State v. Mattox, s. AM-234
| Citation | 441 So.2d 648 |
| Decision Date | 18 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | AM-235,Nos. AM-234,s. AM-234 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Anthony P. MATTOX, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Kathryn L. Sands, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for appellant.
Glenna Joyce Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellee.
The State of Florida appeals from orders dismissing two informations. The two cases have been consolidated for appeal. We reverse.
Appellee Anthony P. Mattox (Mattox) was charged with three burglaries: the Boucher (Circuit Court No. 82-117 CF), Andrews (Circuit Court No. 82-118 CF) and Manly burglaries (Circuit Court No. 82-386 CF). The dismissal of the information in regard to the Boucher and Andrews cases only are involved in this appeal.
In the Boucher and Andrews cases, Mattox moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the Boucher burglary, Mattox alleged, in essence, that the facts upon which the motion was based were that: the breaking and entering occurred between 12:05 p.m. and 8:35 p.m. on December 13, 1981; that latent fingerprints were lifted off broken glass located near the back door of the house; that the back door glass window had been broken during the same approximate time as the breaking and entering; that Boucher had never given Mattox permission to be inside his premises; a friend of Boucher's had a key to the house; and that there is no other circumstantial or direct evidence connecting Mattox to the burglary. The State traversed this motion asserting that: Boucher had never given Mattox permission to be inside or outside his premises; Boucher is not in any way acquainted with Mattox; and the State denied the allegation pertaining to no other evidence as it intended to admit "Williams Rule type evidence" at trial.
As to the Andrews burglary charges, Mattox's motion alleged that: the breaking and entering of the house occurred between 1 p.m. on December 7, 1981, and 8:45 p.m. on December 8, 1981; that nothing was stolen; that the police found a latent print matching Mattox's known print outside the windowsill of the dining room window; the State cannot determine when the latent print was made; Andrews has never given Mattox permission to be inside her premises; and that there was no other circumstantial or direct evidence connecting Mattox with the burglary. The State's traverse to this motion asserted that: it could prove that the fingerprint was placed there recently because it could be lifted and that a print outside of a windowsill will last a relatively short time because of weathering; that Andrews had not given Mattox permission to be inside or outside her premises; that Andrews was not in anyway acquainted with Mattox; and the State denied the assertion that it had no other evidence as it intended to admit "Williams Rule type evidence."
In the meantime, the State had filed a notice in the Boucher case of its intent to offer evidence of the Andrews burglary at trial and in the Andrews case of its intent to offer evidence of the Boucher case. At some point in the Manly burglary case (not involved in this appeal) the trial judge heard a motion in limine and ruled that evidence of the Boucher and Andrews burglaries could not be received in the Manly trial. At a later time, the same trial judge when confronted with the motions in limine in the Boucher and Andrews cases thought he had already ruled on the matter, but nevertheless allowed the State to submit additional authority on the subject. Immediately following that, he heard argument on the motions to dismiss in the Boucher and Andrews cases. In the process of considering the motions to dismiss he allowed the State to present argument on the Williams rule evidence. Following this he took the matter under advisement and later entered the order appealed dismissing the Boucher and Andrews burglary informations pursuant to the 3.190(c)(4) motion.
Following this, the State filed a "Motion to Reconsider: The Granting of Defendant's Motion in Limine in Case 82-117 CF, 82-118 CF and 82-386 CF, Orders Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in Cases 82-117 CF and 82-118 CF and Notice of Supplemental Authority." The case numbers set forth in the motion included the Boucher, Andrews and Manly burglary cases. After a hearing in which there was some discussion regarding a reconsideration of the motion in limine and a statement by the trial judge that the granting of the motion in limine and the dismissals of the Boucher and Andrews burglary cases could be appealed together, the trial judge entered an order denying the motion to reconsider.
Thus, while there is confusion in the record, it is apparent that the trial judge believed that he had granted the motion in limine as to all three cases and so did the parties.
We, therefore, have first reviewed the correctness of the trial judge's determination on the Williams rule evidence and have found his decision to exclude the evidence of the other burglaries in each of the Boucher and Andrews burglary cases was not in error. The record reflects insufficient similarity among the three burglaries to warrant...
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State v. Parrish
...required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. State v. Davis, 243 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla.1971); State v. Mattox, 441 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Thus, unlike the standard employed at trial when the jury considers the evidence, all inferences attendant upon the e......
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Walker v. State
...into the home of another raises an inference that the prints were placed there at the time of the forced entry. 2 In State v. Mattox, 441 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court held that evidence that the "defendant's fingerprint was placed at the point of entry at the time of the bu......
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Birks v. State, 95-37
...intent. At that stage of the proceedings, all facts and inferences therefrom were to be construed in the state's favor. State v. Mattox, 441 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The appellant concedes that, as a general rule, questions of the defendant's knowledge and intent to commit a crime are......