State v. Martha Woolley

• Decision Date: 04 May 1937
• Parties: STATE v. MARTHA WOOLLEY
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

192 A. 1

109 Vt. 53

STATE v. MARTHA WOOLLEY

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 4, 1937

February Term, 1937.

Perjury---Testimony Sufficient to Sustain Conviction---Of One Uncorroborated Witness Insufficient---Circumstantial and Direct Evidence---Measure of Proof---P. L. 1234, Application of Common Law Rules---Perjury Provable By Circumstantial Evidence---Technical Rules---Proof of Previous Inconsistent Statements---Consideration of Evidence on Motion for Directed Verdict---Denial of Motion Without Error---Objection to Admission of Evidence Too General---Previous Sworn Statement Admissible---Offer of Evidence Too General---Objection to Admission of Evidence Too Indefinite---Objection Not Stated to Trial Court---Objection to Argument Not Shown by Record---Previous Inconsistent Statements as Admissions.

1. The ancient rule which required, as a basis for a conviction of perjury, the testimony of two credible witnesses swearing directly to the falsity of the matter concerning which it was claimed that the accused was forsworn, has long since been relaxed, and it is now held that the testimony of one of such witnesses, corroborated by the testimony of another or by circumstances, is sufficient, if thereby the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained upon the testimony of one uncorroborated witness.

3. Sometimes circumstantial evidence is of such character as to be virtually positive and direct, and the line between direct and circumstantial evidence is at times most shadowy, so that evidence held to be direct by some courts is considered to be circumstantial by others.

4. In a prosecution for perjury it is incumbent upon the State to prove the falsity of the facts sworn to by the respondent by testimony equivalent at least to that of two credible unimpeached witnesses, and the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and by a preponderance of evidence over and above one credible witness to balance the defendant's oath at least fully equal to one credible, unimpeached witness.

5. Under the provisions of P. L. 1234 it is necessary to apply only such rules of common law as are applicable to our local situation and circumstances and not repugnant to the Constitution or laws.

6. Perjury may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

7. A prosecution for perjury ought not to be hedged about with technical rules which do not apply to prosecutions for other and quite as serious crimes.

8. Previous inconsistent statements by the respondent whether on oath or not, whether oral or written, are not alone sufficient to support a conviction of perjury, but are competent evidence in corroboration of the testimony of other witnesses.

9. In passing upon exception to denial of respondent's motion for directed verdict in prosecution for perjury, Supreme Court took evidence in light most favorable for the State and excluded effect of modifying evidence.

10. In prosecution for perjury arising out of respondent's testimony in a murder trial that she did not see accused knock her husband down and choke him, where State produced circumstantial evidence tending to show these facts were true and evidence of statements made by respondent corroborating them, and respondent did not deny truth of such statements but testified she did not remember the knocking down and choking and had no recollection of making the statements, it could not be said that there was no evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show respondent's guilt nor that jury, whose province it was to construe and weigh it, would not have been justified in finding her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so that denial of her motion for a directed verdict was without error.

11. A general objection to the admission of evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant and immaterial is not sufficiently explicit, unless it is apparent on the face of the question or offer that the evidence cannot be material or relevant in any state of the case.

12. Admission in perjury prosecution of respondent's sworn statements at an inquest, contradictory to alleged perjured testimony, excepted to as being irrelevant and immaterial held without error, the evidence being material and admissible in corroboration of other evidence in the case.

13. In prosecution for perjury, offer by respondent's counsel "of these fifty-eight pages of her testimony before the grand jury as bearing on any question of intent as bearing on the falsehood here," there being nothing in the transcript or exhibits to show the materiality of the offered evidence, held too general to be availing, since it was not sufficiently explicit to give the trial court to understand the materiality of the offered evidence and no relevant fact appeared to have been brought to the attention of the court so that no record was presented which caused error affirmatively to appear.

14. In such prosecution, objection to offer of transcript of respondent's testimony at trial when alleged perjury was committed on ground that it was not material or relevant to issue raised by information and not "admissible under the information filed and on trial here, for various reasons and under the status of the case as it now stands," held unavailing as too indefinite.

15. In such prosecution, objection to admission of such transcript, that it was error to admit it without limiting it to question of materiality of alleged perjured testimony, not stated in trial court and raised for first time in brief in Supreme Court, held not for consideration.

16. In such prosecution, claim that attorney general made improper use of such evidence in his argument was not for consideration where record failed to show what he said and no exception was taken to it.

17. In prosecution for perjury, instruction to jury referring to claimed statements by respondent, contradictory to alleged perjured testimony, as admissions and evidence of the facts, held without error, since statements were competent, corroborative evidence tending to show facts were otherwise than as respondent had sworn them to be.

INFORMATION for perjury. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the April Term, 1936, Windham County, Jeffords, J., presiding. Verdict of guilty and judgment thereon. The opinion states the case.

Exceptions overruled. Let execution be done.

Ernest W. Gilson, Jr., (A. Luke J. Crispe on the brief) for the respondent.

Ernest F. Berry, State's attorney, for the State.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, SHERBURNE and BUTTLES, JJ.

OPINION

MOULTON

This case comes here upon exceptions by the respondent following her conviction of the crime of perjury. It is alleged in the information that she swore falsely when a witness for the State at the trial of Howard Moody for the murder of her husband, Prosper Woolley, by testifying that she did not see Moody knock her husband down and did not see him choke him. Moody was acquitted of the charge of murder, but found guilty of an assault. The first question arises under the respondent's exception to the denial of her motion for a directed verdict, made at the close of all the evidence. The grounds for the motion might well have been stated with more particularity, but we think that it was sufficiently explicit to cause the court to understand the issue sought to be raised, which was the absence of the direct testimony of at least one credible witness, with corroboration, showing the falsity of the respondent's testimony. That the testimony was material to the issue in the Moody case is not denied.

The evidence upon which the State seeks to uphold the verdict tended to show the following facts: (1) That Moody and Woolley engaged in an altercation upon the porch of the latter's home, during which blows were struck. (2) That after Moody had left the scene, Woolley was found lying on the floor of the porch in a dying condition, although his death was not caused by asphyxiation or strangulation, but by heart failure brought on by excitement and physical exertion. (3) That he had certain abrasions and marks upon his head which might have been caused by blows of a fist, and other abrasions upon his arms and shoulders of a type which would be caused by striking or sliding against a hard surface. (4) That there was a discoloration on his neck, but no indentation, and a small internal hemorrhage in the neck muscle, which could have been caused by the hard pressure of a thumb. (5) That the respondent was the only other person in or about the house, and that she was, at least a part of the time, on the porch or where she could see the contestants through the window. (6) That, soon after the altercation, she stated to several witnesses who came to the house that Moody knocked her husband down and choked him, and, later on, said the same thing to the officers who came to interview her, and signed a written statement to that effect, and, still later, testified under oath, at the inquest, that Moody knocked him down, but did not, to her recollection, choke him.

The ancient rule which required, as a basis for a conviction of perjury, the testimony of two credible witnesses swearing directly to the falsity of the matter concerning which it was claimed that the accused was forsworn, and which, as Mr Wigmore tells us (Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), par. 2040), was a rule of the ecclesiastical law adopted by the common law upon the abolition of the Court of the Star Chamber and the transfer of its jurisdiction to the King's Bench, has long since been relaxed, and it is now held that the testimony of one such witness, corroborated by the testimony of another or by circumstances, is sufficient, if thereby the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Butland, 119 Mass. 317, 324;...