State v. Marcus
| Decision Date | 05 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A2215,A92A2215 |
| Citation | 206 Ga.App. 385,425 S.E.2d 351 |
| Parties | The STATE v. MARCUS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
W. Glenn Thomas, Jr., Dist. Atty., Stephen G. Scarlett, Kevin R. Gough, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellant.
Lane & Crowe, Grayson P. Lane, Brunswick, for appellee.
Defendant Marcus is charged by indictment with the offenses of trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A motion to suppress contraband found in a vehicle driven by defendant was denied on August 26, 1988, by Judge William Killian. Subsequently, a bench warrant for the arrest of defendant was issued for his failure to appear at a scheduled court appearance, but defendant was not arrested, and the case was placed on the dead docket on March 25, 1991. Following the arrest of defendant, the case was removed from the dead docket and returned to active status. Upon reinstatement of the case, it was apparently assigned to Judge Blenn Taylor. On June 5, 1992, defendant filed a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of his 1988 motion to suppress. Upon consideration of defendant's motion, Judge Taylor granted defendant's motion to suppress and the State appeals this ruling. Held:
1. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant's motion for rehearing where the previous judge's order denying defendant's motion to suppress was authorized by the evidence presented at the original hearing and where defendant presented neither new evidence nor new law in support of the motion for rehearing. The trial court may, within its sound discretion, consider anew a suppression motion previously denied. Chastain v. State, 158 Ga.App. 654, 655, 281 S.E.2d 627. See also, Martin v. State, 201 Ga.App. 716, 717(1), 411 S.E.2d 910 and Martinez-Rodriguez v. State, 195 Ga.App. 491, 493(4), 393 S.E.2d 748. While previous Georgia cases have involved primarily the introduction of additional evidence relevant to the issues raised under a motion to suppress evidence, the holding in Chastain should not be narrowly confined to any particular circumstances. It is clear from the federal authority underlying Chastain, that the goal is to secure the ends of justice, and that to this end the trial court will not err in exploring whether intervening matters, whatever they may be, have cast doubt on previous rulings on the issue of suppression.
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering factual findings from the written record which were inconsistent with those implicit in the previous ruling on the motion to suppress evidence. Indeed, similar circumstances were examined and approved in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 which is cited and followed in Chastain.
Relying upon our decision in Cook v. State, 141 Ga.App. 241, 233 S.E.2d 60, the State contends that the trial court erred in rehearing defendant's motion to suppress evidence without vacating the previous order denying the motion to suppress evidence. However, we fail to see any manner in which the Cook decision is relevant to the case sub judice. We do not agree that this case presents the "reverse situation" of that found in Cook, and conclude that this contention is without merit. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in reconsidering defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
2. The State's remaining enumeration of error contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. While the State argues that defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the car he was driving, we find this assertion to be without merit. The uncontroverted evidence is that the vehicle had been entrusted to defendant by its owner; he was the sole occupant and driver; and defendant had personalty in the vehicle. State v. Combs, 191 Ga.App. 625(1), 382 S.E.2d 691; Pupo v. State, 187 Ga.App. 765, 767(5), 371 S.E.2d 219.
The State's evidence was that defendant was stopped by State Trooper Bennett, who observed the vehicle driven by defendant to be traveling on the yellow line on the left side of the northbound lane of an interstate highway. The trooper testified that defendant then changed to the right lane without giving a signal and then crossed the white line on...
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