State v. Matthes
Decision Date | 14 April 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 39962.,39962. |
Citation | 210 Iowa 178,230 N.W. 522 |
Parties | STATE v. MATTHES. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Johnson County; R. G. Popham, Judge.
Defendant was indicted for willful and unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. He was convicted by a jury, and from a judgment entered thereon he appeals.
Reversed.
DE GRAFF, J., dissenting.E. A. Baldwin and Frank F. Messer, both of Iowa City, for appellant.
John Fletcher, Atty. Gen., and F. B. Olsen, Co. Atty., of Iowa City, for the State.
The evidence tends to show that the appellant rented a small room over a garage belonging to one Chaddick, and that the means of access to said room was through a door from a haymow in the barn belonging to Chaddick, to which the garage was attached. A door leading from the attic of the garage to the adjacent alley was nailed shut from the inside. The evidence tended to show that the appellant placed a padlock upon the door leading into the attic from the haymow. The officers who were about to search said place caused Chaddick to ask the appellant to come to the place, which he did. The officers took a key from the appellant, which fitted said padlock, and, entering said attic of the garage, found therein more than 30 empty pint bottles, jugs, quart jars, tin cans, and 45 one-gallon tin cans filled with alcohol. A still was also seized by the officers at said time. Chaddick testified that he did not have any key to the padlock.
[1] I. After proper identification, the still referred to was offered in evidence by the state. The appellant's objection thereto was that it was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and not tending to prove any of the allegations of the indictment. The objection was general and indefinite. The still was a part of the paraphernalia seized at the time of the search in question. The court did not err in overruling the objection that was interposed to the offer of this exhibit. State v. Bryant (Iowa) 225 N. W. 854;State v. Burzette (Iowa) 222 N. W. 394;State v. Campbell (Iowa) 228 N. W. 22.
II. The court gave the jury the following instruction on reasonable doubt:
[2] This instruction is somewhat ambiguous. It cannot be sustained. From the last sentence of said instruction, which we have italicized, the jury may well have understood that if, upon a full and fair consideration of all of the evidence, or from a lack of evidence upon any material fact, they were abidingly satisfied and convinced of the guilt of the appellant, then they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. The correct rule is, of course, that, if from a lack of evidence the jury entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, they are to acquit him; but this is quite a different thing from convicting a defendant upon a lack of evidence upon any material fact. The jury might readily have construed this instruction to place a burden upon the appellant which the law does not require him to assume.
[3] We have recently had occasion to fully discuss the question of an instruction upon reasonable doubt involving the element of a lack of evidence in State v. Anderson (Iowa) 228 N. W. 353, 356. The instruction in the instant case, however, does not conform to the rule therein announced with regard to a reasonable doubt which may arise from a lack or want of evidence. The instruction in question would seem to authorize a jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt from a lack of evidence upon any material fact. Such cannot be the law, and the instruction as given was not only erroneous but obviously was prejudicial to the appellant. It was error to give it.
[4] III. Error is predicated upon the giving of instruction No. 4, which was a copy of Code, § 1924, which in general terms covers the various forms of the prohibitory liquor law. Complaint is made that the instruction did not limit the offense to the strict subject of unlawful possession, but included a reference to the various forms of violation which are prohibited by the statute. The objection is without merit. No prejudice could have resulted to the appellant from the giving of the instruction. The indictment and the instruction of the court were limited to one subject-matter, to wit, unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. State v. Wareham, 205 Iowa, 604, 218 N. W. 145.
[5] IV. Complaint is made because the court gave an instruction defining the term “burden of proof.” The court properly instructed the jury that the burden rested upon the state to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The definition of “burden of proof” might well have been omitted from the instructions, but, when the instructions are read in their entirety, there was no prejudice to the appellant by the giving of said instruction.
[6] V. Complaint is made because in giving instruction No. 7 the court said: “The law further provides that courts and juries shall construe the laws in regard to intoxicating liquors so as to prevent evasion.” Such is the provision of the statute. Code, § 1922. This has been the statutory law in this state for nearly eighty years, since the Code of 1851, § 929.
In Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa, 486 (1874) in an action for damages for injuries from the sale of intoxicating liquor, we said:
“But the statute provides that, ‘Courts and juries shall construe this statute so as to prevent evasions,’ of its provisions, Code, Sec. 1554, which changes the common law rule generally applied to criminal statutes.”
In Cox v. Burnham, 120 Iowa, 43, 94 N. W. 265, 266 (1903) we said:
In Wright v. District Court, 171 Iowa, 596, 153 N. W. 157, 158 (1915), a contempt case, we said:
In State v. Snyder, 185 Iowa, 728, 171 N. W. 8, 10 (1919), we said:
In State v. Elliott, 198 Iowa, 71, 199 N. W. 270, 271 (1924), we said:
In State v. Comer, 198 Iowa, 740, 200 N. W. 185, 187 (1924), we said:
“Complaint is made of instruction No. 5, which is as follows:
‘You are instructed that the statutes of Iowa provide that courts and jurors shall construe the law with reference to intoxicating liquors, so as to prevent evasion; but this statute does not relieve the state from proving beyond a reasonable doubt every...
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