Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan

• Decision Date: 28 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-378-C.A.,99-378-C.A.
• Citation: 774 A.2d 866
• Parties: Diane S. CRONAN ex rel. STATE v. John J. CRONAN.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

774 A.2d 866

Diane S. CRONAN ex rel. STATE v. John J. CRONAN.¹

No. 99-378-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 28, 2001.

Present LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, WEISBERGER (Ret.), and SHEA (Ret.), JJ.

John P. Larochelle, Providence, Sheldon Whitehouse, Attorney General Joshua S. Macktaz, Eugene G. Bernardo, II, Providence, Paul Cassell, Lauren Sandler Zurier, Providence, for Plaintiff.

John A MacFadyen, III, Providence, Lise J. Gescheidt, for Defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

This appeal challenges the Superior Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the private prosecution of a criminal complaint. It also attacks the propriety of the defendant's misdemeanor conviction for simple assault on a number of other grounds. As a result of his conviction, the defendant, John J. Cronan, M.D., received a one-year suspended sentence and one year of probation. The victim, complainant, and prosecutrix (via privately employed counsel) was the defendant's estranged wife, Diane S. Cronan (Mrs. Cronan). During the prosecution of this criminal complaint, the Cronans were engaged in a bitterly contested divorce, though the final decree had not yet entered when the Superior Court found the defendant guilty of assaulting Mrs. Cronan. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

Facts and Travel

On September 27, 1996, during an argument in their Barrington home, Mrs. Cronan claimed that defendant yanked her by the arm, shoved her, and kicked her. She swore out and filed a private criminal complaint against him in District Court on October 22, 1996, accusing him of assault. After arraigning defendant, the court transferred the case on January 30, 1997, to Superior Court in accordance with Rule 23 of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.² Thereafter, in Superior Court, defendant waived his right to a jury trial. When the case was reached for trial, a state prosecutor from the Attorney General's office, who was present in court, declined to prosecute the case upon learning that Mrs. Cronan was prepared to proceed with her own private attorneys serving as the prosecutors for her complaint. Thereafter, without any objection from defendant, Mrs. Cronan's privately employed counsel prosecuted the assault charge against defendant, and the trial justice ultimately found him guilty as charged.

During the trial, Mrs. Cronan testified to the following facts. The Cronans had been married for twenty-four years. During their marriage, they had two children: John, who was then fifteen-years old, and Candace, who was then thirteen-years old. On the evening of September 27, 1996, Mrs. Cronan was in bed reading at about 10 p.m. when her husband walked into the bedroom, lifted the comforter toget into bed, and deliberately knocked all of her reading material onto the floor. When Mrs. Cronan bent over to pick up the material, defendant kicked her, pulled her hair, and called her a "crazy bitch." Mrs. Cronan attempted to flee, but he followed her through the house, tripping her and kicking her along the way to the garage. She tried to dial 911, but defendant ripped the telephone out of her hands and, indeed, he "almost ripped [it] out of the wall." Once she was in the garage, she got into her car and tried to lock the doors, but she was not quick enough to elude defendant, who jumped into the car after her. He then grabbed the keys from her. When she got out of the car, he grabbed her by the hair and pulled her across the garage floor.

The next morning Mrs. Cronan called her mother, to whom she had not spoken in years, and asked her to come over to her house. About a week later, on October 4, 1996, the Barrington police came to the home with a constable and an ex parte eviction notice. When the police observed the bruises on Mrs. Cronan's body, they advised her to fill out a complaint at the station. But the police never arrested defendant for the assault. Other witnesses corroborated various aspects of Mrs. Cronan's testimony.

The defendant testified that on September 21, 1996, his wife was in a rear-end automobile accident, resulting in soft tissue bruising. He explained that his wife had been behaving in a bizarre way, threatening him and the children with violence. He said that he told Mrs. Cronan that unless she continued with her psychiatric care, he and the children would move out of the house. He admitted to swatting Mrs. Cronan with a pillow once in 1996, but he denied the assault allegations that led to this trial. Other witnesses also testified and corroborated various aspects of defendant's testimony.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial justice rendered a bench decision in which he evaluated all the testimony and found defendant guilty. On the same date, he sentenced defendant. Thereafter, onMarch 1, 1999, the trial justice heard and denied defendant's motions for arrest of judgment and for a new trial. The defendant challenges these rulings on appeal.

