State v. Martineau, 37637

Decision Date19 February 1960
Docket NumberNo. 37637,37637
Citation257 Minn. 334,101 N.W.2d 410
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. George MARTINEAU, Relator.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The purpose of the right to have counsel appointed, or to be represented by counsel, as provided in M.S.A. § 611.07 and the state and Federal constitutions is to protect the accused from a conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and this right to counsel cannot be nullified by appointment of, or representation by, counsel who merely furnishes perfunctory or casual representation.

2. As facts existed with respect to defenses of two codefendants the consolidation of informations charging separate and distinct crimes for a single trial of both defendants in the face of existing conflicting interests constituted a denial to relator of the statutory rights as defendant; of due process under U.S.Const. Amend. XIV; and of right to counsel under Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6.

George F. Martineau, Stillwater, for relator.

Maynard E. Pirsig, Minneapolis, amicus curiae.

Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Solicitor General, St. Paul, Hugo A. Laine, County Attorney, Cloquet, for respondent.

NELSON, Justice.

Writ of error issued upon petition of George Franklin Martineau alleging prejudicial denial of his rights as defendant by his being forced to submit to a single trial, jointly with a codefendant, under two informations charging separate and distinct crimes of assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the first degree.

On February 13, 1958, two informations were filed charging relator and one Andrew Leo Oksanen with assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the first degree. Defendant was jointly arraigned with Oksanen and plead not guilty. Without formal order of consolidation both defendants were tried jointly on both charges in one trial. A separate verdict of guilty was returned as to each defendant on each charge. Relator received a sentence of 5 years for the assault and a sentence of not less than 10 years and not more than 40 years for the larceny, this latter sentence to run consecutively and not concurrently with any other sentence. The relator was also charged with two prior convictions to which he plead guilty. These felonies had been committed when he was 17 and 20. The application of M.S.A. § 610.28 accounts for the severity of the sentences.

After the sentences were imposed, the sentencing judge filed an order limiting the sentence for grand larceny in the first degree to not more than 20 years, making the total term not more than 25 years including the 5-year sentence.

Relator was arrested on February 5, 1958, at Duluth and taken to the Carlton County jail at Carlton by the sheriff of that county. During the early hours of February 5 relator, after drinking heavily in a Duluth tavern, rode in the back seat of a car driven by Oksanen toward Wrenshall in the vicinity of Duluth, and on the way they sideswiped another car driven by one Fritz Karjala. Karjala claimed that both occupants of the car beat him at this point, which gave rise to the charges of assault in the second degree. There appears to be no dispute that Karjala was beaten by someone, but relator contends that he was sleeping in the back seat of the car at that time and knew nothing of the incident. Karjala's car was pushed into a ditch along the road after which Oksanen drove off. Oksanen admitted having assaulted Karjala, but he has also made the statement that relator had no part in it as he was asleep at the time.

Later that same morning the Wrenshall school was broken into and looted, which gave rise to the charges of grand larceny in the first degree for stealing property of the value of $42.16 in cash and a sweater.

The state admits that there was a consolidation for trial of the informations charging two separate crimes which occurred at two separate and distinct times and places without any motion or order being made relative to consolidation; that the court appointed one counsel to defend both defendants for both crimes. Relator contends that because of a conflict of interest in so far as the two defendants were concerned the trial court should not have appointed one counsel for both without ordering separate trials.

Relator has filed with this court a copy of an unsigned confession by Oksanen and a later affidavit by him. These state that relator knew nothing of the crimes and was in a drunken stupor in the rear seat of the car both at the time of the assault and when the break-in occurred. Oksanen's affidavit states:

'That the Court appointed counsel, Donald Dieson, was requested by both George F. Martineau and Myself to have seperate (sic) trials so that I could testify at George F. Martineaus trial, however I and George F. Martineau were tried jointly as the Attorney stated such was nessary (sic) to save on expenses--

'That the Court appointed Attorney argued against my taking the stand in behalf of George F. Martineau, * * *.'

Oksanen further stated that he stood ready to testify that Martineau was not a party to the commission of either offense. The transcript of the trial so far as it is before us shows that he consistently stated that relator was not a participant in either of the crimes charged. Oksanen further states in his affidavit that he would have testified that he gave relator part of the loot from the schoolhouse thus connecting relator with the larceny at the time of arrest. Relator claims that these facts would have been in evidence but for the fact that counsel, who had been appointed to represent both defendants, advised against Oksanen's taking the stand.

