State v. Martines

• Decision Date: 27 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 90926–1.,90926–1.
• Citation: 355 P.3d 1111,184 Wash.2d 83
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Jose Figeroa MARTINES, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

184 Wash.2d 83

355 P.3d 1111

STATE of Washington, Petitioner

v.Jose Figeroa MARTINES, Respondent.

No. 90926–1.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 7, 2015.

Decided Aug. 27, 2015.

Prosecuting Atty. King County, James Morrissey Whisman, King Co. Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Oliver Ross Davis, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Pamela Beth Loginsky, Washington Assoc. of Prosecuting Atty., Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

Shelley Anne Williams, Attorney General Office, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Patrol.

Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, Criminal Justice–Criminal Litigation Unit Atty. General.

Nancy Lynn Talner, Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Aclu.

Opinion

STEPHENS, J.

¶ 1 Jose Figeroa Martines was involved in a car accident. Pursuant to a warrant, a blood sample was extracted from Martines after an officer suspected he was driving while under the influence (DUI). The blood tests revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of about 0.061 and markers of two different central nervous system depressants. Martines was charged with felony DUI under RCW 46.61.502. He sought to suppress the blood test results showing the presence of drugs on the ground that there was no probable cause to show he was under the influence of drugs, as opposed to alcohol. The trial court denied Martines's motion, and a jury convicted him as charged.

¶ 2 The Court of Appeals reversed Martines's conviction. State v. Figeroa Martines, 182 Wash.App. 519, 331 P.3d 105 (2014). The court did not decide the probable cause question but held instead that the blood test was an unlawful warrantless search. The court reasoned that drawing blood and testing blood constitute separate searches, each of which requires particular authorization, and that the warrant here authorized only a blood draw. The State appealed, and we accepted review. 181 Wash.2d 1023, 339 P.3d 634 (2014). We also granted review of Martines's contingent issue: whether probable cause existed to test Martines's blood sample for drugs. Id.

¶ 3 We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate Martines's conviction. We hold that the warrant authorized the drawing and testing of Martines's blood for both alcohol and drugs based on probable cause to believe Martines had committed a DUI.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 4 The relevant facts are undisputed. On June 16, 2012, officers observed Martines driving his vehicle erratically on State Route 167. Martines's car veered into another car, swerved into the median, and rolled over. An off-duty Tukwila detective saw the collision and drove to the accident site. The detective observed that Martines was stumbling, had slurred speech, and smelled like beer. The detective, along with other witnesses, observed Martines crawl back into his vehicle, retrieve a bag, and throw it into a ditch. Martines later engaged in an altercation with a passenger from the other car. A King County Sheriff's deputy arrived, and the deputy and the detective placed Martines in handcuffs.

¶ 5 A Washington State trooper arrived to the scene moments later, interviewed witnesses, and was debriefed by the detective. The trooper took custody of Martines and informed him he was under arrest for suspicion of DUI. The trooper observed Martines had red, bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol. Martines told the trooper he drank “ ‘[o]ne Blue Moon’ ” beer that night. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Nov. 5, 2012) at 20. The trooper located a bag in a nearby ditch containing a Blue Moon cardboard six-pack container with only one unopened beer bottle. VRP (Nov. 8, 2012) at 107–08.

¶ 6 The trooper sought a search warrant to extract a blood sample from Martines at a local hospital. His affidavit for probable cause stated:

A sample of Martines, Jose Figeroa's blood, if extracted within a reasonable period of time after he/she last operated, or was in physical control of, a motor vehicle, may be tested to determine his/her current blood alcohol level and to detect the presence of any drugs that may have impaired his/her ability to drive....

The Legislature has specifically authorized the use of search warrants for blood in cases in which the implied consent statute applies. See RCW 46.20.308(1) (“Neither consent nor this section precludes a police officer from obtaining a search warrant for a person's breath or blood.”)....

Therefore, I request authority to cause a sample of blood, consisting of one or more tubes to be extracted from the person of Martines, Jose Figeroa by a physician....

