State v. Matamoros
| Decision Date | 23 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38359 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL JOHN MATAMOROS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY Daylene A. Marsh District Court Judge
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Maris Veidemanis Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
{¶1} Defendant Paul John Matamoros appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an inventory search of a vehicle he operated but did not own, as well as a statement he made during his arrest. After his motion was denied, Defendant pleaded no contest to trafficking by possession with intent to distribute, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20 (2006), but reserved his right to appeal.
On appeal, Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the decision to impound the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution; and (2) whether the arresting deputy's pre-Miranda questioning of Defendant violated his right to be free from self-incrimination. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. The Decision to Impound
{¶2} Defendant does not challenge the scope of the inventory search of the vehicle Instead, he asserts the decision to impound the vehicle was unconstitutional absent attempts to find reasonable alternatives. "The constitutionality of a search or seizure is a mixed question of law and fact and demands de novo review." State v. Jim 2022-NMCA-022, ¶ 7, 508 P.3d 937 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When a defendant invokes our inherent power as a separate sovereign in our federalist system of government to provide more liberty under the New Mexico Constitution than is mandated by the United States Constitution, we utilize the interstitial approach to constitutional interpretation set forth in State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19, 22-23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this analysis, we "answer three questions: (1) whether the right asserted by the defendant is protected under the federal constitution, (2) whether the defendant preserved the state constitutional claim, and (3) whether there exists any one of three reasons for diverging from federal precedent." Id. Ultimately, we disagree with Defendant because we conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the arresting deputy from impounding the vehicle, and Defendant failed to develop his argument that the search of the vehicle was unlawful under the New Mexico Constitution.
{¶3} The Fourth Amendment mandates that searches and seizures must be reasonable. State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025. "Warrantless seizures are presumed to be unreasonable and the [s]tate bears the burden of proving reasonableness." State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to prove that a warrantless search is reasonable, the state has the burden of showing the search was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Baldonado, 1992-NMCA-140, ¶ 19, 115 N.M. 106, 847 P.2d 751. Inventory searches are a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6; see also Jim, 2022-NMCA-022, ¶ 8 ("Nearly fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court legitimized the 'routine practice of securing and inventorying' the contents of an automobile after it had been impounded." (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)).
{¶4} Our Supreme Court has concluded that for the inventory search exception to apply under the Fourth Amendment, "there must be some nexus between the arrest and the reason for the impounding," but "that nexus need only be reasonable." State v. Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶ 6, 97 N.M. 634, 642 P.2d 1093. "[N]o compelling need must be present to justify impoundment of a vehicle incident to an arrest." Id. If a defendant possesses property at the time of an arrest, "then a reasonable nexus exist[s] between the arrest and the seizure and inventory search of the [property]." State v. Davis, 2018-NMSC-001, ¶ 16, 408 P.3d 506. "[A] defendant 'possesses' any object that the defendant loses control over as a consequence of arrest and where that loss of control gives rise to the possibility that the object might be lost, stolen, or destroyed and the police potentially held liable for the loss, theft, or destruction." Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
{¶5} Here, there is a reasonable nexus between Defendant's arrest and the reason for impounding the vehicle. Defendant lost control of the vehicle because of his arrest. Although Defendant had just parked the vehicle at a private residence, it was not registered to Defendant, the passenger, or the persons residing at the private residence. Without permission from the registered owner to leave the vehicle at a private residence, leaving it would present a risk that the vehicle could have been lost, stolen, or destroyed. See id.; see also State v. Boswell, 1991-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 2, 12-13, 111 N.M. 240, 804 P.2d 1059 (). Accordingly, there was a reasonable nexus between Defendant's arrest and the reason for impounding the vehicle.
{¶6} Defendant urges us to conclude otherwise-that the vehicle was safe because it was lawfully parked on private property. He asks us to adopt the analysis provided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2015), which departs from other federal circuit courts, and to determine that the decision to impound was a pretext for a drug search. See id. at 1249-50 (examining a non-exclusive list of factors to determine "whether an impoundment is justified by a reasonable and legitimate, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale"). Defendant did not present this argument to the district court and thus failed to preserve it. See State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 45, 345 P.3d 1056 . Further, Defendant's argument invites us to construe the reasonable nexus requirement as one which "must be read in the way the Tenth Circuit reads it." That is, there must be "a nexus between the car and the crime for which the suspect is arrested." We are bound by our Supreme Court's precedent, which articulates the extent of our analysis as to whether the decision to impound a vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Manzanares, 1983-NMSC-102, ¶ 3, 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (citing Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030, ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778); see also Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2015-NMCA-030, ¶ 30, 345 P.3d 1086 (), rev'd on other grounds, 2016-NMSC-035, 385 P.3d 619. Defendant's proposed analysis, however, would contradict our Supreme Court's conclusion in Williams that a "compelling need" to impound is not required, and "[t]he fact that the vehicle was legally parked and could have been left there does not make the impoundment improper." 1982-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 6-7. Consequently, we agree with the district court that the Fourth Amendment did not require suppressing the evidence from the inventory search of the vehicle.
{¶7} The search Defendant complains of is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and so we next consider whether Defendant preserved review of the issue under the New Mexico Constitution. See Jim, 2022-NMCA-022, ¶ 7; see also State v. Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 12, 414 P.3d 332 ( .
{¶8} "It is well-established that Article II, Section 10 provides more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment." State v Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 51, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Accordingly, Defendant "need only '(1) assert the constitutional principle that provides the protection sought under the New Mexico Constitution, and (2) show the factual basis needed for the [district] court to rule on the issue' in order to preserve his claim." Jim, 2022-NMCA-022, ¶ 12 (alterations omitted) (quoting Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 22)). Here, Defendant asserted in his motion to suppress that the inventory search violated Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution and developed the facts supporting his argument in the motion and at the suppression hearing. The district court also denied the motion on Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 grounds. We conclude that Defenda...
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