State v. Manning, 64309

• Decision Date: 28 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 64309,64309
• Citation: 380 So.2d 46
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald MANNING.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 46

380 So.2d 46

STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald MANNING.

No. 64309.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 28, 1980.

Ann Woolhandler, George M. Strickler, Jr., New Orleans, Paul Henry Kidd, A Law Corporation, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

CALOGERO, Justice.^*

Gerald Manning was indicted by the Ouachita Parish grand jury on October 20, 1977, for the aggravated rape of Vonda Harris, the first degree murder of Vonda Harris, and the aggravated rape of his neighbor, a sixty year old Monroe woman. The aggravated rape of the neighbor was severed from the case at bar and tried separately.¹ The jury here found him guilty of attempted aggravated rape and of second degree murder of the victim Vonda Harris. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the rape offense, and life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the murder offense. He appeals the conviction on the grounds that his confession to the rape-murder of Vonda Harris was obtained in violation of this fifth amendment and Miranda rights and that the state withheld material evidence from him.

On February 21, 1977, a workman discovered the nude body of a young woman behind a vacant house in Monroe, Louisiana. The victim, Vonda Harris, had been raped and beaten to death.

Six months after the discovery of Vonda Harris' body, on August 9, 1977 at 1:41 a. m. the Monroe police received a complaint from the sixty year old woman that she had been raped by a young man who lived next door to her. She identified the defendant Gerald Manning as the man who had raped her. Defendant was taken to the police station and questioned for several hours. At 4:59 a. m. defendant requested an attorney. At 5:08 a. m. defendant told the police that he didn't need an attorney and made an exculpatory statement concerning his neighbor's claim.

At 6:00 a. m. the police allowed Manning to return home but asked that he return to the station at 8:00 a. m. When he returned he took a lie detector test in which he admitted being at the neighbor's residence, but denied having had intercourse with her. At 10:00 a. m. defendant was again allowed to return home. Several hours later the police asked Manning to return to the police station for questioning. Shortly after the questioning began, Manning made an oral unrecorded confession that he had forced his neighbor to have sexual intercourse with him.

Defendant was then questioned about the Vonda Harris rape-murder. At 2:50 p. m. Manning made an oral recorded statement implicating himself and an accomplice, Morris "Buck" Perkins, in the Harris murder. At 3:31 p. m. defendant made an oral inculpatory statement concerning the neighbor's rape. The police ceased questioning Manning at 5:00 p. m. August 9th and resumed questioning about the Harris case the next morning at 8:15 a. m. At 10:35 a. m. on August 10, 1977 Manning made another oral recorded statement in which he admitted his participation in the murder of Vonda Harris.

We deal first with the confession issue. Defendant contends that his confessions should not have been admitted for the following reasons:

1) The confessions were obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights.

2) The confessions were not made freely and voluntarily.

3) The trial court failed to articulate the standard it used in ruling on the admissibility of the confessions.

The defense argues that the police obtained his confession by violating two rights protected by Miranda, the right to remain silent, and the right to counsel. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant contends that the police deprived him of both rights by giving him equivocal Miranda warnings and engaging in conduct which encouraged defendant to believe that he could not go home unless he gave a statement. The defense argues that the alleged violation of Manning's rights which occurred at 5:03 a. m. August 9, 1977 rendered all subsequent confessions by Manning unlawful and inadmissible.

At 1:41 a. m. on August 9, 1977 Officer Otwell of the Monroe Police Department was called to investigate a complaint by defendant's neighbor that she had been raped by a young man who had lived next door. After listening to her complaint and briefly questioning Manning, the officer gave defendant his Miranda warnings and took him to the police station.

At the station at 2:25 a. m. he signed a waiver of his constitutional rights. At 4:59 a. m. defendant began to make an oral recorded statement. When asked if he waived his constitutional rights, Manning answered "yes", but in the course of questioning the following exchange took place:

"Q: I need to get you to speak up?

A: Talk to you now? Am I gonna talk to you now?

Q: Well, that's what I am talking about. Do you want an attorney here or do you want to go ahead and tell us your side of it?

A: I want an attorney, you know.

Q: Well, I need to know. If you want an attorney right now let me know and we'll stop talking to you if you want an attorney?

A: Talking about I can get somebody to come here now?

Q: No, they will appoint you one later but I'll quit talking to you if you want an attorney?

A: I want an attorney.

Q: O.K. Statement concluded at 5:03 A.M. 8-9-77."

Officer Zambie then told the defendant that they did not have an attorney available immediately and would have to question him at a later time when the presence of an attorney could be secured. The officers began preparing to leave the interrogation room when the defendant announced that he did not need an attorney and that he wanted to "clear the air." Manning then made a statement at 5:08 a. m. that he had not been in his neighbor's residence at the time of the rape. Later at 6:00 a. m., August 9th, the police took Manning home and asked him to return to the station at 8:00 a. m.

Defendant contends that in the foregoing incident the police rendered defendant's Miranda rights meaningless by telling him that he could have an attorney, but not until later, thereby creating the impression that he would not be allowed to go home unless he waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

When a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of that right by the police. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, 325-326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). The other constitutional right safeguarded by Miranda, the right to counsel, demands an equally strict standard of conduct by the police. In either instance, the police must cease interrogation when the defendant exercises these constitutional rights.² Miranda, supra. The accused is not precluded, however, from later changing his mind and waiving those same rights. State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316 (La.1978). But the state's burden is a heavy one. State v. Mouton, 366 So.2d 1336 (La.1978); State v. Peevy, 321 So.2d 324 (La.1975). The courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 63, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 431 (1977).

In the present case defendant received three Miranda warnings before making the 5:08 a. m. Exculpatory statement concerning the rape of his neighbor. Officer Otwell gave Manning a Miranda warning at 1:50 a. m. at Manning's house. At 2:25 a. m. defendant signed a written waiver of rights form. Later at 5:03 a. m. while an officer was asking Manning if he understood his Miranda rights, Manning exercised his rights by stating that he had nothing to say and that he wanted an attorney. After the officers ascertained defendant's intentions, they immediately ceased questioning Manning, indicating to him that his rights would be respected. They told the defendant that they could not provide him with a lawyer at that time (5:00 a. m.), but that he could have counsel appointed for him later. They told the defendant in no uncertain terms that they would not question him until he was provided with counsel. Manning's statement within minutes that he didn't need a lawyer was volunteered by Manning; he was not responding to police questioning at that time.

The facts recited above support the conclusion that defendant understood his Miranda rights and that his decision to waive right to counsel during interrogation and make a statement resulted from Manning's belief that he could convince the police of his innocence. There is no indication of an overpowering of defendant's will by the police officers. When Manning invoked his Miranda rights at 5:03 a. m., he saw the meaning of those rights the officers immediately stopped questioning him, and the officers told him that they could not question him until an attorney was present. The fact that the police honored defendant's right to cut off questioning indicated to Manning that the promise of an attorney was not illusory.³

We conclude that defendant's Miranda rights were not violated by the Monroe police officers at 5:03 a. m. on August 9, 1977, nor at any time thereafter. The officers gave defendant fresh Miranda warnings before beginning each new round of questioning.

Defendant contends that Miranda warnings notwithstanding, his confession must be suppressed because it was not made freely and voluntarily. Before a confession may be introduced into evidence the state must show that the confession was made freely and voluntarily and that it was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. R.S. 15:451, See Brown v. Mississippi,...