State v. Mathes
| Decision Date | 05 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. COA13–955.,COA13–955. |
| Citation | 763 S.E.2d 926 (Table) |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Robert Lee MATHES, Jr. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Carrie D. Randa, for the State.
Richard J. Costanza for Defendant.
On 11 October 2012, Defendant Robert Lee Mathes, Jr., was arrested and charged with driving while impaired, driving while license revoked, and hit and run causing property damage. On 5 November 2012, Defendant was indicted for habitual impaired driving in lieu of the original impaired driving charge because he had three or more convictions for driving while impaired in the ten years directly preceding the current charge. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements and tangible evidence on 15 April 2013, and a hearing on that motion was conducted the same day. The evidence presented at the hearing tended to show the following:
Officer Roger Patton of the Black Mountain Police Department (“BMPD”) responded on 11 October 2012 to a dispatch concerning a wreck on North Blue Ridge Road in Buncombe County. The driver of the truck, who was reportedly wearing tan shorts and a blue jean jacket, left the scene of the accident and was walking north on North Blue Ridge Road. When Officer Patton arrived at the scene, he pulled into a retirement complex and discovered an unoccupied Chevrolet pickup truck blocking both lanes of North Blue Ridge Road with the front end in a ditch. The truck had sustained extensive damage. Witnesses at the scene indicated that the driver of the truck had gone up the road and was wearing a plaid jacket and tan shorts.
Officer Patton drove from the parking lot of the retirement complex onto Old United States Highway 70. Four to five minutes later and approximately 200 to 250 yards away from the accident, Officer Patton spotted a person, later identified as Defendant, walking along the road. Defendant was wearing a plaid jacket and tan-colored shorts, but no shoes. Officer Patton got out of his car and told Defendant that he was investigating an accident on North Blue Ridge Road. When Officer Patton asked Defendant if he knew anything about the accident, Defendant indicated that he did not. According to Officer Patton, Defendant looked intoxicated and appeared to have urinated on himself. His eyes were bloodshot and glassy, there was a dark stain on his pants, he smelled of alcohol and urine, and he had slurred speech.
Officer Patton (Italics added). During the frisk Officer Patton felt a set of keys in Defendant's right front pocket, but did not remove them. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Patton to elaborate on the frisk:
(Italics added). Officer Patton testified on redirect that he placed Defendant in handcuffs out of concern for officer safety.
When Officer Patton and Defendant returned to the scene of the accident, two unidentified witnesses told Officer Patton that Defendant was the person they saw get out of the truck. Officer Patton then determined that (1) the truck did not belong to Defendant and (2) Defendant's driver's license was revoked. At that point, Officer Patton placed Defendant under arrest for driving while impaired and driving while license revoked.
During the arrest Officer Patton again searched Defendant and, at that point, removed the keys from his pocket. Defendant indicated that none of the keys would fit in the truck's ignition. Nonetheless, Officer Patton entered the truck, inserted one of the keys, and “turned the switch over and turned it back off.” Officer Patton did not attempt to start the engine. Pursuant to BMPD policy, Officer Patton then left the keys with the vehicle for transportation by the towing company. Afterward, he took Defendant to the Buncombe County Detention Facility.
Another police officer, Officer Christopher Staton, traveled with Officer Patton and Defendant to the facility. During the ride, Defendant made several comments that the keys would fit in any Chevrolet vehicle. Upon arrival, Officer Staton read Defendant his Mirandarights for the first time. Defendant waived those rights, declined to submit to a chemical analysis of his breath, and refused to answer more than three questions about the incident. Defendant also continued to deny having driven the truck.
At the suppression hearing, Defendant moved the trial court to suppress any evidence obtained “as the fruit of the ... illegal ... search of Defendant's person.” The trial court orally denied Defendant's motion and memorialized that denial by written order entered 17 April 2013. In its written order, the court also made the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law:
... FINDINGS OF FACT:
....
12. [BMPD] policy required that keys to any vehicle that requires towing should be left at the scene of the wreck. As a result ..., Officer Patton obtained the keys from ... Defendant and tried them in the vehicle's ignition. The keys did work in the ignition. So the keys were left at the accident scene to be given to the tow truck driver.
....
3.... Officer Patton had reasonable grounds to conduct an investigatory stop of ... Defendant as a pedestrian, to conduct a protective pat[ ]down for officer safety, and to transport ... Defendant from the road[ ]side to the wreck scene in his police vehicle.
4.... [Officer Patton] had probable cause to arrest ... Defendant and charge [ ] him with [d]riving [w]hile [i]mpaired, [d]riving [w]hile [l]icense [r]evoked and[, h]it and [r]un [f]ailure to [s]top after a motor vehicle accident involving property damage.
Defendant's trial began immediately after the court's oral denial of his motion to suppress. At the close of the State's case and the close of all of the evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him. The trial court denied that motion, and Defendant was convicted of driving while impaired, driving while license revoked, and hit and run causing property damage. Because Defendant stipulated to having three convictions of driving while impaired in the previous ten years, he received a sentence for habitual impaired driving, a class F felony. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 23 to 37 months in prison for habitual impaired driving and 120 days in prison for hit and run and driving while license revoked. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
Our review of the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke,306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “The trial court's conclusions of law ... are fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Hughes,353 N .C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
“This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith,186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). State v. Fritsch,351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (citation omitted), cert. denied,531 U.S. 890, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000).
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress and dismiss. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Patton did not have the authority to (1) perform a pat down when he first encountered Defendant or (2) seize Defendant's keys during the arrest. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State did not present substantial evidence that he was the operator or driver of the truck. We find no prejudicial error.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This prohibition applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution similarly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. There are generally two types of “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment: (1) arrests and (2) investigatory stops. [In order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, an a]rrest[ ] require[s] that the arresting officer have “probable cause,” whereas investigatory stops do not.
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