State v. Mastracchio

• Decision Date: 23 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-548-C,90-548-C
• Citation: 605 A.2d 489
• Parties: STATE v. Gerald S. MASTRACCHIO, Jr. A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 489

605 A.2d 489

STATE v. Gerald S. MASTRACCHIO, Jr.

No. 90-548-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 23, 1992.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Annie Goldberg, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jeffrey Greer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Richard Casparian, Public Defender, Catherine Gibran and Barbara Hurst, Asst. Public Defenders, for defendant.

OPINION

SHEA, Justice.

This matter is before the Supreme Court on appeal for the second time. In the first appeal, State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165 (R.I.1988), we affirmed the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree in all respects except for the issue of whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to try him for this offense.

The defendant, Gerald S. Mastracchio, Jr., was seventeen years of age at the time of the murder of Richard Valente (Valente), who was thirteen. The defendant was twenty-three years of age at the time he was charged, tried, and convicted. Prior to trial and at trial, he argued that at the time of the offense he was a juvenile and that only the Family Court had jurisdiction to try him. After resolving all the other issues raised on defendant's appeal, we remanded the case to the Superior Court for a hearing and findings on whether the Family Court would have waived its jurisdiction over the accused juvenile if the evidence of defendant's guilt had become available to the authorities at the time the murder occurred.

The waiver-hearing justice decided a waiver would have been ordered. The defendant then filed this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court.

The seminal case discussing whether a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is proper is Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). In Kent the United States Supreme Court established that certain due process rights must be observed for a valid waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to occur. The Kent Court held that social service records, probation reports, and other similar records regarding juveniles must be made available to their attorneys. Id. at 562-63, 86 S.Ct. at 1057-58, 16 L.Ed.2d at 98. Moreover, the defendant must be given a hearing at which he or she would have the assistance of counsel. Id. at 561, 86 S.Ct. at 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d at 97. At the hearing the Juvenile Court would have considerable latitude to decide whether it should retain or whether it should waive jurisdiction over the juvenile. That latitude, however, is not complete. There must be a procedural regularity, sufficient in the particular circumstances, to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness as well as compliance with the statutory requirements of a full investigation. Id. at 552-53, 86 S.Ct. at 1053, 16 L.Ed.2d at 92-93.

Subsequent to Kent this court decided Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.I. 517, 231 A.2d 767 (1967), in which we held that Knott, an adult at the time of trial but a juvenile at the time of the crime, was entitled to a hearing under Kent, at which he would be represented by counsel and would have access to the juvenile's social service and juvenile records. This court added to the Kent requirements that the defendant was entitled to findings of fact as well as a statement of the reasons for the waiver determination. Id. at 522, 231 A.2d at 769. This court also identified the factors that the waiver justice should consider in reaching a decision to waive. They are (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the prosecutive merit of the case, (3) the defendant's record, (4) the safety concerns for the community, and (5) the potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 527-28, 231 A.2d at 772. This court also made mention of a Harvard Law Review article entitled, Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 Harv. L.Rev. 775 (1966). In that article an additional relevant factor discussed was the nature of the crime and the sophistication of the criminal method employed. Knott, 102 R.I. at 528, 231 A.2d at 772.

The Legislature addressed the question of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction when it enacted G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 14-1-7. ¹ That section provided that the Juvenile Court could waive jurisdiction for trial before the Superior Court after a full investigation to try any child aged sixteen years or older charged with a crime that would produce an indictment if the child were an adult. Of course, if the waiver occurred, the child would be tried in Superior Court. Rule 12 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure adopted by the Family Court established the procedure for and the standards to be considered in such a waiver hearing. The rule addresses all the criteria and considerations addressed in Kent and Knott.

Finally, in the case of In re Frances J., 456 A.2d 1174 (R.I.1983), this court expressed the observation that "in cases involving juveniles who have almost reached their eighteenth birthdays and when they are charged with a serious offense of the type involved in the case at bar, the Family Court should seriously consider waiver of jurisdiction pursuant to G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 14-1-7." 456 A.2d at 1175 n. 1. In Frances the offense was a crime of passion, the stabbing of a girl to death in a dispute over a boyfriend.

Following our remand, the trial justice conducted an extensive hearing on the question of waiver during several sessions extending over a period of more than a year. When rendering his decision, he correctly described his duties as requiring that he "place myself in the position of the Family Court Judge, back when this offense allegedly took place, to determine whether or not a Family Court Judge, at that time, would have waived jurisdiction of the Family Court in order to have defendant tried as an adult in the Superior Court."

The evidence presented by the state at the waiver hearing consisted of the entire transcript of defendant's trial in which he was convicted; the criminal record of Geraldo G. Mastracchio, defendant's father; and the intake report of the Family Court and the Family Court record regarding defendant himself--all of which items were admitted as exhibits in this case.

From these exhibits we learn that Richard Valente's parents testified at defendant's trial. They described their son at age thirteen as a youngster physically large and mature for his years who was a follower rather than a leader. He had suffered a severe head injury in an automobile accident that changed his personality. As a result of the injury Valente had a plate of some type inserted in part of his skull. He had developed a shyness or fear of people. He sought the company and the protection of older boys for security. He was frequently in the company of defendant. He had been caught attempting to remove a radio from an automobile parked at the apartment complex where he lived. When his mother brought him to the West Warwick police station, he admitted that he had attempted the theft at the instigation of defendant and Steven Dionne and a person named Landi.

Peter Gilbert (Gilbert) testified at defendant's trial that when he came back to Rhode Island, having escaped from prison in Florida, the first people he went to see were the Mastracchios. Gilbert had known defendant from the time defendant was seven years old. Gilbert testified that defendant had admitted to him that he had beaten Valente with the help of Dionne, ² who was also concerned that Valente would talk to the police about crimes they had committed. Gilbert testified that defendant said he had been cultivating Valente because Valente was about to come into money from an automobile-accident settlement. The two youths "gave him [Valente] a severe beating," "smacked his head in and threw him in the car," and drove toward Newport to dispose of the body. When they heard noises coming from the body, they were on the Jamestown bridge. Fog concealed them from oncoming traffic and no headlights were visible from other cars. They stopped the car and "dumped Valente over the rail and watched until he hit the water." Valente's body was discovered a few days later, washed ashore at Jamestown.

Gilbert acknowledged before the jury that he was a convicted felon who, at the time defendant admitted the Valente murder to him, was in Rhode Island, having escaped from prison in Florida. At the time of his testimony, Gilbert said he was in the protective custody of the Providence police, serving certain sentences imposed by the States of Maine and Florida. He admitted to a criminal career with convictions of fifteen very serious criminal offenses in Maine, Massachusetts, Florida, and Rhode Island for which he had served or was serving sentences. He admitted that he had been involved in three murders. He was cooperating with the authorities by giving information to the police about several crimes in which he had been involved or of which he had knowledge. The Valente murder was one of those cases in which he assisted the authorities.

He had entered into a signed agreement with the Attorney General in which he agreed to give information in his possession in exchange for financial support and for protection for his family. According to the agreement, if he testified truthfully in cases in which he was called upon, the Attorney General would recommend to the court a maximum of a fifty-year sentence with ten years to serve on all outstanding charges. He described his custodial situation as a lockup situation in the custody of the Providence police department. "I have a 24-hour guard seven days a week * * * in a cell block area" with "[b]ars on the windows."

The Bureau of Criminal Identification record on defendant's father, presented at the waiver hearing, records a life of serious crime beginning in 1941, ranging from assaults on a...