Analysis

On appeal from his conviction in Superior Court, defendant argues various issues that we organize under three separate headings. First, defendant challenges the legality of a private misdemeanor prosecution in Superior Court. He insists that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the Attorney General deferred to the complainant's private attorneys and allowed them to prosecute the assault charge to judgment. In the alternative, defendant asks this Court to exercise its supervisory powers and to prohibit private misdemeanor prosecutions like this one. Second, defendant asserts numerous constitutional, procedural, and evidentiary defects concerning this private prosecution: namely, (1) that it violated defendant's constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and separation of powers; (2) that the withdrawal of defendant's waiver of a jury trial in the District Court occurred without his knowledge or consent; (3) that the prosecution failed to comply with the discovery requirements of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (4) that the trial justice erred in admitting certain "propensity evidence" during trial, in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Third, defendant suggests that the prosecution failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny. We address below each of these arguments (including whether they have been preserved for appeal).

I Private Misdemeanor Prosecutions

The first question on appeal concerns the legality of a private person like Mrs. Cronan initiating and prosecuting a criminal misdemeanor complaint to judgment in Superior Court. More specifically, defendant asserts that Rhode Island does not authorize private prosecutions like this one and that, as a result, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over this criminal proceeding. The complainant counters that state statutes and the decisions of this Court authorize private misdemeanor prosecutions.

In denying defendant's post-trial motion for arrest of judgment, the Superior Court relied upon G.L.1956 § 12-10-12 as authority for allowing Mrs. Cronan to proceed via a private complaint and private prosecutors. Section 12-10-12, is entitled "Filing of complaints," provides in pertinent part that:

"Subject to any other provisions of law relative to the filing of complaints for particular crimes, any judge of the district court or superior court may place on file any complaint in a criminal case other than a complaint for the commission of a felony or a complaint against a person who has been convicted of a felony or a private complaint. * * * If no action is taken on the complaint for a period of one year following the filing, the complaint shall be automatically quashed and destroyed." (Emphasis added.)

The trial justice ruled:

"So, I do not see that this Court is without jurisdiction. As I said, our legislature in [§] 12-10-12 makes reference to the filing of criminal complaints, and State v. Peabody, I know it is fashionable at times to say, well, if a case is old, it must not have any life left to it, but State v. Peabody, has not been overruled, and I think it contains an accurate and succinct declaration of the common law practice of having these complaints allowed at the level of misdemeanors."

The trial justice correctly construed both § 12-10-12 and State v. Peabody, 25 R.I. 178, 55 A. 323 (1903), as supportive of the conclusion that private misdemeanor prosecutions are valid in this jurisdiction. In Peabody, a private individual filed a criminal complaint and successfully obtained a conviction against the defendant for nonsupport of his children. Id. at 179, 55 A. at 323. While the defendant's petition for a new trial was pending, the complainant died. Id. The issue on appeal was whether the complainant's death served to abate the proceeding. Id. The Court in Peabody ruled that the complainant's death had no effect on the case since "the State is the real prosecutor." Id. at 180, 55 A. at 323. The Court further reasoned that, "the mere fact that a private individual is the complainant does not have the effect to render the case any the less a State case than though it were brought by a chief of police or any other prosecuting officer." Id. Peabody, therefore, as well as the Court's previous decision in State v. Woodmansee, 19 R.I. 651, 35 A. 961 (1896), supports the conclusion that private misdemeanor prosecutions, initiated by complaints filed by a private citizen, long have been a part of Rhode Island criminal law.³

In addition to § 12-10-12, other legislative enactments directly authorize prosecutions by private complaint. Thus, G.L.1956 § 12-4-1 expressly authorizes the filing of private complaints "[w]henever * * * any person has * * * threatened to commit any crime or offense against the person or property of another," and § 12-4-2 explains...