State v. Marx
| Decision Date | 12 May 1905 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. MARX. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; William S. Case, Judge.
Gershon Marx was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Donald G. Perkins and Clayton B. Smith, for appellant. Solomon Lucas, State's Atty., for the State.
Upon the trial the accused presented to the court, in writing, 18 requests to charge. These requests covered definitions of reasonable doubt, and instructions in respect to circumstantial evidence, with special reference to the testimony which had been produced, and its sufficiency to warrant the conviction of murder in the first degree; instructions upon the weight of evidence which had been given; the probative force of flight, in view of the particular testimony given; the weight to be given the evidence pointing to an unknown guilty party; the weighing of the testimony given by those interested in detection and conviction; the weighing of presumptions arising from the subsequent conduct of the accused; the weight to be given the testimony of the accused; the weight to be given to the testimony of a witness believed to have made a willfully false statement as to any particular fact; the effect of the presumption of innocence which prevails throughout the trial; and the necessity of each juror being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. The subject-matter of these requests is sufficiently and accurately covered by the charge of the court. No error is assigned for refusing to charge in the language of any request, except the ninth, eleventh, and thirteenth requests, which relate to instructions for weighing the testimony of witnesses who had been interested in the detection of the accused, for weighing the presumptions arising from the subsequent conduct of the accused, and for weighing the testimony of the accused himself. The instructions as given by the court in compliance with these requests are too plainly adequate and correct to justify discussion, and the errors assigned in the refusal of the court to charge in the language of the requests are not pursued in the brief for the accused.
The other reasons of appeal assign error in certain quotations from the charge of the court as given.
Section 1508, Revision 1902, is as follows: "No person shall be convicted of any crime punishable by death, without the testimony of at least two witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereto." The court, having instructed the jury as to the law of criminal homicide, the essentials of the crime of manslaughter, the essentials of the crime of murder, and the additional elements prescribed by statute which distinguish any particular murder as murder in the first degree, added: The accused claims that the court erred in neglecting to define to the jury the meaning of the phrase "or that which is equivalent thereto," and in not again calling their attention to the statute in the brief summary at the close of the charge of the conditions requisite to each of the four verdicts it was within the power of the jury to render, and these alleged errors are assigned in the fourth and ninth reasons of appeal.
Section 1508 was first adopted in 1672, in the following language: "It is ordered by this court, that no person for any fact committed shall be put to death without the testimony of two or three witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereunto." Revision 1672, p. 69. On page 9 the offenses for which a person may be put to death (15 in number) are prescribed. Most of these offenses were established in 1642, and were based upon the Mosaic Code; the passage of Scripture requiring the punishment of death being cited with each offense. 1 Col. Rec. 77. The punishment of willful murder by death is based upon Num. Chap. xxxv, 30, 31: None of the laws were printed till 1672, and when they were revised for publication the scriptural rule that one witness shall not testify against any person, to cause him to die, was formally adopted as applicable to all capital offenses, in the language above cited, which is evidently based upon Deut. xvii, 6: "At the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death." It is to be remembered that, at the time of the adoption of this statute, judicial trials included various kinds of evidence, other than oral and direct testimony, which might be equivalent or equally efficacious to prevent the putting any one to death at the mouth of a single witness. The act of 1672, with some changes in phraseology made in 1821 and about 1835, which do not alter its meaning, has remained on our statute book until the present day. It is the duty of the court to call the attention of the jury to the statute, and instruct them that the case must be proved by the testimony of at least two witnesses, or by evidence which is equivalent thereto, and that the requirement of two witnesses is complied with if there are two or more witnesses, each testifying to different parts of the same transaction, or to different circumstances concerning the case, tending directly to show the guilt of the party accused, although there may not he two witnesses to any one fact or circumstance. Ordinarily this is the whole duty of the court, and more extended comment is not necessary, nor likely to be profitable. Having thus called the attention of the jury to the statute, the court is not bound to again refer to it in other parts of the charge. Swift's Ev. p. 142; State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 385; State v. Kelly. 77 Conn. 266, 274, 58 Atl. 705. The accused has no reason to complain of the action of the court referred to in the fourth and ninth reasons of appeal.
The court, in the opening part of the charge, states to the jury that the accused is on trial under an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree, and therefore their deliberations would involve the law of homicide—that is, the law and its bearing upon and relation to the killing of one human creature by another—and proceeds as follows: "More precisely, gentlemen, you are concerned with that species of homicide which the law defines to be unlawful or criminal, for no possible aspect of the case presented upon the evidence makes it necessary or profitable for you to consider that class of homicide which the law regards as excusable or justifiable." There is no error in...
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State v. Ross
...doubt. See State v. Cots, 126 Conn. 48, 58, 9 A.2d 138 (1939); State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129, 96 A. 370 (1916); State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 22, 60 A. 690 (1905). The evidentiary burden imposed on the state by § 54-83 does not, however, preclude a finding of guilt in capital cases in ......
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State v. Mosback
...issues of law and all questions of law arising in the trial of criminal cases....” General Statutes § 54–89 ; see also State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 28, 60 A. 690 (1905) ( “[i]n jury trials it is the province of the court to decide questions of law, and of the jury to decide questions of fact......
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State v. Mosback
...issues of law and all questions of law arising in the trial of criminal cases. . . ." General Statutes § 54-89; see also State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 28, 60 A. 690 (1905) ("[i]n jury trials it is the provinceof the court to decide questions of law, and of the jury to decide questions of fact......
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Quednau v. Langrish
...tend to 'uncover the weakness of a weak case, the difficulties of a difficult case, or the strength of a strong case.' State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 28, 60 A. 690, 694. The court, however, must leave the jury free to make their own decision of fact unless only one conclusion is reasonably pos......
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Mitigating the dangers of capital convictions based on eyewitness testimony through treason's two-witness rule.
...fact committed shall be put to death without the testimony of two or three witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereto." State v. Marx, 60 A. 690, 691 (Conn. 1905). According to the court, the statute was based not on the law of treason, but on Mosaic code. Id.; see also supra note 92 (c......
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State v. Ross: New Life for Connecticut's Death Penalty?
...§ 5483. The interesting origins and history of this statute, which is unique in Anglo Saxon jurisprudence, are traced in State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, (1905). It should be recalled that Connecticut had no formal constitution until 1818 when it codified and "constitutionalized" its common law ......