State v. Marinski
| Decision Date | 22 April 1942 |
| Docket Number | 28983. |
| Citation | 139 Ohio St. 559,41 N.E.2d 387 |
| Parties | STATE v. MARINSKI. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
When a defendant in a criminal case is permitted to introduce evidence of his life history, he waives the protection of Section 1639-30, General Code, and may be cross-examined with reference to the disposition of any charge preferred against him as a juvenile.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Lucas County.
In the Court of Common Pleas the defendant, Harry Marinski twenty years of age, was convicted of the offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent under Section 12619, General Code.
Upon an appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was reversed and the case was remanded for retrial for the following reasons:
'1. Said court erred in the admission over objection of said Harry Marinski of testimony as to his commitment for juvenile delinquency to the Boy's Industrial School, and
The case is in this court for review by reason of the allowance of the state's motion for leave to appeal.
Thomas J. O'Connor, Pros. Atty., and John H. Morgan, both of Toledo, for appellant.
Jesse S. Heslip, of Toledo, for appellee.
The Court of Appeals based its first finding of error upon the provisions of Section 1639-30, General Code, which read in part as follows: 'The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court, nor shall such disposition or evidence operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service examination, appointment or application.'
For some reason not disclosed by the record the trial court permitted the defendant upon his own insistence and over the prosecuting attorney's objection to testify as to where and how he had spent the previous years of his life. In his narration of the schools he had attended and the places he had been employed, the defendant neglected to mention his incarceration at the Boys' Industrial School. Then upon cross-examination the prosecuting attorney was permitted to inquire as to this part of the defendant's history. This the Court of Appeals held, was in violation of the foregoing provisions of Section 1639-30, General Code, and therefore erroneous.
That this is a salutary statute properly designed to afford some measure of protection from the indiscretions of youth is beyond cavil. However, it is a vastly different matter to permit an interpretation that would enable a defendant to employ the statute for the purpose of deception and to accomplish a miscarriage of justice. After all, a trial before a judicial tribunal is primarily a truth-determining process, and if it in any sense loses its character as such, it becomes the veriest sort of a mockery. It must be remembered that it was this defendant himself who not only offered to tell but insisted upon narrating the story of his previous years. To place himself in a favorable light before the court and jury it was necessary for him to tell but part of his history and conceal the remainder. This he did. When this challenge confronted the court and the prosecuting attorney, did this statute render them impotent in their duty to reveal the truth? The participating members of this court are unanimously of the opinion that it did not. The cross-examination was proper.
The defendant relies upon the decision of this court in the case of Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E. 473. However, a study of the facts therein discloses circumstances at variance with those in the instant case. There the defendant himself offered no such evidence; the state presented it. Here it was offered by the defendant over the state's objection. In that case the defendant was therefore entitled to the protection of the statute.
The second claim of error involves the charge of the trial court to the jury with reference to the element of purpose. Section 12619, General Code, reads in part as follows: 'Whoever steals any motor...
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State v. Duncan
...to limit the record. Nonetheless, Duncan argues that his testimony did not "open the door" to his juvenile adjudications pursuant to Marinski. We {¶ 53} Duncan testified about his life history, including his current pursuit of becoming a hip-hop artist, and his past endeavors including bein......
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State v. Rodriguez, 4094
...the State could rebut this with evidence of a juvenile record. State v. Ralls, 213 Kan. 249, 515 P.2d 1205 (1973); State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942). A defendant may not use the confidentiality of juvenile records statute for deception. Marinski, supra. Here defense ......
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State v. Bentley
...process, and if it in any sense loses its character as such, it becomes the veriest sort of a mockery." State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 560, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942).{¶ 26} Regarding the filing delay, Bentley explained that, after he received C.B.'s letters in 2010 and 2011, he was unable ......
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State v. Collins, 48560
...that the stay at Eldora must have been recent which the majority here reads into State v. Wasson, supra. In State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Weygandt, C. J.), defendant at one time was sent because of juvenile delinquency to the Boys' Industrial School. A statute, Ge......