State v. Mark T.
| Decision Date | 27 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | AC 40439 |
| Citation | 199 A.3d 35,186 Conn.App. 285 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. MARK T. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Robert L. O'Brien, Hartford, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was William A. Adsit, North Haven, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and, on the brief, Sarah E. Steere, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Keller, Bright and Pellegrino, Js.
The defendant, Mark T., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding relevant evidence, and thereby violated his constitutional right (1) to present a defense and (2) to testify in his own defense. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant, who was thirty-five years of age, had maintained custody of his biological daughter, the victim, for hardly three weeks at the time of the incident. The victim was thirteen, in the eighth grade, and enrolled in an intensive behavioral support class for children who were prone to disruptive behavior. At home, the defendant had significant difficulty maintaining control of the victim. He therefore arranged for the victim to participate in independent after-school counseling at a local mental health facility.
On the morning of September 9, 2015, the defendant arrived at the victim's school to take her to her scheduled appointment at the mental health facility. The front office secretary contacted the victim's classroom to inform Monika Wilkos, the victim's special education teacher, that the defendant had arrived in the main office to pick up the victim. As the victim was gathering her belongings in the classroom, she protested in front of Wilkos, stating that she did not want to go with the defendant. Wilkos asked the victim to accompany her to the front office, and while en route, the defendant approached the victim and Wilkos in the hallway.
After a number of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the victim to come with him, the defendant attempted to pick her up and carry her. When the victim resisted, a tussle ensued, and the defendant dragged the victim by one leg through the school corridors toward the exit. School personnel called the police. By the time police arrived, the defendant had dragged the victim through the front office and into the foyer. When he saw the police, the defendant released the victim. The police interviewed the defendant and school staff, but took no further actions.
The following day, both the school psychologist and the school nurse spoke to the victim regarding the incident. During the interviews, they both noticed bruising on the victim's body and subsequently reported the incident to the Department of Children and Families (department). A police officer assigned to the school district investigated the incident and, thereafter, an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant. After learning of the arrest warrant, the defendant turned himself in to the police without incident.
The operative information charged the defendant with one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) and one count of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (1). During multiple pretrial hearings, the defendant insisted on representing himself despite the court's many warnings about the dangers of self-representation.1 The defendant refused court-appointed counsel, but the court ultimately assigned the defendant standby counsel in accordance with Practice Book § 44-4.
Before trial, the state filed, among other things, a motion in limine requesting that the name, address, and any other identifying information pertaining to the victim be kept confidential pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86e. The victim's guardian ad litem also argued in favor of the motion, underscoring the harmful impact that disclosure of sensitive facts could have on the victim. The defendant objected, claiming that details of his relationship with the victim were necessary to demonstrate his urgent need to get help for the victim. The court granted the motion in part and ordered that only the victim's first initial be used in the record and at trial. The court also ordered that the defendant's pretrial motions containing the name of the victim and the name of the program that the defendant was planning to take her to be placed under seal for the purposes of the record. The court further ordered that it would rule on the admissibility of other facts as they arose at trial.
On September 19, 2016, following a three day jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of risk of injury to a child, but not guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree. On April 4, 2017, the court imposed a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, execution suspended, with three years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant's appeal is predicated on his contention that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right (1) to present a defense and (2) to testify in his own defense in violation of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution.2 Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred when it excluded evidence relevant to his theory of defense of parental justification by limiting his inquiry with respect to the victim's violent behavior toward others at school. He further claims that when he testified in his own defense, the trial court unconstitutionally limited his testimony with respect to his struggles with the victim's behavior, and her history of extreme and physical opposition. He argues that because the jury did not hear this evidence, it was unable to fully understand the urgent need to get the victim mental health treatment. The state argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited certain aspects of the defendant's testimony. Specifically, the state argues that the trial court gave the defendant wide latitude with respect to his presentation of evidence and did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence that was beyond the scope of redirect examination or of a collateral nature. In other words, the state argues that the defendant's claims are not of a constitutional nature but, rather, are evidentiary. As an initial matter, we agree with the state that the defendant's claims are not of a constitutional magnitude and, instead, are evidentiary in nature.
"Regardless of how the defendant has framed the issue, he cannot clothe an ordinary evidentiary issue in constitutional garb to obtain [a more favorable standard of] review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Warren , 83 Conn. App. 446, 452, 850 A.2d 1086, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 907, 859 A.2d 567 (2004). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosario , 99 Conn. App. 92, 99 n.6, 912 A.2d 1064, cert. denied, 281 Conn. 925, 918 A.2d 276 (2007).
Furthermore, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holley , 327 Conn. 576, 594, 175 A.3d 514 (2018). Moreover, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos , 182 Conn. App. 604, 614–15, 190 A.3d 892, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 917, 193 A.3d 1213 (2018). Accordingly, we review the defendant's claims under the abuse of discretion standard.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly precluded testimony regarding the victim's violent disposition, which bore on whether the defendant used a reasonable amount of force when he attempted to remove the victim from school. Specifically, he argues that the court erred when it precluded questions posed to Wilkos with respect to whether the victim had been violent with others at school. The defendant argues that his questions were not beyond the scope of the redirect examination because Wilkos experienced the victim's misbehavior firsthand and, in her response to the state's redirect examination, raised the issue of physical altercations between children and school officials. We disagree.
The following facts are relevant to the disposition of this claim. At trial, during the state's presentation of evidence, the victim's special education teacher, Wilkos, testified about the nature of the school's intensive behavioral education program, which she described as a ...
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