State v. Marshall, 19600
| Decision Date | 28 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 19600,19600 |
| Citation | 195 S.E.2d 709,260 S.C. 323 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Earl Clyde MARSHALL, Appellant. |
Ernest B. Hinnant and Hugh L. Willcox, Jr., Florence, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and Robert M. Ariail, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant, indicted for murder, was convicted in the Court of General Sessions for Florence County of manslaughter and received a sentence of nine (9) years. He was indigent and three attorneys were appointed to represent him, one of whom had less than five years experience as an attorney and the others with more than five. At his arraignment, only the attorney with less than five years experience was present. Upon the call of the case for trial, with all of the appointed attorneys present, motions were made for a continuance and refused. Reversal of the conviction is sought upon the grounds (1) that appellant was not properly represented at his arraignment, since he was represented at the time only by an attorney with less than five years experience; and (2) that his motion for a continuance should have been granted.
Appellant contends that the failure of the court to provide him with an attorney as his arraignment, who had five or more years experience, deprived him of the right to counsel which the law required. This contention is based upon Section 17--507 of the 1962 Code of Laws, which provides that where counsel is appointed for an accused in a capital case, one of the counsel 'shall have a minimum of five years of practice before the bar.'
There is no contention that counsel who appeared with appellant at his arraignment was incompetent, nor is there any showing that appellant was not competently represented at the time. When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty; and there is no intimation that he would have entered any different plea if his other counsel had been present. While it is stated that if counsel with more than five years experience had been present they 'could have made some motions perhaps that would have been granted,' the record is devoid of any fact or circumstances showing that any motions could or would have been made, other than those which were made and entertained by the court. The mere fact that appellant was represented at his arraignment by counsel of less than five years experience did not deprive him of any right afforded under the foregoing statute, in the absence of prejudice therefrom; and the record contains no such showing of prejudice.
The remaining exceptions charge error in the refusal of the motion for a continuance. The motion was made upon the grounds that there had not been...
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...writs but they were never produced. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for a continuance. State v. Marshall, 260 S.C. 323, 195 S.E.2d 709 (1973). Appellant's discovery motion was refused because he would not comply with Standing Order 75-2 of the Greenville Count......