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 97–99. The trooper obtained a warrant authorizing the “extract[ion]” of a blood sample from Martines. CP at 100–01. The warrant indicated probable cause existed to believe Martines's blood contained evidence of the crime of DUI under RCW 46.61.502. The warrant did not include any express reference to testing of the blood sample.

¶ 7 Pursuant to the search warrant, a blood sample was drawn from Martines at a local hospital. The Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory tested the sample for the presence of alcohol and drugs. The test results indicated Martines had a BAC of 0.061 and 0.062 at the time of the testing, which the toxicologist estimated would have been 0.121 two hours after the accident. Martines's blood also contained 0.05 milligrams per liter of diazepam

, a central nervous depressant and active ingredient in Valium, and 0.03 milligrams per liter of nordiazepam, also a nervous system depressant and metabolite of diazepam. Martines had been previously convicted of vehicular assault while driving under the influence of an intoxicant, a predicate offense for felony DUI under RCW 46.61.502(6)(b)(ii). The State charged Martines with felony DUI.

¶ 8 Martines moved to suppress all evidence of drugs or drug testing. He argued there was no probable cause to test his blood sample for drugs because witnesses observed only signs of alcohol intoxication. The State objected, arguing that in a DUI context, testing seeks to determine the existence of an impairing substance, which may be alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both. Further, the State argued that once it obtains a blood sample through a lawful search, it may test the sample for anything it deems appropriate. The trial court denied Martines's motion. The court held that if probable cause exists to test for either alcohol or drugs, then probable cause exists to test for both. The evidence of alcohol and drugs in Martines's blood was admitted at trial, and the jury found Martines guilty of felony DUI.

¶ 9 On appeal, Martines raised a new issue of constitutional magnitude, arguing that the blood test constituted a separate intrusion requiring specific authorization. He retreated from his earlier concession that the warrant authorized the blood test for alcohol. See CP at 5–6; see also VRP (Nov. 5, 2012) at 31 (Martines's counsel stated during the suppression hearing, “I'm seeking to exclude just evidence of drug testing.”); Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, State v. Figeroa Martines, No. 64663–7–1 (Apr. 15, 2014), at 0 min., 48 sec., https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/appellateDockets/index.cfm?fa=appellateDockets.ShowOralArglist&courtID=a01&DocketDate=20140415 (Martines's counsel conceded at oral argument that the warrant authorized drawing and testing of the blood for alcohol: “The trooper quite properly sought and obtained a warrant for the taking of blood from Mr. Martines and the testing of that blood for alcohol.”).

¶ 10 The Court of Appeals reversed Martines's conviction. Figeroa Martines, 182 Wash.App. 519, 331 P.3d 105. Relying on Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the court held that testing of a blood sample constitutes a separate search that requires express authorization. Id. at 528, 331 P.3d 105. The court reasoned that testing of a blood sample “intrudes upon a privacy interest that is distinct from the privacy interests in bodily integrity and personal security that are invaded by a physical penetration of the skin.” Id. at 530, 331 P.3d 105. The court held that the warrant did not authorize testing at all and therefore the toxicology tests were an unlawful warrantless search. Id. at 532, 331 P.3d 105.

¶ 11 The State petitioned to this court for review, which we granted. Figeroa Martines, 181 Wash.2d 1023, 339 P.3d 634. We also granted review of Martines's original issue, which the Court of Appeals did not address: whether probable cause existed to test Martines's blood sample for drugs, as opposed to alcohol.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 We review de novo a trial court's legal conclusions on a motion to suppress. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash.2d 862, 867, 319 P.3d 9 (2014).

¶ 13 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that warrants may be issued only upon a showing of “probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Probable cause exists if the affidavit supporting the warrant describes facts and circumstances sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that a person is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the criminal activity can be found at the place to be searched. State v. Thein, 138 Wash.2d 133, 140, 977 P.2d 582 (1999) ; see also State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d 525, 536, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (noting probable cause is the proper determination for the taking of a suspect's blood). “The standard of reasonableness to be applied takes into consideration the special experience and expertise of the arresting officer.” State v. Fricks, 91 Wash.2d 391, 398, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979).

¶ 14 We initially address Martines's contingent issue. He argues probable cause did not exist to believe he was under the influence of drugs, as opposed to alcohol. Martines notes the...