State v. Marston
| Decision Date | 08 May 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 56676,No. 1,56676,1 |
| Citation | 479 S.W.2d 481 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeanetta Yvonne MARSTON, Appellant. April, 10, 1972. Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court en Banc Denied |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Charles B. Blackmar, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, for respondent.
J. Arnot Hill, Hill & McMullin, Kansas City, for appellant.
Appellant, Jeanetta Yvonne Marston, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was found guilty of Murder in the , first Degree, a felony, by a jury which assessed her punishment at life imprisonment, the State having waived the death penalty, and from the judgment entered on said verdict the defendant appeals. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3, Const. of Mo.1945, V.A.M.S., as amended 1970.
The sole point raised on this appeal is that the Court erred in giving Instruction No. 3, the verdict-directing instruction on the crime of murder in the first degree, for the reason that said instruction did not require the jury to find that the homicide had been committed by the defendant wilfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly.
The Information charging defendant with Murder in the First Degree alleged that on November 26, 1970 defendant 'did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously, premeditatedly and deliberately and of her malice aforethought, make an assault in and upon one Guy C. Robbins with a dangerous and deadly weapon, to-wit: .38 calibre revolver loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls, then and there inflicting upon the said Gyy (sic) C. Robbins a mortal wound. . . .' The information charged the crime in the classical sense, that is, it was not brought under the felony murder rule.
Instruction No. 3, of which defendant complains was as follows:
'If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
'First, that on the 26th day of November, 1970, in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant caused the death of Guy C. Robbins by shooting him, and
'Second, that the defendant intended to take the life of Guy C. Robbins, and 'Third, that the defendant considered taking the life of Guy C. Robbins and reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before shooting him, then you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
'However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the foregoing, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.
'In determining whether the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you must consider other instructions herein submitting whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.
'If you do find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you will fix her punishment at imprisonment by the Department of Corrections during her natural life.'
It must first be recognized that the phraseology of the foregoing instruction is a substantial departure from the rather stilted phraseology used in the past in criminal cases. This instruction has been recommended by the Committee of the Missouri Bar on Criminal Pattern Instructions. Neither this instruction nor any other instruction so recommended has been either approved or disapproved by this Court. We must therefore consider the validity of the instruction as given without regard to its source. Nevertheless, we do acknowledge and appreciate the work done by the Missouri Bar Committee on Criminal Pattern Instructions.
It is obvious that the words willful, deliberate, and premeditated are not used in the instruction. Did the failure to utilize these words permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree without regard to the essential elements of that crime set forth in § 559.010, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.? The answer is 'no'.
Sec. 559.010, supra, provides: 'Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and every homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the first degree.'
The function of instructions is to transmit to the jury those legal propositions which the law requires to be satisfied before the jury can return a verdict. Numerous reported cases make it clear that whenever the statutory language of 'willful, deliberate or premeditated' is utilized in an instruction it is desirable, if not necessary, for the court to define those terms in order that members of the jury will not employ their own private definitions of these words, and thereby misunderstand the instruction and the very nature of the elements of the crime submitted in the instruction. The function of the definition instructions is therefore to center the attention of the jury on the legal definition of the words in order that the jury can determine, under the evidence, whether the defendant is guilty of the offense submitted.
The instruction in the instant case substituted the definition of the words 'willful, deliberate and premeditated' for the words themselves, and therefore if the language of the instruction correctly set forth the definitions of the statutory elements, the statutory elements have not in any sense been ignored, but to the contrary have been preserved in the instruction.
Re: 'Willfully'. 'Willful' is a word that appears in § 559.010, supra, which sets forth the elements of Murder in the First Degree and it is therefore necessary that the homicide be committed willfully in order for the offense to be murder in the first degree. In previous cases the courts generally used the word 'willful' as part of the instruction submitting murder in the first or second degree, and then defined 'willful' as meaning intentionally, and not accidentally State v....
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State v. Turner
...is performed with "a cool and deliberate state of mind." State v. Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo.banc 1980); State v. Marston, 479 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Mo.1972). In this connection, it is worthy of mention that direct proof of the required mental state is seldom available and such intent i......
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State v. Roberts
...director provided an adequate submission of the required findings under the law, understandable to an average juror. State v. Marston, 479 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Mo.1972). As previously noted, under the general rule if an accomplice has a purpose to promote an offense, he may be found to have the......
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State v. Smart
...That committee's suggested form of instruction for murder in the first degree was recently found sufficient by this court in State v. Marston, Mo., 479 S.W.2d 481, decided April 10, 1972. The attack in that case was similar to that here made, i.e., that the instruction failed to use termino......
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State v. Garrette
...The word "willfully," in defining a criminal offense, has been held to mean "intentionally" or "knowingly." State v. Marston, 479 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Mo.1972); State v. Foster, 355 Mo. 577, 197 S.W.2d 313, 321 (1946). Said another way, the term "willful" as used in criminal statutes simply mea......