State v. Marsh, 26

Decision Date11 October 1977
Docket NumberNo. 26,26
Citation237 S.E.2d 745,293 N.C. 353
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Emmett L. MARSH.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Associate Atty. Daniel C. Oakley, Raleigh, for the State.

William H. Helms, Monroe, for defendant.

BRANCH, Justice.

The single question presented by this appeal is whether the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense.

The trial judge must charge the jury on all substantial and essential features of a case which arise upon the evidence, even when, as here, there is no special request for the instruction. State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328. State v. Todd, 264 N.C. 524, 142 S.E.2d 154. Unquestionably, self-defense may become a substantial and essential feature of a criminal case, and when there is evidence from which it may be inferred that a defendant acted in self-defense, he is entitled to have this evidence considered by the jury under proper instruction from the court. State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 203 S.E.2d 830. State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 148 S.E.2d 279. State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769.

The right to act in self-defense rests upon necessity, real or apparent, and a person may use such force as is necessary or apparently necessary to save himself from death or great bodily harm in the lawful exercise of his right of self-defense. A person may exercise such force if he believes it to be necessary and has reasonable grounds for such belief. The reasonableness of his belief is to be determined by the jury from the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the accused at the time. State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184 S.E.2d 249. State v. Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E.2d 24. However, the right of self-defense is only available to a person who is without fault, and if a person voluntarily, that is aggressively and willingly, enters into a fight, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense unless he first abandons the fight, withdraws from it and gives notice to his adversary that he has done so. State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 504, 196 S.E.2d 750. State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 252, 179 S.E.2d 429, State v. Davis, 225 N.C. 117, 33 S.E.2d 623.

Decision of this appeal turns upon the question of whether there is evidence from which the jury might infer that defendant acted in self-defense. We think there was such evidence.

The witness Bonnie Duncan testified:

. . . I saw Emmett Marsh on the morning of April 8 of this year around Mr. Bivins' Exxon station. He was at the station prior to the time that I got there. As I...

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50 cases
  • State v. Herbin
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • November 6, 1979
    ...determined by the jury from the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time of the killing. State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353, 237 S.E.2d 745 (1977); State v. Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E.2d 24 Elsewhere in his charge, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: "No......
  • State v. Harper
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
    • June 21, 2011
    ...infer that he acted in self-defense." State v. Allred, 129 N.C. App. 232, 235, 498 S.E.2dPage 12204, 206 (1998) (citing State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353, 354, 237 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1977)). In determining whether an instruction on self-defense is warranted, the facts are viewed in the light most ......
  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • January 8, 1980
    ...... State v. Herbin, supra; State v. Spaulding, supra; State v. Clay, supra; State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353, 237 S.E.2d 745 (1977); State v. Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E.2d 24 (1968); State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 28 S.E.2d 519 (1944). ......
  • State v. Juarez, COA15–152.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
    • October 6, 2015
    ...unless he first abandons the fight, withdraws from it and gives notice to his adversary that he has done so." State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353, 354, 237 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1977). Although our courts have not explicitly defined an "initial aggressor," we have held that withdrawing from conflict is......
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