State v. Mares

• Docket Number: S-1-SC-38948
• Decision Date: 22 December 2023
• Parties: STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE M. MARES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

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STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE M. MARES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. S-1-SC-38948

Supreme Court of New Mexico

December 22, 2023

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23-112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

CERTIFICATION FROM THE NEW MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS John Dean Jr., District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Luz C. Valverde Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

OPINION

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

{¶1} Defendant Eddie Mares signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police after he requested an attorney at his felony first appearance, after he was appointed an attorney, and even after his appointed attorney advised him not to speak to police. In this case, we determine that the police did not violate Defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by interviewing him. As the United States Supreme Court made clear in Montejo v. Louisiana 556 U.S. 778 (2009), police may initiate contact with a represented defendant and seek to obtain the defendant's statement and waiver of counsel outside the presence of counsel. This is the rule even when the defendant previously asserted the right to counsel in open court, id. at 797, and even when the defendant does not consult with counsel about the wisdom of waiver before deciding to waive, id. at 786. Under Montejo, "the decision to waive [the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] need not itself be counseled. And when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick." Id. (citation omitted).

{¶2} We consider the question on certification from the Court of Appeals, which perceived an apparent conflict between this Court's prior precedent construing the Sixth Amendment and the later-decided rule in Montejo. Order of Certification to the New Mexico Supreme Court, State v. Mares, A-1-CA-37950 (N.M. Ct. App. June 4, 2021); see also NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (1972) (allowing the Court of Appeals to certify to this Court "a significant question of [constitutional] law" or "an issue of substantial public interest"). In addition to resolving the substantive Sixth Amendment issue, we take this opportunity to clarify the parameters for certification from the Court of Appeals under Section 34-5-14(C). We hold that the Court of Appeals should certify an issue when it appears that our precedent directly controls that issue and is contrary to later United States Supreme Court precedent. We further clarify that we accept certification of issues rather than cases, thus abrogating Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶ 46 n.10, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40, and Rhein v. ADT Automotive, 1996-NMSC-066, ¶ 2, 122 N.M. 646, 930 P.2d 783. {3} We recognize that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Montejo is controlling precedent under which Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, and to the extent that State v. Desnoyers, 2002-NMSC-031, 132 N.M. 756, 55 P.3d 968, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Forbes, 2005-NMSC-027, ¶ 6, 138 N.M. 264, 119 P.3d 144, conflicts with Montejo, Desnoyers is overruled. We do not reach the question of whether Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides greater protection because that question was not properly preserved. We remand the remaining issues raised by Defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

{¶4} At his first appearance on charges of criminal sexual penetration of a minor, Defendant requested counsel to assist in his defense, and the court appointed counsel. Counsel advised Defendant not to speak with anyone about the case, including police. The following day, notwithstanding the fact that Defendant was represented by counsel, police interviewed Defendant in jail.

1. The interview

{¶5} At the start of the interview, police stated multiple times that they "want[ed] to hear [Defendant's] side of the story" and implied that if they knew his side of the story, they could help Defendant counter media and social media narratives about Defendant's guilt. They invited Defendant to ask his own questions, because "[i]nformation goes both ways." Defendant asked why police had put his information in the news and on social media, and stated that he had already lost his job and his house due to the charges against him. The police offered to answer his questions once Defendant waived his Miranda rights, stating:

We can talk about all that, okay? I apologize that it put you in a bad spot. That's never my intent, okay? Um, but to start off, since you're here in jail, we do have to go over your rights, okay? And you've heard them before. You do have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you. You have the right to a lawyer, and if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided by, for free. By signing this, you're saying you understand these rights and voluntarily waive them, will answer questions. Um, that being said, if you sign this, you have the right to not talk to us at any point in time. So if you become uncomfortable or whatever, then just bring it up and you can stop talking to us. Does that make sense?

{¶6} Defendant signed the waiver. Defendant then told police that counsel "told me not to, not to even actually talk to you guys, period. . . . [T]hat's their advice, like don't talk to anybody besides us. . . . But like I said, I have nothing to hide." The police downplayed counsel's advice, stating, "[t]hey always say that. They always say that though anyway. That they know something that's in your benefit to talk to us. Like the lawyers that say, 'Don't talk to cops!' Like oh, sometimes they want to hear your side of the story."

{¶7} Subsequently, Defendant made several statements that could be construed as incriminating. When confronted with the victim's story, Defendant responded, "I don't know. I mean, okay. I mean if it happened, I mean it happened. But from my thoughts, I didn't touch her." Defendant agreed with an officer's suggestion that it was "possible" that Defendant could not remember some of the night's events because he had too much to drink. When police asked whether Defendant had penetrated the victim with "just fingers rather than full on," Defendant replied, "[t]o be honest, I cannot tell you exactly. I couldn't tell you exactly. And to be honest, this conversation does make me uncomfortable because that is my daughter, and it's uncomfortable." An officer replied, "[t]here's no way around it being uncomfortable. But we gotta talk about it at the same time. I guess we're kind of stuck here, trying to figure it out together."

{¶8}At one point, police told Defendant that "we're here to help you." Defendant stated, "Everything in my brain right now is telling me that I shouldn't be talking to you," to which police replied, "And that's the strong thing, don't ever talk to the cops. Man, like you say. . . [y]our side of the story needs to get out there, dude." Another officer stated, "People get so messed up, like, 'oh shit. [M]aybe I shouldn't talk to the po,'" but, "[your] situation [is] not going to get any worse" by talking to police because, "the charges are already filed. . . . You're not going to have more charges. No, that's not the case. We're just here to find out what happened and to get the truth out."

2. District court proceedings

{¶9}The State filed a motion to admit Defendant's statements to police. The State argued that the police interview did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel pursuant to Montejo. Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the statements, arguing in relevant part that Montejo did not control this case because it was factually distinguishable.

{¶10} Prior to the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the following timeline of events: (1) the criminal complaint was filed on May 19, 2017; (2) one month later, on June 18, Defendant was arrested; (3) the following day, June 19, Defendant applied for a public defender, the district court ordered the appointment of counsel, Defendant met with an attorney from the public defender's office, and that attorney instructed Defendant not to speak with anyone; (4) the following day, June 20, police spoke to Defendant in jail.

{¶11} The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress and granted the State's motion to admit Defendant's statements. The district court concluded that "[u]nder the federal constitution, this issue is controlled by Montejo" and "Defendant has not presented to the court any argument or law that the New Mexico state constitution would provide greater protection than the federal constitution."

{¶12} The jury convicted Defendant on two counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor. The district court sentenced Defendant to thirty years in prison.

3. Defendant's appeal

{¶13} Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that (1) police interviewed him in violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment because Defendant asserted his right to counsel at his first appearance and was represented by counsel at the time of the interview and (2) the district court improperly denied the jury's request to review transcripts of Defendant...