State v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 12 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. S-95-019,S-95-019
• Citation: 550 N.W.2d 655,250 Neb. 597
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Leonardo MARTINEZ, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 655

550 N.W.2d 655

250 Neb. 597

STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Leonardo MARTINEZ, Appellant.

No. S-95-019.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

July 12, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Indictments and Informations: Double Jeopardy. An indictment shall advise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in order that he may meet the accusation and prepare for his trial and that, after judgment, he may be able to plead the record and judgment in bar of further prosecution for the same offense.

2. Indictments and Informations: Time: Double Jeopardy. Where an information provides a timeframe which has a distinct beginning and an equally clear end within which the crimes are alleged to have been committed, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.

3. Indictments and Informations: Double Jeopardy: Proof. An indictment or information alone does not constitute a defendant's sole protection against double jeopardy. Rather, a defendant may allege and prove facts outside of the record in support of his plea of former adjudication.

4. Indictments and Informations: Evidence: Convictions. An information or indictment is not rendered invalid when the State presents evidence of several violations in its efforts to secure one conviction.

5. Indictments and Informations: Sexual Assault: Minors: Time: Double Jeopardy. The State may allege a timeframe for its allegations of sexual assault of a child in its first prosecution; as a quid pro quo to ensure that this liberty is not abused, the State must survive double jeopardy scrutiny if it attempts a second prosecution based upon the same transaction during the same timeframe.

6. Indictments and Informations: Time: Double Jeopardy. Unless the offense charged in a second prosecution is clearly separate and apart from the offense charged in the first prosecution, the timeframe alleged in the first prosecution acts as a blanket bar for subsequent prosecutions.

7. Indictments and Informations: States: Evidence: Time. If, at the time an information is filed, the State knows of all facts and all possible charges arising from one transaction or series of transactions within a timeframe, and if nothing prevents the State from filing all charges in one information, then there is no reason that the State need attempt a series of prosecutions of one charge at a time rather than prosecute all charges at once.

Jon Placke, of Box Butte County Public Defender's Office, for appellant.

Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein, Lincoln, for appellee.

WHITE, C.J., and CAPORALE, FAHRNBR UCH, LANPHIER, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, and GERRARD, JJ.

WHITE, Chief Justice.

We agreed to the State's petition for further review to resolve the disagreement between two decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals. At issue are the Court of Appeals' decisions in State v. Martinez, 4 Neb.App. 192, 541 N.W.2d 406 (1995), and State v. Quick, 1 Neb.App. 756, 511 N.W.2d 168 (1993).

In the information against Martinez, it was alleged that a first degree sexual assault against Matthew P. occurred "between July 1, 1991 and June 18, 1994." In Martinez, the Court of Appeals relied on Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 431, 33 S.Ct. 383, 384, 57 L.Ed. 583 (1913), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated that an indictment

shall advise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in order that he may meet the accusation and prepare for his trial and that, after judgment, he may be able to plead the record and judgment in bar of further prosecution for the same offense.

(Emphasis supplied.) See Cowan v. State, 140 Neb. 837, 2 N.W.2d 111 (1942). The Court of Appeals in Martinez held that an information must apprise a defendant with reasonable certainty of the charge against him so that he may prepare a defense to the prosecution and be able to plead the judgment as a bar to a later prosecution (citing State v. Piskorski, 218 Neb. 543, 357 N.W.2d 206 (1984)).

The question, then, on which the decisions of the Court of Appeals differed was whether the information, as limited by the trial court, i.e., from July 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993, satisfied the Bartell standard. The Quick court held that the Bartell standard was not satisfied by a timeframe allegation; the Martinez court, however, held that where an information provides a timeframe which has a distinct beginning and an equally clear end within which the crimes are alleged to have been committed, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. We agree. As noted by the Martinez court, to hold otherwise would impose an impossible burden on a child sexual assault victim where there are allegations of multiple assaults over a lengthy timeframe. Any implication to the contrary in State v. Quick, supra, is disapproved.

In State v. Piskorski, supra, this court considered the claim that an information is unconstitutionally vague if it alleges a timeframe, rather than a specific date, during which a crime was committed. Like Martinez and Quick, Piskorski arose from one conviction based on several alleged commissions of sexual assault; like the child victims in Martinez and Quick, the child victim in Piskorski could not specify the date on which the assault occurred. The State had alleged that the assault occurred between September 1 and December 25, 1982. At trial, the State proved one sexual assault within that period by relating the assault to a particular event, the presence of the child's mother during the assault. Proof of that event, if sufficient, would make it possible for Piskorski to subsequently prove, if necessary, which act had resulted in his conviction.

We found the information charging Piskorski to be constitutionally sufficient. An indictment or information alone does not constitute a defendant's sole protection against double jeopardy....