State v. Mason
| Citation | 506 S.W.2d 458 |
| Decision Date | 15 January 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 35020,35020 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stanley Roy MASON, Defendant-Appellant. . Louis District, Division One |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Graham LaBeaume, Public Defender Bureau, Robert C. Babione, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, J. Brendan Ryan, Circuit Atty., Thomas J. Kavanaugh, Asst. Circuit Atty., St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant-appellant, Stanley Roy Mason was charged with second degree burglary, tried, found guilty by a jury and the jury being unable to agree on punishment, sentenced by the court to four years in the department of corrections. § 560.070, RSMo. He appeals and raises one issue--that the evidence was insufficient to make a case for the jury to sustain the conviction.
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence, the facts in evidence and the favorable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the state and most favorable to the verdict of the jury, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary must be disregarded. State v. Watson, 350 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Mo.1961). It is not our function to substitute our judgment for that of the jury--we determine only whether the evidence was sufficient to make a submissible case.
The evidence shows that on May 17, 1972, Mr. James E. Beck was the owner of Sylvia's Clothing Store located at 798 Bayard Avenue in the City of St. Louis. On that evening at about 7:30 p.m. Mr. Beck that evening at about 7:30 p.m. Mr. Beck door and put a 'two by four' behind the door and went out the 'side to the grocery store.' He stated that he locked the 'clothing store from the inside.' At approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of May 18, he was called by the police and returned to the store. The 'two by four' was hanging down on one end, and there was a 'piece of glass out'; the 'glass was broken'. There were 'some shirts and some pants' missing valued at 'between $450.00 maybe $475.00.' Mr. Beck knew the defendant since he 'grew up in the neighborhood.' While Mr. Beck saw the defendant that morning of May 18, he did not see the defendant with any of the clothing.
The goods were never recovered.
Officer Carl Edwards testified that he was on duty that morning in a patrol car and received a call about a fire at Bayard and Hodiamont. When in sight of Sylvia's Clothing Store, he 'observed three males coming out of the front door.' The lights were on inside the store. When he saw the three individuals coming out of the store, he stopped his vehicle and at that time the men began running. He jumped out of the car, identified himself as an officer, attempted to apprehend them, and was able to apprehend the defendant, Mason. The officer testified that Mason was one of the three men coming out of the store; that he was the second one out of the front door. Mason was running east. He indicated that Mason did not stop voluntarily and that it was necessary to stop him.
Although the place was tested for fingerprints, none were found. The officer further stated that the three men coming out of the store did not have anything in their hands and a search revealed nothing.
On cross-examination, the officer was confronted with his testimony at preliminary hearing where he answered 'no' to a question, 'He ran I take it?' But on redirect he stated that he had to chase the defendant and that the defendant did not stop when told to do so.
The defendant testified. He stated that at about 1:30 a.m. on the morning of the 18th he was at a friend's house and left there between '1:30 and quarter to 2:00.' He went to a donut shop and then went toward home near the clothing store. He was with two friends and when he arrived at Hodiamont and Bayard, he saw Officer Edwards who got out of his car and called. He denied running from Officer Edwards or entering the store or breaking the window in the store door or taking anything from the store.
At the close of the evidence the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which was overruled. Rule 26.10, V.A.M.R. The jury found the defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree. Post trial motions were overruled, the defendant was granted allocution and sentenced.
Appellant contends that the conviction and judgment must be set aside because the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction since there is no connection between appellant and the breaking into the premises or the stealing of the property. He relies on several decisions. 1
He argues that mere presence at the time and place of the crime does not render a person guilty of an offense nor does mere presence when coupled with flight. And when a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
It is well settled in this state that in order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances must not only be consistent with each other and be consistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with innocence, but the circumstances must point satisfactorily to guilt and exclude every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Burnley, supra, 480 S.W.2d at 881; State v. Walker, 365 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo.1963).
Evidence that an accused had an opportunity to commit an offense, or evidence which merely raises a suspicion is an insufficient basis for a conviction. And mere presence of an accused at the commission of a felony is also insufficient. While flight is a circumstance to be considered against an accused in connection with other evidence, presence and flight alone are insufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Castaldi, supra.
The evidence shows that the defendant was one of the three persons 'coming out of the front door', that he was the person in the middle of the three, that the time was an early hour of the morning when the store was closed, that the clothing store was locked the evening before by the owner, it had, in fact, been burglarized, and that the defendant fled so that it was necessary...
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State v. Dodson, 37584
...if there was substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably reach such a conclusion. State v. Strong, supra; State v. Mason, 506 S.W.2d 458 (Mo.App.1974). We find that there was substantial evidence of defendant's guilt. It is of no consequence here that there was no direct evide......
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State v. Steward
...to guilt as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Cox, 527 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Mo.App.1975); State v. Mason, 506 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Mo.App.1974); State v. Sanderson, 528 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Mo.App.1975); State v. Brunson, 516 S.W.2d 799, 803 We have examined the authorit......
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State v. Coleman
...Durham, 367 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.1963). Other cases sustaining convictions of burglary under similar factual situations include State v. Mason, 506 S.W.2d 458 (Mo.App.1974); State v. Hawkins, 491 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.1973); State v. Wheeler, 478 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.1972); State v. Marler, supra. The court d......
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State v. McRae, KCD
... ... Here, as has been previously demonstrated, there were additional circumstances from which the jury might infer appellant's participation in a joint action. Furthermore, there was more than mere presence and flight, so that the statement in State v. Mason, 506 S.W.2d 458, 460(3--5) (Mo.App.1974), that '* * * presence and flight alone are insufficient to sustain a conviction' is not to be applied here ... In conclusion, the evidence in the case was sufficient to support the charge of burglary against appellant. Being sufficient for ... ...