It can of course be argued that counsel's decision that Oksanen not take the stand in his own defense was in his best interest; but if Oksanen would have testified as he has indicated, that advice was against relator's interest. It is argued on the part of the state that it was not the duty of counsel to seek to pin all the responsibility on Oksanen in order to exculpate relator. However, from relator's standpoint, it was counsel's duty to attempt to relieve relator, whom counsel was equally appointed to defend, from supposedly unfounded charges.

The foregoing situation shows the conflict of interests which interfered with defense counsel's doing his full duty to either of his clients in the face of consolidation for trial of the two cases. It is elementary that separate trials were necessary in order that counsel might provide the full defense to which each defendant was entitled without being hampered by having to consider conflicting interests.

The evidence relating to the grand larceny is entirely circumstantial. The most damaging evidence is that relator was in possession of stolen goods and attempted to dispose of a part. This situation has been explained by Oksanen. When he saw they were about to be arrested he awakened relator and impressed upon him the necessity of assistance in getting rid of the loot taken from the school. Thus it was made to appear that the relator was possessed of at least a part of the stolen goods. Had Oksanen been called to testify at a separate trial of relator, this evidence might well have had the effect of rebutting the inferences that arose from the possession of the loot.

A close inspection of Karjala's testimony to support the assault charge gives a clear impression of extreme confusion on his part. Karjala's explanation of his identification of the men who accosted him is not what might be termed convincing, and at times when asked if Martineau hit him he answered in the negative.

Giving due consideration to Karjala's limited command of English, it still does not explain the inconsistencies and discrepancies involved in his testimony. These might well have been cleared up had Oksanen taken the witness stand. As the record stands, it does not convincingly connect relator with the assault. A state's witness who first saw Karjala after the beating testified that Karjala had not mentioned being rendered unconscious although Karjala testified at the trial repeatedly that he had been unconscious. William E. Johnson, criminal investigator for the St. Louis County Sheriff's Office, testified as follows:

'Q. During the course of talking to him about another matter, Mr. Johnson, did Mr. Oksanen volunteer information to you concerning this assault case that we are trying today and the breaking-in of the Wrenshall school? A. He did state that he, en route in his travels from Duluth to Wrenshall, had assaulted an individual. At that time he stated he had another party in the car who he knew was Martineau but he also stated that a party was asleep in the backseat of the car.

'Q. From what you recall on this statement given by Mr. Oksanen, it was his statement to the effect that Mr. Martineau was asleep in the car all of the time? A. That is right.'

The other criminal investigator for St. Louis County Sheriff's Office, Fred Wallin, testified as follows:

'Q. What did he (Oksanen) have to say concerning Martineau as to where he was at the time of the assault and school break-in? A. He was sleeping in the car.'

Relator contends that he did not want to be tried jointly with Oksanen but that the court-appointed counsel, in cooperation with county officials and in an effort to keep trial expenses at a minimum, allowed relator to be tried along with Oksanen even though Oksanen had made statements admitting his guilt and exculpating relator.

What might well have proven a weakness of the cases against the relator was never presented to the jury. Apparently relator sensed something of his position when he gave a negative response to the question of the trial court as to whether he felt he had been afforded a fair trial.

We do not conclude that the evidence was not adequate to sustain a verdict if the case had been separately and properly tried; the point is that here an...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • State v. Duncan
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 21, 1977
    ...271 Minn. 477, 479, 136 N.W.2d 401, 403, certiorari denied, 382 U.S. 948, 86 S.Ct. 410, 15 L.Ed.2d 356 (1965); State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 342, 101 N.W.2d 410, 415 (1960). The policy of this state still strongly favors separate trials, and recognizes that they should be the rule rath......
  • State v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • July 2, 1965
    ...the court there were inconsistencies in the defense of the codefendants. In addition, appellant relies for reversal on State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410. There, the appellant was denied the benefit of exculpatory testimony from a codefendant because of the latter's failure t......
  • State v. Strimling
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 10, 1978
    ...offer the other which was precluded by the joint trial. See, State v. Swenson,301 Minn. 199, 221 N.W.2d 706 (1974); State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410 (1960). It is true that certain testimony at trial was admissible as to one defendant and hearsay as to the other; however, t......
  • State v. Biehoffer
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1964
    ...as it appears in the statute should be construed to mean 'must' and to give the absolute right to separate trials. State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410, relied upon by defendant, does not support this claim. That decision holds merely that separate trials should be ordered when......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT