State v. Martin

Decision Date13 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2010AP505–CR.,2010AP505–CR.
Citation2012 WI 96,343 Wis.2d 278,816 N.W.2d 270
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Randy L. MARTIN, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

343 Wis.2d 278
816 N.W.2d 270
2012 WI 96

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
Randy L. MARTIN, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner.

No. 2010AP505–CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 18, 2012.
Decided July 13, 2012.


[816 N.W.2d 273]


For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Byron C. Lichstein and Frank J. Remington Center, Madison, and oral argument by Byron C. Lichstein.

For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.

[816 N.W.2d 274]


MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.

[343 Wis.2d 284]¶ 1 We review an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 1 AFFIRMING THE MILWAUkee county circUit court'S judgmEnt of cOnviction against Randy L. Martin (“Martin”).2 The State charged him with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Wisconsin Statutes section 941.29(2),3 and one count of carrying a concealed[343 Wis.2d 285]weapon in violation of § 941.23.4 At trial, a jury found Martin guilty on both counts.

¶ 2 Two issues are presented for our consideration: 1) whether Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) required the suppression of Martin's statements taken at the scene, and 2) if it did require suppression, whether the erroneous admission of these statements was harmless.

¶ 3 Because Martin made incriminating statements while in police custody and while being subjected to interrogation by police officers, we conclude that he had a Fifth Amendment right to receive Miranda warnings. Accordingly, we hold that it was error to admit the incriminating statements at trial. Further, we hold that because the State has not met its burden of proving that it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error,” State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 49, 254 Wis.2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)), the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial.

I. FACTS

¶ 4 On November 14, 2008, Milwaukee Police Sergeant James Fidler (“Fidler”) 5 was traveling eastbound on West North Avenue in the City of Milwaukee, [343 Wis.2d 286]approaching a red light at the intersection of West North Avenue and North 49th Street. While Fidler was in the process of stopping, he observed a 2004 Hyundai Santa Fe sport utility vehicle (the “SUV”) with tinted rear windows directly in front of his squad car, as well as another vehicle (the “car”) in front of the SUV. Fidler observed Martin exit the SUV from the driver's side

[816 N.W.2d 275]

door, walk forward toward the car, and shout at the driver of the car. From his vantage point, Fidler could also see the driver of the car, who was shouting back at Martin through an open window of the car. As Martin moved toward the car, the other driver alighted from his vehicle, presumably to confront Martin.

¶ 5 As soon as the driver of the car exited his vehicle, he noticed Fidler, and chose to remain at the door of the car. Martin, however, who apparently did not see Fidler, continued to proceed toward the car. As Martin approached the car, Fidler observed Martin retrieve an object from his jacket pocket and point it at the driver of the car, and heard Martin say to the driver of the car “I have something, I've got something for you.” Fidler could not see the object Martin had retrieved from his jacket; however, when Martin produced that item from his pocket, the driver of the car motioned toward Fidler. As Fidler approached both drivers, Martin placed the item back in his pocket, and [343 Wis.2d 287]began to return to the SUV. Fidler immediately called Martin toward him, and placed him in handcuffs.

¶ 6 After placing Martin in handcuffs,6 Fidler searched Martin and found an expandable baton in his pocket. That baton was approximately six inches in length when collapsed, but was capable of expanding to a length of over 15 inches.

¶ 7 As Fidler was completing his search of Martin, Officers Hollis Smith (“Smith”) and Andrew Moutry (“Moutry”) approached the scene, heading westbound on West North Avenue in a second marked squad car. They noticed Fidler engaged with Martin, and stopped to assist Fidler.7 When Smith and Moutry approached Fidler to see if he needed assistance, he instructed them to search Martin's SUV.

