State v. Mathews

• Decision Date: 31 October 1869
• Citation: 44 Mo. 523
• Parties: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. WILLIAM MATHEWS, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

44 Mo. 523

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,

v.WILLIAM MATHEWS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1869.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction.

Hill & Jewett, for appellant.

Johnson, Attorney-General, and Hitchcock & Lubke, for respondent.

I. The act of March 10, 1869 (Sess. Acts 1869, p. 45), does not relate to more than one subject, and that subject is properly expressed in the title. (City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich. 495; Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Ga. 69; McAunich v. Mississippi R.R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311; O'Leary v. Cook, 28 Ill. 534; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Metc., Ky., 556.)

II. It does not impair the obligation of a contract. (Bank of Columbia v. Attorney-General, 3 Wend. 588; Commonwealth v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 21 Pick. 542; Gorman v. Pacific R.R. Co., 26 Mo. 441; Thorpe v. The Rutland R.R. Co., 1 Will. 141; Lyman v. Boston & W. R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 288; Norris v. The Androscoggin R.R. Co., 39 Me. 275; New Albany & Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Swearingen, 33 Ill. 289.)

III. The remedy given by section 43 of said act is not exclusive of the ordinary remedy, by information or indictment, for misdemeanors committed by violations of the provisions thereof.

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant, who is president of the Excelsior Insurance Company, was prosecuted and convicted in the Court of Criminal Correction for a violation of the insurance laws of this State. It is agreed that the Excelsior Insurance Company is a company for insuring fire and marine risks, and was chartered by the Legislature several years prior to the passage of the general insurance law now in force, and that the act of incorporation exempted it from the operation of the statutes of 1855, subjecting corporate charters to legislative repeal, alteration, or amendment. The prosecution was commenced under the thirteenth section of the act “to create an insurance department,” and which gives the superintendent power to investigate and inquire into the business of insurance transacted in this State, and which declares that any person who shall refuse to give the necessary and requisite information when thereto demanded, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be subjected to a fine and imprisonment. Under the division in the law, entitled “an act for the incorporation of insurance companies other than life assurance companies, and for the regulation of insurance business other than life assurance business,” the twenty-third section makes it the duty of the president, or vice-president and secretary, or a majority of the directors, of every insurance company organized under the act or laws of this State, to make a report of its condition to the superintendent, within a given time. The section specifies particularly what the report and statement shall contain. The forty-seventh section requires every company organized by or incorporated under the laws of this State, to file the first statement, as mentioned in the twenty-third section, with the superintendent within ninety days after the passage of the act. The defendant refused to make and file the statement or give the required information. Before disposing of the main issues which arise in this cause, I will notice a preliminary point which has been pressed upon our attention, and that is whether this proceeding is not misconceived, and whether an information will lie. The forty-third section of the act last referred to provides that every violation of the act shall subject the party violating to a penalty of five hundred dollars, which shall be sued for and recovered in the name of the State of Missouri, by the attorney-general of the State, or circuit attorney of the circuit in which the company or agent, or agents, so violating shall be situated; and one-half of such penalty, when recovered, shall be paid into the treasury of the State, and the other half to the informer of such violation. It is insisted that this remedy is exclusive, and the only remedy that can be resorted to for a violation of the law. But this position is clearly untenable. The section refers to all violations of this act, and not particularly to the especial provisions we are now considering. The act “to create an insurance department” defines the duties and powers of the superintendent. It invests him with certain authority and power necessary to enable him effectively to execute and enforce the law, and make it subserve the object for which it was passed. For the purpose of obtaining information and thoroughly understanding the condition of insurance companies, they were required to furnish him with certain statements and facts; and a refusal to comply with that duty was made a misdemeanor. Therefore, whenever they fail to comply with or violate the provisions of the said thirteenth section, they are liable to be proceeded against for a misdemeanor. The qui tam action provided for in the forty-third section may be used in case of other violations, and possibly may be regarded as a cumulative remedy; but it is not necessary to express any positive opinion upon that point. For a reversal of the judgment, it is contended that the provisions of the law under which the conviction took place are unconstitutional: first, because they relate to a subject not included within the title of the act applicable to this case; second, because the duties and burdens devolved on the appellant's company are an impairing of the obligation of a contract. As to the first point, the constitution declares that no law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title (Const. Mo., art. IV, § 32). In the case of the City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578, we had occasion to examine this question with some care, and have seen no reason for departing from the conclusions there arrived at, or to change the construction then placed upon the clause. In that case the title was “An act amendatory of an act to enable the city of St. Louis to procure a supply of wholesome water.” The act, after authorizing the board of water commissioners to require owners of buildings to take out water licenses, went on to provide, in substance, that parties who failed or neglected to comply with its provisions, should be subject to certain penalties, and enacted how the penalties should be recovered. These provisions, we held, related to the subject embraced within the title, and were congruous and connected with it, and were entirely valid. The question in that case and the present one is precisely analogous. The board of water commissioners were invested with certain powers, and the penalty was essential to make those powers effectual. So, in the organization of the insurance department, it was necessary, in order to carry out the act, to empower the superintendent to do certain things; but the power would have been fruitless without authority to enforce it. To say that a separate chapter must be enacted for every provision in the framework of a law, with a distinct title, would be almost impossible and wholly ridiculous.

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