State v. Manuel

• Decision Date: 31 December 1838
• Citation: 20 N.C. 144
• Parties: THE STATE v. WILLIAM MANUEL.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

20 N.C. 144

THE STATE

v.WILLIAM MANUEL.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DECEMBER TERM. 1838

Constitutional Law—Working Out Court Costs.

1. The act of 1831, ch. 13 (1 Rev. Stat, ch. 111, sees. 86, 87, 88, 89), providing for the collection of fines imposed upon free negroes and free persons of color convicted of any criminal offense, by directing them to be hired out under certain rules, regulations, and restrictions, is not so clearly repugnant to the 39th section of the Constitution, which provides that debtors shall not be continued in prison after delivering up bona fide their property for the use of their creditors, nor to the 19th section of the same which gives to the Governor the power of granting pardons, nor to the 10th section of the bill of rights, which prohibits the imposition of excessive fines or the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment, nor to the 3d section of the same which declares that no man nor set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate privileges from the community but in consideration of public services, nor to the spirit of the 12th section of the same, which forbids the deprivation of liberty to a free-man "but by the law of the land," nor to the principles of free government, as to warrant the courts in pronouncing it unconstitutional and void.

2. The act of 1838, which provides that if any person shall be convicted in any court of record in this State of any crime or misdemeanor, and shall be in execution for the fine and costs of prosecution, and shall have remained in prison for the space of twenty days, he may be discharged in the manner therein prescribed, does not repeal the act of 1831, ch. 13, but as the last expression of legislative will, necessarily abrogates so much of that act as stands in the way of its provisions.

3. The primary purpose of the Constitution was the well being of the people by whom it was ordained, and the political powers reserved or granted thereby, must be understood to be reserved or granted to the people collectively, or to the individuals of whom it was composed.

4. But that section in the Constitution which prohibits the imprisonment of debtors, applies to debtors, whether citizens or foreigners, dwelling among us—and all those sections which interdict outrages upon the person, liberty or property of a freeman, secure to that extent all amongst us who are rescognized as persons entitled to liberty, or permitted the enjoyment of property. They are so many safeguards against the violation of civil rights, and operate for the advantage of all whom these may be lawfully possessed.

5. According to the laws of this State all human beings within it fall within one of two classes, to wit, aliens and citizens.

6. Foreigners, unless made members of the State, continue aliens. Slaves manumitted here become freemen—and if born within North Carolina are citizens of North Carolina—and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State.

7. Naturalization is the removal of the disabilities of alienage. Emancipation is the removal of the incapacity of slavery. The latter depends

wholly upon the internal regulations of the State—the former belongs to the government of the United States, and it would be a dangerous mistake to confound them.

8. The possession of political power is not essential to constitute a citizen. If it be, then women, minors, and persons who have not paid public taxes are not citizens.

9. Free negroes and free persons of color are entitled as citizens to the protection of the 39th section of the Constitution, and the 10th section of the Bill of Rights.

10. The cases of Burton v. Dickens, 7 N. C., 103, and Jordan v. James, 10 N. C., 110, approved.

11. The 39th section of the Constitution, under the operation of the act of 1778, Rev. ch. 133, prohibits the imprisonment of an insolvent debtor, after that insolvency has been ascertained to be bona fide in any manner directed by law, either before or since the adoption of the Constitution.

12. A fine imposed for an offense against the criminal law of the country is a punishment.

13. And as, after it has been judicially imposed, the same means may be used to enforce its collection, which by law the State may employ to collect its debts, it may, for this purpose, be regarded as a debt due to the State.

14. But it is not a debt within the meaning of the 39th section of the Constitution.

15. Constitutions are not themes proposed for ingenious speculation, but fundamental laws ordained for practical purposes. Their meaning once ascertained by judicial interpretation and contented acquiescence, they are laws in that meaning until the power that formed shall think proper to change them.

