure to observe the provisions of section 388 of the 1931 Code of Iowa with reference to the transfer of funds, in that they did not obtain the approval of the budget director, details of which are set forth in the petition covering 89 pages of printed matter. The answer is a general denial, except for such statements and allegations as are admitted or explained, and specifically denies that said officials were guilty of willful neglect, misconduct, maladministration, or corruption in office, and denies the various specific allegations of the petition, and sets forth alleged facts by way of justification, explanation, and refutation of the particular acts and conduct set forth in the petition, which it is alleged in the petition constituted grounds for removal from office. Said answer also attacks the constitutionality of sections 388 and 390 of the Code of 1931 as being in violation of the provisions of section 6 of article 1 and section 1 of article 3 of the Constitution of the State of Iowa.

The cases were heard by agreement of parties on the same evidence in so far as applicable, and submitted on the same evidence and pleadings in the cases. The pleadings were practically identical in all three cases and were combined for submission to this court, and are herein considered accordingly.

No question was raised as to the fact that the defendants occupied the official positions alleged. The issues raised by the pleadings in a general way involve the question of the guilt of the defendants of the alleged misconduct, maladministration, or corruption in office, and/or habitual neglect or refusal to perform their official duties under section 1091 of the Code, and whether or not they have been guilty of a violation of section 388 of the Code, relative to transfer of funds, and, if so, whether or not, under section 390 of the Code, such violation constitutes a sufficient ground for removal from office, and likewise involve the constitutionality of said sections 388 and 390 of the Code.

We have carefully examined the record and considered the particular propositions pointed out and urged by both appellant and appellees in arguments, both written and oral, and on the question of alleged misconduct, maladministration, and corruption in office, we are constrained to hold that while there are many acts which were irregular and a number of which are specifically prohibited by statute, substantially as alleged in plaintiff's petition, yet in view of the prior pronouncements of this court in the cases of State v. Roth, 162 Iowa, 638, 144 N.W. 339, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 841; State v. Zeigler, 199 Iowa, 392, 393, 202 N.W. 94; and State v. Naumann, 213 Iowa, 418, 239 N.W. 93, 81 A.L.R. 483, requiring that all such acts, whether of omission or commission, in order to constitute grounds for removal must have been done knowingly, willfully, and with an evil or corrupt motive and purpose, we do not believe the cause for removal upon these grounds was proven with that degree of certainty which the law demands. The primary purpose of the law, as contained in section 1091 of the Code of 1931, is to protect the public interest. The rules governing are fully discussed and set forth by this court in State v. Meek, 148 Iowa, 671, 127 N.W. 1023, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 566, Ann.Cas. 1912C, 1075.While we cannot place our stamp of approval upon the manner and method pursued by these defendants in the management of the affairs of the municipality, and are in no way excusing acts and conduct which amount to actual violation of statutory laws, yet we can discern no purpose, on the part of said officials in what they did, to harm, or which was inimical to the interests of such city. No corrupt or evil design or purpose is manifest from the evidence, with that degree of certainty required by our prior holdings, and in this respect we think the findings of the lower court are correct.

We are likewise in accord with the findings of the trial court to the effect that the evidence is clear and convincing that the mayor and commissioners knowingly and intentionally paid various city expenses out of funds which were not allocated to or levied for such purposes, and that such appropriation, payments, and transfer of funds were made without a compliance with section 388 of the 1931 Code of Iowa, and that by reason of Code, § 390, the defendants are subject to removal from office unless said section 388 is unconstitutional, as claimed by the defendants, appellees herein. This leaves nothing further in this case for our consideration except the question of the constitutionality of said sections 388 and 390 of the Code, and our attention will therefore now be directed to the consideration of this question.

The exact wording of the statute is as follows:

" Transfer of active funds . Upon the approval of the director, it shall be lawful to make temporary or permanent transfers of money from one fund of the municipality to another fund thereof. The certifying board or levying board, as the case may be, shall provide that money temporarily transferred shall be returned to the fund from which it was transferred within such time and upon such conditions as the director shall determine, provided that it shall not be necessary to return to the emergency fund, or to any other fund no longer required, any money transferred therefrom to any other fund." Section 388.

" Violations . Failure on the part of any public official to perform any of the duties prescribed in this and the five preceding chapters shall constitute a misdemeanor, and shall be sufficient ground for removal from office." Section 390.

This law was attacked on two grounds: First, it sets up no standard of conduct to guide the budget director in passing judgment or in making his decision with reference to the transfer of funds, and therefore it is an attempt to delegate legislative power to an executive official, which is an infringement upon the provisions of the Constitution, which provides that the legislative power is vested in the General Assembly; and, second, it violates the doctrine of uniformity of laws, in that it leaves to the whim and arbitrary decision of the director to apply one rule in one municipality and another rule in another.

In approaching this question we are impressed with the grave responsibility resting upon the court in dealing with the provisions of the fundamental law of this state, and with the duty of the court in seeing that its provisions remain inviolate. In the first place, we are confronted with the rule of construction of legislative acts laid down by our court that: " There is no presumption against the validity of an act of the Legislature. On the contrary, all presumptions are in its favor, and a statute will not be held unconstitutional unless its contravention of constitutional guaranties is so clear, plain, and palpable as to leave no reasonable doubt on the subject; and where the language is reasonably susceptible of different meanings, the courts will lean to that construction which is consistent with its validity." City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Company, 193 Iowa, 1096, at page 1117, 184 N.W. 823, 832, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A.L.R. 1322; State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co., 168 Iowa, 1,147 N.W. 195, L.R.A. 1917B, 198; Barr v. Cardell, 173 Iowa, 18, 155 N.W. 312; McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N.W. 902, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 706; State v. United States Express Company, 164 Iowa, 112, 145 N.W. 451; Brady v. Mattern, 125 Iowa, 158, 100 N.W. 358, 106 Am.St.Rep. 291; Rodemacher v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 41 Iowa, 297, 20 Am.Rep. 592.

The three branches, executive, judicial, and legislative, are co-ordinate parts of our government, and the line of demarcation between the three in matters of the character here involved is not easily defined according to any fixed standard of interpretation. As early as the year 1825, no less renowned authority than Chief Justice Marshall, in recognition of this difficulty under such circumstances as confront us in this case, said: " The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details." Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 41, 6 L.Ed. 253.Our own court has given expression to the same thought in McLeland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa, 1232, at page 1238, 201 N.W. 401, 403, 203 N.W. 1:" The exact line of demarcation between legislative power...