State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 20 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-036,81-036 |
| Citation | 437 A.2d 308,121 N.H. 1032 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Wesley MARTIN. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (Paul J. Barbadoro, Concord, on the brief), by brief for the State.
James E. Duggan, Concord, by brief for defendant.
On January 9, 1981, the defendant was convicted of burglary after a jury trial before Mullavey, J., who denied his motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence and for alleged prejudicial statements of the prosecutor.
The evidence supports a finding that on June 15, 1978, Joan Edwards returned home from school with a friend, Linda, and found the defendant and his younger sister inside the Edwards' home. The sister was coming downstairs from Joan's bedroom and the defendant was coming out of Joan's parents' bedroom on the first floor. The defendant left soon after Joan arrived, and his sister also left within five minutes thereafter. After they left, Joan went to her parents' bedroom and found her mother's bank open, on the floor near the doorway. She put the bank back in its place. When told of the occurrence, the mother checked the bank and another bank in the bedroom on the next day, and found that money was missing from both.
The defendant's sister, who was thirteen years old in 1978, testified that she took the money two days prior to the date in question, and that she was alone at the time. She stated that she and the defendant entered the home on June 15 to wait for Joan and Linda because the defendant wanted to meet Linda.
The defendant argues that although circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction, State v. Goodwin, 118 N.H. 862, 866, 395 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1978), it must exclude "any other rational conclusion" to be sufficient. See State v. O'Malley, 120 N.H. 507, 509, 416 A.2d 1387, 1388 (1980); State v. Costello, 110 N.H. 182, 183, 263 A.2d 671, 672 (1970). He claims that his sister's admission furnishes another rational conclusion which is not excluded by the circumstantial evidence in this case, specifically, that she stole the money.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we follow the test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), that the evidence is insufficient if "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2788, see State v. Gilbert, 121 N.H. 305, 313, 429 A.2d 323, 329 (1981). Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant stole the money from the bank. We hold that any rational finder of fact could have found that the evidence excluded all rational explanations other than that the defendant committed the burglary.
The defendant admits that he made an unauthorized entry and that the evidence supports an inference that he took money, but he argues it is equally rational to conclude that his sister stole it on June 13.
In addition to the sister's motive to protect her brother, several facts support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who took the money on June 15, and that he entered the home with the intent to steal. The sister testified that she entered the Edwards' house on June 13 by using a key left on the porch, but Mrs. Edwards testified that no spare key had been left on the porch or anywhere else. The evidence also indicated that the bank in question was in its proper place on June 14 and on the morning of June 15, while Joan testified that when she entered the bedroom after the defendant's visit, the bank was open on the floor near the doorway rather than in its proper place.
Furthermore, the defendant's "surprise" on being discovered, and his sudden departure thereafter, were not consistent with the stated purpose of his visit-meeting Linda. There was evidence that he had been told a few days before to keep off the premises. If the purpose...
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