State v. Martin

• Decision Date: 18 December 1906
• Citation: 45 Wash. 76,87 P. 1054
• Parties: STATE ex rel. DILL et al. v. MARTIN.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

87 P. 1054

45 Wash. 76

STATE ex rel. DILL et al. v. MARTIN.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 18, 1906

Appeal from Superior Court, Chelan County; Miles Poindexter, Judge.

Proceeding by the state, on relation of John G. Dill and others, against C. Victor Martin, for disbarment. From a judgment of disbarment for three years, defendant appeals. Modified and affirmed.

John E. Humphries, George B. Cole, C. H. Neal and M. J. Cochran, for appellant.

William Grimshaw, A. N. Corbin, and Frank Reeves for respondent.

HADLEY, J.

This is a proceeding for the disbarment of C. Victor Martin, who has been regularly admitted as an attorney and counselor at law, and authorized to practice law before the courts of this state. The proceeding was instituted on the motion of members of the Bar Association of Chelan county, as relators or informers. Specific charges of unprofessional conduct were made and a hearing was had thereon in the superior court of Chelan county, the Honorable Miles Poindexter, a visiting judge of Spokane county, sitting at the hearing. The hearing resulted in a judgment of disbarment for the term of three years, and this appeal is from the judgment.

Appellant's first assignment of error is that the court overruled the demurrer to the specifications contained in the motion for disbarment. It is argued that the motion is insufficient to state a cause of action, or to give the court jurisdiction for the reason that the relators have no interest which enables them to prosecute an action of this kind. It is insisted that they cannot maintain this proceeding within the rule of In re Ault's Disbarment, 15 Wash. 417 46 P. 644. The real question decided in that cases was that the petitioner for the disbarment had no such interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding as made it an aggrieved party and such as entitled it to prosecute an appeal from a judgment refusing disbarment. It was also stated that, if the judgment had been against the attorney, he could have appealed, for the reason that he would have been an aggrieved party in interest, inasmuch as the judgment deprived him of the right to practice his profession. It was said in the opinion in that case: 'There can be but two parties in interest in a case of this kind outside of the respondent namely, the court and the public. The respondent is an officer of the court and the law provides a method by which the court can determine the fitness or unfitness of an attorney for that position, and no doubt the interests of the public can be protected by an action authorized by some one who represents the public, but the appellant in this case neither represents the court nor the public, and it can be of no interest to it who the attorneys of the court of the state of Washington are.' It was recognized by the above that a disbarment proceeding may be instituted by some one who represents the public or the court. The petitioner in that case was a corporation, and, as was said, it neither represented the public nor the court. The relators here are not only individual members of the public, but are also attorneys and officers of the court, and in a very true sense may be said to represent the court in so important a matter as that of bringing before it the question of misconduct of one of its own officers. The statute, section 4776, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., simply requires that such proceedings shall be instituted of the court's own motion or upon the information of another. It does not state that such other person shall necessarily have a financial interest in the matter, or an interest of such a nature as characterizes one as a party in interest in ordinary litigation, and we think it manifest that it was intended that a matter of this kind can be brought before the court upon the information of any individual, and particularly of one who sustains such an important relation to the court as that of an attorney and officer thereof. It is a common rule for such proceedings to be instituted as provided by our statute, namely, of the court's own motion, or upon the information of others. 4 Cyc. 913. Cases there cited show that the proceedings are frequently instituted by bar associations and attorneys. In the case of Fairfield County Bar ex rel. v. Taylor (Conn.) 22 A. 441, 13 L. R. A. 767, the court said: 'At the commencement of the hearing the committee who had made the charges proposed to offer evidence of their appointment as a committee of the bar, and for that purpose had the records of the bar in court, and so stated. The court ruled that such evidence was not required, but that the court would recognize the persons named, they being known to the court as members of the bar, as proper persons to prefer the charges, and to present the matter therein contained to the court. This ruling was objected to, and is the first reason of appeal. There is no force to the objection. While it would have been well enough, perhaps, to have received that record, it would have been wholly without significance. It was the duty of the attorneys, if they knew of unprofessional conduct by the appellant or any other attorney, to bring it to the attention of the court. An appointment by the bar to do that which it was their duty to do without any appointment could give them no added authority. Nor was any such appointment necessary to give the court jurisdiction. The court might summon the appellant to a hearing upon any information it had that it deemed worthy of credit, whether it came from lawyers or laymen.' The above-stated rule is both reasonable and wholesome, and is undoubtedly comprehended by our own statute. It was not even held in the case of In re Ault's Disbarment (Wash.) 46 P. 644, that the petitioner there could not have instituted the inquiry by bringing the matter before the court, but only that it was not an aggrieved party and could not appeal. No such question is now here.

It is further contended that it was error to overrule the demurrer, for the following reasons: It is said it was treated as a demurrer to the separate specifications of charges; that the latter were treated as separate causes of action; and that certain specifications amounted to charges of barratry within the statute. Session Laws of 1903, page 68, c. 56. It is urged that said statute is unconstitutional, and that the demurrer should have been sustained. In view of the whole case it seems to be unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the constitutionality of the barratry statute, a subject much discussed in the briefs. There are a number of specifications which in no sense relate to the barratry statute, and were, therefore, not challenged by the demurrer upon this ground. Evidence was introduced under these, and findings were made thereon. These, we think, are themselves determinative of the appeal, and it is therefore immaterial what view the trial court may have entertained as to the constitutionality of the barratry statute. We quote below from findings made by the court under specifications bearing the same numbers as the respective findings:

'Findings of fact as to specification 8. That in making the solicitations referred to in findings of facts as to specifications '6' and '7' the said defendant, C. Victor Martin, falsely and fraudulently represented to said Lucy F. Richardson that her attorney, W. J. Canton, who was then representing her in said action, desired the said C. Victor Martin to assist the said Canton, and had requested him to assist in defending the aforesaid action, the said Martin then and there well knowing that the said Canton had not made such a request, and did not desire him to assist in defending said action, such representations being made with the intent of inducing the said Lucy F. Richardson to employ him, the said Martin, to assist in defending for her in said action.

'Findings of fact as to apecification 9. Finds that on or about the 1st day of November, 1904, at Wilson Creek, Douglas County, Wash., the said C. Victor Martin, then and there being a duly admitted and practicing attorney, did personally solicit employment of one Lucy F. Richardson, to defend for her in the case of Richardson v. Richardson, hereinbefore referred to, and, as an inducement to said Lucy F. Richardson to employ him in said action, did represent to said Lucy F. Richardson that W. J. Canton, her attorney in said action, was grossly neglecting, and had neglected, his duty; that he was a drinking man; and that, if he was allowed to continue to handle said case as her said attorney without the assistance of said C. Victor Martin, it would probably be three years before said case would be settled up, but, if said Lucy F. Richardson would employ him, the said Martin, he would be able to get the suit settled up about December 15, 1904, said representations being then and there made with the intent of inducing the said Lucy F. Richardson to employ him, the said Martin, in said case, he, the said Martin, then and there well knowing that the said representations were untrue, the facts being that the said Martin had been informed prior to said November 1, 1904, that the decision had been rendered and was then being written by one of the judges of the Supreme Court, and that said opinion would probably be handed down about December 15, 1904, all of which said Martin fraudulently concealed from said Lucy F. Richardson.'

'Findings of fact as to specification 11. The court finds that he, the said C. Victor

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