State v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 17 March 1926 |
| Docket Number | 74. |
| Parties | STATE v. MATTHEWS. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Harnett County; Devin, Judge.
Rory Matthews was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. New trial.
Indictment for murder. From the judgment reciting that "the jury had rendered a verdict in due form, that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, with recommendation of mercy," and adjudging that "said Rory Matthews shall suffer death by electrocution in the manner provided by law," defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Photograph correctly representing premises where homicide occurred may be used by witness to explain his testimony.
Use of photographs of premises taken by witness of homicide, few days later, held proper to illustrate his testimony.
W. P Byrd and F. H. Taylor, both of Lillington, and Young, Best & Young, of Dunn, for appellant.
Dennis G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.
The indictment to which defendant, upon his arraignment, entered a plea of "Not guilty," was sufficient in form to support either of four verdicts, to wit: (1) Guilty of murder in the first degree; or (2) guilty of murder in the second degree; or (3) guilty of manslaughter; or (4) not guilty. Upon either of these verdicts it was the duty of the court i. e., of the presiding judge, to render judgment as prescribed by the law of this state.
Upon a verdict that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, the judgment prescribed by law is that the defendant suffer death (C. S. § 4200) by means of electrocution (C. S. §§ 4657-4665). These statutes were duly enacted by the General Assembly, pursuant to section 2 of article 11 of the Constitution of North Carolina. No discretion is vested by these statutes, or by any other law in this state, in the court or the presiding judge either as to what the punishment shall be upon a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree or as to the means by which, or the manner in which, death, as the punishment prescribed by statute, shall be inflicted. The court has discretion only as to the date upon which a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree shall be put to death if upon appeal by defendant to the Supreme Court the judgment is affirmed, upon a finding of no error in the trial, a new date for the execution is fixed arbitrarily by the statute. Pub. Laws 1925, c. 55, C. S. § 4663. Neither the court nor the Governor now fixes such date.
Upon a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, or of guilty of manslaughter, the law prescribes that the judgment shall be that defendant be imprisoned upon the former verdict, in the state prison, for a term not less than 2, nor more than 30 years (C. S. § 4200); upon the latter verdict, in the county jail or state prison for a term not less than 4 months nor more than 20 years (C. S. § 4201). While the judge has no discretion as to the kind of punishment to be inflicted, which upon either verdict is imprisonment, a wide discretion is vested in him as to the term of the imprisonment. The various judges of the superior courts of the state are further authorized and directed, in their discretion, in sentencing prisoners to the state prison, to fix a maximum and a minimum number of years for the imprisonment, thus making the sentence indeterminate. C. S. § 7738. In exercising the discretion thus vested in him by law with respect to the term of imprisonment, the judge may take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case which he may find from the evidence, either on the trial before the jury, or upon the motion for judgment upon the verdict. Where, in his opinion, the facts and circumstances justify it, he may temper justice with mercy, mindful that "mercy blesseth him that gives and him that takes." In other cases, he may feel it his duty to render such judgment, within the law, as will impress the defendant with the vigor and strength of the law, and as will also strike terror into the hearts of evildoers, thereby deterring them, by fear of like consequences, from the commission of a similar offense.
It is the declared policy of the people of this state, with respect to punishment for crimes, that, the object of punishments being not only to satisfy justice, but also to reform offenders, and thus prevent crime (Const. N.C. art. 11), discretion shall be vested in the courts to determine the extent of punishments to be inflicted upon persons who have been convicted of crime, to the end, not only that the punishment may fit the crime, but also that it may be adapted to the purposes of the state in dealing with those who have violated its laws more often because of their infirmities than because of a wicked purpose to do evil. It is therefore declared in the Constitution of the state that only murder, arson, burglary, and rape may be punished with death, if the General Assembly shall so enact. For obvious reasons, the General Assembly has not conferred upon the courts any discretion as to the judgment to be rendered upon a conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree (C. S. § 4200); of arson (C. S. § 4238); of burglary in the first degree (C. S. § 4233); or of rape (C. S. § 4204). It may be noted, however, that both the crimes of murder and of burglary, as defined at common law, have been divided by statute into two degrees; only those who are convicted of either of these crimes in the first degree may be put to death.
If the verdict of the jury is "Not guilty" upon an indictment for murder, the judgment must, of course, be that the defendant be discharged from custody. There is no provision by statute or otherwise in this state for the rendition of a verdict of guilty of any crime, with a recommendation of mercy, by the jury. Punishments for crime are prescribed by law. Where the kind or amount of punishment is not fixed by statute, the discretion to be exercised is vested by law in the court or presiding judge. It is a sound, judicial discretion, "a liberty or privilege allowed to a judge, within the confines of right and justice, but independent of narrow and unbending rules of positive law, to decide and act in accordance with what is fair, equitable, and wholesome, as determined upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, and as discerned by his personal wisdom and experience, guided by the spirit, principles, and analogies of the law." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 375. A jury has fully discharged its duty and performed its function, under the law of this state, when its members have sat together, heard the evidence, and rendered their verdict accordingly. As the judge must not invade the true office and province of the jury by giving an opinion in his charge, either in a civil or criminal action, as to whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven (C. S.§ 564), so the jury must be content to leave with the judge the grave responsibility imposed upon him to render a judgment upon their verdict according to law.
The record upon this appeal discloses that the evidence offered by both the state and the defendant was submitted to the jury under a full and correct charge by the court. This record contains the following statement:
To this instruction defendant excepted. He assigns same as error. Thereafter the jury returned a verdict as follows:
"Guilty of murder in the first degree, with recommendation of mercy."
The court received this verdict as rendered. Defendant moved that the verdict be set aside. This motion was denied, and defendant excepted. After judgment had been rendered upon the verdict as recorded, the court stated that the recommendation of mercy would be transmitted at the proper time to the Governor.
It should be noted that the defendant, by this assignment of error, presents his contention, not that it was error to receive the verdict as rendered by the jury, but that it was error for his honor to instruct the jury that they might render a verdict upon the indictment in this case with a recommendation of mercy. This instruction was manifestly applicable to a verdict of guilty only. It could not have been understood by the jury as applicable to a verdict of not guilty. The court had, in the charge to the jury, correctly instructed the jury that, if they found the defendant guilty they must say by their verdict whether he was guilty of murder in the first degree, of murder in the second degree, or of manslaughter. There was evidence submitted to the jury from which they could have found facts which, under the instructions of the court, would have sustained either of the four verdicts permissible under the form of the indictment. Defendant admitted that he killed the deceased with a shotgun. All the evidence showed that deceased, at the time he received the mortal wound, had in his hands a grubbing hoe with which he had been at work prior to the appearance of defendant upon the scene. The relation between deceased and defendant for some time prior to the homicide had been unfriendly. Defendant contended that he killed deceased in self-defense. The state contended that he killed him with malice, and relied, not only upon the admission that defendant killed deceased with a deadly weapon, but also upon evidence which tended to show express malice. The state further contended that there was evidence which showed, not only that the homicide was murder, but that the murder was deliberate and premeditated, within the meaning of C. S. § 4200, as...
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