State v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 22 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. C,C |
| Citation | 805 S.W.2d 776 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Thomas Lee MATTHEWS, Appellant. C.A. 89. 805 S.W.2d 776 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Joel W. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Hugh W. Stanton, Jr., Dist Atty. Gen., Glenn I. Wright, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Memphis, for appellee.
Howard L. Wagerman, William B. Seligstein, Memphis, for appellant.
The appellant, Thomas Lee Matthews, was convicted of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to sell by a jury of his peers. The trial judge, finding that the appellant was a persistent offender and he had committed an especially aggravated offense, imposed a Range II sentence consisting of a fine of $5,000 and confinement in the Department of Correction for a period of nine (9) years.
The appellant appealed as of right to this Court after the trial judge denied his motion for a new trial. Tenn.R.App.P. 3(b).
The appellant raises seven (7) issues for our review. He contends that the evidence contained in the record is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction. He further contends that the trial judge committed error of prejudicial dimensions in (a) failing to grant his motions for the entry of a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief and the close of all the proof, (b) denying his motion to suppress, (c) permitting a police officer to state the street value of cocaine in the community, (d) refusing to allow the use of prior recorded testimony to impeach a witness, (e) permitting the assistant district attorney general to comment on his failure to call a witness during summation, and (f) refusing to sentence him pursuant to the Community Corrections Act of 1985.
The appellant raises the following issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence: "[T]he verdict of the jury was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the evidence preponderates in favor of the evidence of the Defendant, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury." As can be seen, the appellant raises the same question three different ways. Unfortunately, the three theories, individually and collectively, fail to state the ultimate question which this Court must resolve, namely, whether the evidence contained in the record is sufficient to support a finding by a rational trier of fact that the appellant is guilty of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance with the intent to sell beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
The preponderance of the evidence test was replaced by the rational trier of fact test in Jackson v. Virginia, supra. Rule 13(e), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, also embodies the rational trier of fact test.
The portion of the issue contending that the "verdict of the jury was contrary to the weight of the evidence" poses an improper question because it requires that this Court "weigh" the evidence. 2 Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court is empowered to weigh the evidence, when, as here, a jury has returned and the trial judge has approved the challenged verdict. 3
The portion of the issue which contends that "the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury" is so general that it fails to comport with the requirements of Rule 27(a)(4), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, this issue has been waived. 4 As Judge Charles E. Nearn, now retired, said in Tortorich v. Erickson: "To answer such a query requires a degree of clairvoyance with which this Court is not possessed." 5
We opt to consider this issue notwithstanding the fact that it has been waived.
While on routine patrol, two police officers noticed four men in a parking lot behind a rooming house. As the police cruiser slowed near the front of the rooming house, one of the men ran behind the house. The officers pulled into the driveway and proceeded to the rear of the house at a rapid rate of speed. When the officers reached the rear of the house, the appellant was kneeling on the ground adjacent to an opening in the foundation of the house. The appellant subsequently stood up, turned around, and walked towards the officers.
An officer found a small package of cocaine lying on the ground equidistant between the side of the house and the opening in the foundation. A large quantity of cocaine was found just inside the opening in the foundation. The total weight of the cocaine was 30.5 grams. $974 was taken from the appellant's person following his arrest.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, this Court must review the record to determine if the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient "to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 6 This rule is applicable to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or direct and circumstantial evidence. 7
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. 8 Nor may we substitute our inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence. 9 To the contrary, we are required to afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. 10
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court. 11 In State v. Grace 12 our Supreme Court said: "A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State." 13
A criminal offense may be established exclusively by circumstantial evidence. 14 However, before an accused may be convicted of a criminal offense based upon circumstantial evidence alone, the facts and circumstances "must be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant." 15 In other words "[a] web of guilt must be woven around the defendant from which he cannot escape and from which facts and circumstances the jury could draw no other reasonable inference save the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." 16
Since a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, 17 the defendant has the burden in this Court of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. 18 This Court will not disturb a verdict of guilt due to the sufficiency of the evidence unless the facts contained in the record and any inferences which may be drawn from the facts are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 19
There is sufficient evidence contained in the record from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the appellant was guilty of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance with the intent to sell beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
This issue is without merit.
The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police officers. The trial judge preliminarily ruled that the appellant had standing to challenge the search and seizure. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that (a) the appellant did not have an expectation of privacy in the premises that society was willing to recognize and (b) the search and seizure made by the officers was reasonable.
The first question this Court must determine is whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas that the police officers traversed. If the appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the appellant did not have standing to challenge the actions of the officers; and the question as to whether the search and seizure was reasonable becomes moot.
The evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing revealed that the appellant and Valentina Thaus were co-owners of the property in question. The two story structure located on the premises had been converted into a rooming house. A "Rooms For Rent" sign was permanently attached to the front of the structure. The appellant did not live on the premises; and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant stored any of his possessions on the premises.
There was a parking lot for tenants located behind the structure. Cars were parked in this lot when the event in question occurred. A common driveway, used by the tenants to drive from the street to the parking lot, was located on the north side of the structure.
The structure was situated on a conventional foundation. Along the rear of the structure there was an opening in the foundation, which was used to gain entrance to the area beneath the structure. There was no door or covering over the opening.
The earth beneath the house was extremely damp. One of the officers referred to the surface as containing "sludge", and there was "garbage" there as well. It appears that the sewer line was blocked, and two men were trying to unclog the line when the event in question occurred.
The officers entered the premises through the common driveway. The packet of cocaine was found lying on the ground along the edge of the parking lot. The bulk of the cocaine seized was discovered just inside the opening in the foundation.
We conclude that the appellant did not have standing to challenge the seizure of either the packet of cocaine or the larger quantity of cocaine found inside the opening of the foundation. The fact that the appellant was a co-owner of the property did not, standing along,...
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