State v. Manning
| Decision Date | 18 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 43685,43685 |
| Citation | 86 Wn.2d 272,543 P.2d 632 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Virgil MANNING and Tony August, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Donald C. Brockett, Pros. Atty., LeRoy C. Kinnie, Deputy Pros. Atty., Spokane, for petitioner.
Kain & Snow, George A. Kain, Turner, Stoeve, Gagliardi & Kennedy, Brian B. Kennedy, Spokane, for respondents.
The State appeals from an order suppressing evidence obtained during a special inquiry judge proceeding. We affirm.
Defendants were arrested and charged in district court with professional gambling in violation of RCW 9.46.220. Following a preliminary appearance they were released, one on bail, the other on recognizance. Approximately 45 days later the prosecutor instituted a special inquiry judge proceeding pursuant to RCW 10.27.170. The special inquiry proceeding was directed solely at the named defendants to obtain additional information to support the charges previously filed against them. Neither the defendants nor their attorneys were present at the special inquiry hearing. A month later the prosecutor filed an information in superior court charging defendants with the same crimes for which they had been charged in district court. After their arraignment on the superior court charges, defendants moved to suppress any evidence against them which had been obtained at the special inquiry hearing.
Defendants rely on two theories to sustain the suppression order: (1) The statute authorizing the special inquiry judge proceedings does not allow the use of that process to gather evidence against specific defendants After they have been charged. (2) Alternatively, if the statute does authorize such proceedings, it violates defendants' constitutional rights of assistance of counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and cross-examination.
The special inquiry judge proceeding is of relatively recent origin in this state. This proceeding was created by the criminal investigatory act of 1971, Laws of 1971, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 67. It appears to have resulted from a study of the Judicial Council, which had on several occasions recommended a criminal investigatory act in somewhat different form from that finally enacted. 22 Washington State Judicial Council Reports 17 (1969--1970). Similar statutory proceedings exist in Michigan and Connecticut. Mich.Stat.Annot. §§ 28.943--. 944, M.C.L.A. §§ 767.3, 767.4; Conn.Gen.Stat.Annot. § 54--47.
A special inquiry judge is defined by statute as 'a superior court judge designated by a majority of the superior court judges of a county (whose function is) to hear and receive evidence of crime and corruption.' RCW 10.27.020(7); RCW 10.27.050. The principal section of chapter 10.27 relating to the special inquiry judge proceeding provides:
When any public attorney, corporation counsel or city attorney has reason to Suspect crime or corruption, within the jurisdiction of such attorney, and there is reason to believe that there are persons who may be able to give material testimony or provide material evidence concerning such Suspected crime or corruption, such attorney may petition the judge designated as a special inquiry judge pursuant to RCW 10.27.050 for an order directed to such persons commanding them to appear at a designated time and place in said county and to then and there answer such questions concerning the Suspected crime or corruption as the special inquiry judge may approve, or provide evidence as directed by the special inquiry judge.
(Italics ours.) RCW 10.27.170.
An essential difference between the special inquiry judge and the grand jury proceedings is that the grand jury is empowered to issue indictments while the special inquiry judge cannot. RCW 10.27.150.
The question is whether the statutes authorize use of this proceeding to gather evidence against charged defendants as contrasted to an investigatory process to ferret out evidence leading to potential defendants. The act simply does not answer the question. There is no legislative history to assist us. The Judicial Council Report states:
This added law enforcement aid is patterned after the one man grand jury law of Michigan. . . . Special inquiry judge proceedings are viewed by the Judicial Council as supplementary to a regular grand jury which has the power to actively investigate evidence of crime and corruption, a power not granted to the special inquiry judge. The special inquiry judge does not have the power to issue indictments as does the grand jury, but...
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State v. Reeder
...160 Wash.2d at 244, 156 P.3d 864. 28.Miles, 160 Wash.2d at 244, 156 P.3d 864. 29. Laws of 1971, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 67. 30.RCW 10.27.010. 31.State v. Manning, 86 Wash.2d 272, 273, 543 P.2d 632 (1975). 32. Judicial Council of State of Wash., The Twenty–Second Biennial Report 17–18 (Jan. 1, 197......
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State v. Reeder
...¶ 22 In contrast to a grand jury, an SIJ cannot issue subpoenas once a defendant is charged with a crime. State v. Manning, 86 Wash.2d 272, 275, 543 P.2d 632 (1975). SIJs also cannot issue indictments and do not make the decision of whether to prosecute. Neslund, 103 Wash.2d at 86, 690 P.2d......
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State v. Fowler, No. 32525-0-II (WA 1/31/2006)
...contends that the State used the special inquiry process to gather evidence to support charges already filed. In State v. Manning, 86 Wn.2d 272, 275, 543 P.2d 632 (1975), our Supreme Court held that a special inquiry proceeding may not be used to discover or gather evidence against a defend......
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State v. Burri
...defendant was prejudiced by the special inquiry proceeding. We disagree with the state and affirm the dismissal. State v. Manning, 86 Wash.2d 272, 543 P.2d 632 (1975), decided while the instant case was pending on appeal, makes the state's first contention untenable. Manning held: (W)e conc......