State v. Marquez

• Decision Date: 30 June 2016
• Docket Number: Opinion Number: NO. S–1–SC–34418
• Citation: 376 P.3d 815,2016 NMSC 025
• Parties: State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Eric Marquez, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

376 P.3d 815

2016 NMSC 025

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Eric Marquez, Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion Number: NO. S–1–SC–34418

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: June 30, 2016

Bennet J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, William A. O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Defendant–Appellant.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} In this case we again address whether shooting at or from a motor vehicle can serve as a predicate for felony murder. We recognize that the collateral-felony rule has generated confusion and hope to clarify its application in this opinion. Following trial, the jury found Defendant Eric Marquez guilty of first-degree felony murder contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–2–1(A)(2) (1994), and shooting from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–3–8(B) (1993). The underlying felony supporting Defendant's felony murder conviction was the felony of shooting from a motor vehicle. To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the district court vacated Defendant's conviction of shooting from a motor vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment followed by a minimum period of five years of parole supervision. In his direct appeal, Defendant claims that: (1) shooting at a motor vehicle cannot serve as a predicate felony in the context of a felony murder conviction; (2) the court erred in precluding evidence of drive-by shootings at Defendant's home before 2010; (3) the jury instructions on felony murder and self-defense failed to instruct on the essential elements that Defendant did not act in self-defense or with sufficient provocation; and (4) admission of the Medical Investigator's testimony violated Defendant's confrontation rights.

{2} We hold that the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge and vacate Defendant's felony murder conviction. We reject Defendant's second, third, and fourth claims. We remand to the district court for entry of an amended judgment reinstating his conviction for shooting from a motor vehicle.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{3} On March 10, 2011, J.T. Melendrez, with his girlfriend Angel Ortega in the passenger seat of his car, drove to a gas pump at a local convenience store and parked his car. While Melendrez carried a gun on some occasions, he left the weapon in the car at Ortega's urging. Melendrez got out of his car and walked toward the store. Suddenly, Defendant drove into the convenience store parking lot, yelling from his truck. Defendant shot the unarmed Melendrez once from inside his vehicle and twice after exiting his vehicle, while yelling “[t]hat's what you fucking get. You shouldn't have fucking went past my house, stupid bitch.”

{4} Ortega ran to Defendant and confronted him. She told Defendant that “it wasn't [Melendrez's] fault” because Melendrez had just been picking up Ortega. Defendant said “[t]hat's what he fucking gets for passing by my house.” Defendant then got in his car and drove away. As he drove toward his home, Defendant called 911 to report what he had done.

{5} Las Cruces Police Department Agent Gabriel Arenibas was working that evening and was directed to Defendant's home by dispatch. When Arenibas arrived at Defendant's address, Defendant was outside and talking on his cellular telephone. Defendant got down on the ground as soon as he saw Arenibas. Defendant was “emotional,” but Arenibas was able to detain him. Other officers responded and Arenibas walked Defendant to the back seat of a marked patrol car. Defendant told Arenibas that he had “messed up his life to protect his family.”

{6} Detective Mark Meyers, also of the Las Cruces Police Department, was directed to respond to the scene of the shooting. But while he was on his way he learned that Defendant had been apprehended, and Meyers instead went to the police station to meet with Defendant. Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with Detective Meyers. Defendant admitted to shooting Melendrez.

{7} Defendant told police that he had been eating with his wife at a Subway earlier that evening. While at the Subway, Defendant received a call from a neighbor who said that Melendrez was driving around Defendant's home. Defendant claimed to have been worried because he believed that Melendrez had been involved in drive-by shootings at Defendant's home in the past. Defendant thus wanted to go home and check on his property.

{8} Defendant said that while he was on his way home he saw Melendrez's truck at a convenience store. Defendant explained that he decided to stop and tell Melendrez to leave his family and his home alone. Defendant claimed that before he got out of his own car Melendrez “made a move” as if to pull a gun from his waistband. And from inside of his own car, Defendant responded by shooting Melendrez with a shotgun. Defendant then got out of his car and shot Melendrez again. Defendant acknowledged that he could have simply driven past the convenience store or driven away without shooting Melendrez. But, Defendant explained, he did not do that because he wanted to tell Melendrez to leave him alone.

{9} Chief Medical Investigator Dr. Ross Zumwalt assisted in the autopsy of Melendrez's body. Melendrez had sustained one gunshot wound to his chest and one to his abdomen. Dr. Zumwalt determined that these two gunshot wounds caused Melendrez's death, and that the manner of death was homicide.

{10} The jury convicted Defendant of first-degree felony murder contrary to Section 30–2–1(A)(2), and shooting at or from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm contrary to Section 30–3–8(B). To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the district court vacated Defendant's conviction of shooting from a motor vehicle. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment followed by a minimum period of five years of parole supervision. Defendant appealed directly to this Court. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“Appeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court.”). Rule 12–102(A)(1) NMRA. In his direct appeal, Defendant claims that: (1) shooting at a motor vehicle cannot serve as a predicate felony in the context of a felony murder conviction; (2) the court erred in precluding evidence of drive-by shootings at Defendant's home before 2010; (3) the jury instructions on felony murder and self-defense failed to instruct on the essential elements that Defendant did not act in self-defense or with sufficient provocation; and (4) admission of the medical investigator's testimony violated Defendant's confrontation rights.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Shooting from a motor vehicle was improperly used as a predicate for felony murder in this case

1. Introduction and standard of review

{11} The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder and shooting from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm. Defendant argues that the Legislature did not intend to make shooting at or from a motor vehicle a predicate felony for purposes of felony murder and that we should thus reverse his conviction of felony murder. More specifically, Defendant contends that shooting at or from a motor vehicle is in essence a crime of assault or battery and is not independent of or collateral to a murder committed during the course of the shooting. In response, the State argues that shooting at or from a vehicle should uniformly be treated as a collateral felony because, unlike aggravated battery, it is “a crime which itself carries a high degree of risk to people other than the murder victim.”

{12} Defendant's arguments raise questions of law, which we review de novo. State v. Rowell , 1995–NMSC–079, ¶ 8, 121 N.M. 111, 908 P.2d 1379. The fundamental principle of any attempt at statutory interpretation is to further the legislative intent and purposes underlying the statute. See Sec. Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't , 1988–NMCA–068, ¶ 6, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306. “In construing a statute, our charge is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent.” Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n , 2009–NMSC–013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135.

2. New Mexico's felony murder rule

{13} There are three types of first-degree murder in New Mexico: (1) willful and deliberate killings; (2) killings committed “in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony,” so-called felony murder; and (3) killings committed by an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others so as to indicate a depraved mind. Section 30–2–1(A). To obtain a conviction of felony murder, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony, which was either a first-degree felony or was committed under circumstances or in a manner dangerous to human life, that the defendant caused the death of the victim during the commission or attempted commission of the felony, and that the defendant intended to kill or knew that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. See UJI 14–202 NMRA.

{14} This Court has examined the felony murder doctrine on numerous occasions, and we have repeatedly emphasized that the Legislature intended to limit the application of this crime. See Campos v. Bravo , 2007–NMSC–021, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 846 ; State v. Campos , 1996–NMSC–043, ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 ; State v. Ortega , 1991–NMSC–084, ¶¶ 14–15, 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Frazier , 2007–NMSC–032, ¶ 1, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 ; State v. Harrison , 1977–NMSC–038, ¶¶ 12–14, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321, superseded by rule on other grounds by Tafoya v. Baca , 1985–NMSC–067, ¶ 17, 103 N.M. 56, 702 P.2d 1001. Among the many limitations we have...