16. The costs of a convicted offender are not a debt.

17. The sentence pronounced against a convicted criminal that he shall pay the costs of prosecution is as much a part of his punishment as the fine imposed eo nomine, and it has never been held that he could discharge himself therefrom by taking the oath of insolvency, except by virtue of statutory enactments authorizing or supposed to authorize such a discharge.

18. The right of the Legislature to prescribe the punishment of crimes belongs to them by virtue of the general grant of legislative powers. It is a power to uphold social order by competent sanctions unless they be restricted, and so far only as they are restricted by constitutional prohibitions, it is a power in the Legislature to accomplish the end by such means as in their discretion they shall judge best fitted to effect it.

19. The 39th section of the Constitution has no application to, or bearing upon debts due to the State.

20. Its object, and sole object, was to protect unfortunate debtors who had been unable to comply with their private engagements, from the malignity, resentment and cruelty of their offended creditors.

21. The language of the 10th section of the bill of rights is addressed directly to the judiciary for the regulation of their conduct in the administration of justice.

22. No doubt the principles of humanity, sanctioned and enjoined in this section, ought to command the reverence and regulate the conduct of all who owe obedience to the Constitution. But when the Legislature, acting upon their oaths, specifying the fines to be imposed, etc., as the reasonable or excess of them, are necessarily questions of discretion, it is not easy to see how this discretion can be supervised by a co-ordinate branch of the government. Certainly in no case can it be, unless the act complained of contain such a flagrant violation of all discretion as to show a disregard of constitutional restraints.

23. Whatever might be thought of a penal statute, which in its enactments makes distinctions between one part of the community and another capriciously and by way of favoritism, it cannot be denied that in the exercise of the great powers confided to the Legislature for the suppression and punishment of crimes, they may rightfully so apportion punishments according to the condition, temptations to crime, and ability to suffer, of those who are likely to offend, as to produce in effect that reasonable and practical equality in the administration of justice, which it is the object of all free governments to accomplish.

24. The execution of every sentence of a court is under the control of the court, and the court is bound by obligations too sacred to be disregarded to allow time to make application for a pardon in every case where time is bona fide desired for that purpose.

25. Appeals in criminal cases annul the sentences rendered below, and whether the sentences be approved or disapproved, they are not to be affirmed or reversed in the Supreme Court; but the decision of that court is to be certified to the court below with instructions to proceed to judgment and sentence thereon agreeably to that decision and the laics of the State.

THE defendant, at the Spring Term, 1838, of the Superior Court of Sampson, before his Honor, Judge Dick, was convicted of an asault and battery, and thereupon was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty dollars, and it appearing to the court that he was a free person of color and unable to pay the said fine, it was further ordered and adjudged by the said court that the sheriff of the county of Sampson should hire out the defendant to any person who would pay the said fine for his services for the shortest space of time. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

GASTON, J., after stating the case as above, proceeded as follows: There is thus directly presented for our decision the question which was heretofore raised and argued in the case of Oxendine (ante, 2 vol., 435),

but which it was then deemed neither necessary nor proper to determine, that is to say, whether the act of 1831, ch. 13 (See 1 Rev. Stat., ch. 3, secs. 86, 87, 88, 89), "to provide for the collection of fines imposed upon free negroes and free persons of color," be unconstitutional and void. Every case seriously questioning the constitutionality of a statute is entitled to the most deliberate consideration, because it invokes the exercise of the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government. The case before us not only seriously raises this question—but raises it upon grounds so plausible at least, if not so strong, as to render a full examination of them a task of some difficulty. We have therefore felt it our duty to examine the question with diligence and care, and if the conclusion to which we have arrived be not right, the error will not have resulted from the omission of our best efforts to form a correct judgment.

The act of 1831 directs that when a free negro or free personsof color shall be convicted of an offense against the criminal law and sentenced to pay a fine, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that he is unable to pay the fine imposed, the court shall direct the sheriff of the county to...