¶ 8 At that point, Smith discovered Lee Roy Henry (“Henry”), a close childhood friend of Martin's,8 seated in the passenger seat of the SUV. After Henry exited the vehicle,9 Smith searched the SUV. While [343 Wis.2d 288]conducting that search, Smith discovered a loaded “High Standard” .22 caliber revolver (the “revolver”) concealed in a small pull-out tray under the passenger seat. Smith, who was not wearing gloves at the time of the search, removed the entire tray from the SUV with the revolver still inside, but did not touch the revolver. Smith described the revolver as unusual for two reasons: it was larger than most .22 calibers with which he was familiar, and it was capable of holding nine cartridges in its cylinder.10

[816 N.W.2d 276]

¶ 9 The witnesses' versions of events begins to differ at the point where they recount Smith removing the tray from the SUV. The police officers' version of the events is as follows.11

¶ 10 Smith testified that he carried the tray containing the revolver over to Martin and Henry and showed them the revolver. He then asked Martin and Henry, neither of whom had been provided with Miranda warnings,12 who the owner of the revolver was. Both Martin and Henry denied ownership of the [343 Wis.2d 289]revolver. Smith testified at trial that he then “told Mr. Henry, who was the passenger, and [was] sitting basically on top of this weapon, that I was placing him under arrest for carrying [a] concealed weapon.”

¶ 11 Smith testified that as he prepared to place Henry under arrest, Martin asked Smith and Fidler why Henry was being arrested. Smith replied that he was placing Henry under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon. Martin then asked the police officers whether they would let Henry go if he (Martin) admitted the revolver belonged to him. In response to this question, Smith told Martin that he did not want Martin to say it was his revolver if it was not, but he should be a “stand-up guy” and admit the revolver was his if it was. Martin responded by telling Smith that the revolver belonged to him, and that he should let Henry go.

¶ 12 Even though Martin stated that the revolver belonged to him, Smith asked Martin to describe it. Martin responded that it was a black .22 caliber handgun, which Smith testified at trial would have been difficult to determine through just a visual examination. Based on Martin's admission that the revolver belonged to him, the police arrested Martin, and chose not to arrest Henry.

¶ 13 Henry's version of the events was slightly different.13 He testified that Smith did not show the tray to him, and he was unsure if Smith showed the tray to Martin. Smith then asked both Martin and Henry who owned the revolver, and both denied ownership. Henry stated that the officer thought the revolver belonged to him because it was under the passenger[343 Wis.2d 290]seat, where Henry was seated. Henry testified that Smith then asked Martin whether he was “gonna [sic] be a stand-up guy and let your uncle go to jail for this gun being in the vehicle, or are you gonna [sic] man up.” Martin then asked Smith what type of gun it was, and, according to Henry, Smith responded that Martin “should know what type of gun it was” if it belonged to him. As to the events that took place after this point, Henry admitted that his memory was not clear as to the chronology, but was certain that Martin made two statements. First, he testified that Martin described the revolver to an officer, but that in his description Martin did not mention its caliber or color. Second, Henry testified that Martin told an officer that if he let his uncle (Henry) go, he (Martin) would say the revolver was his.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 14 The State charged Martin with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon

[816 N.W.2d 277]

in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), and one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of § 941.23.14 At the preliminary hearing, Martin pleaded not guilty to both charges, and the case was set for trial soon thereafter.

¶ 15 Before trial, Martin brought a suppression motion that sought to preclude the introduction at trial of his statements to the police.15 At the hearing on this [343 Wis.2d 291]motion, the court heard testimony from Fidler, Smith, and Henry regarding the events incident to the case. Martin's counsel argued that one of the officers should have Mirandized Martin before engaging in custodial questioning, and therefore any statement of Martin's that followed the improper questioning was properly suppressed.

¶ 16 The circuit court, after hearing the testimony and argument, decided that because 1) Martin's response to the first question was exculpatory,16 rather than inculpatory,17 and 2) Martin's question regarding why the officers were taking Henry into custody was not in response to a question, there was “no violation of Miranda.” Accordingly, the circuit court denied Martin's motion to suppress the statements.

¶ 17 Martin's two-day jury trial began on April 6, 2009.18 The State and Martin presented their theories of the case to the jury in both opening statements and closing arguments. During its opening statement, the State made the following comments regarding the felon in possession charge:

[O]fficers who came to assist Sergeant Fidler[ ] searched the vehicle of [Martin], a vehicle which he purchased—excuse me—a vehicle which he co-owned [343 Wis.2d 292]with another individual. In that vehicle, you will hear, a .22 caliber revolver was found under the...

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