State v. Matzinger

• Decision Date: 19 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16CA4.,16CA4.
• Citation: 81 N.E.3d 841,2017 Ohio 324
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Victoria MATZINGER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

81 N.E.3d 841

2017 Ohio 324

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Victoria MATZINGER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 16CA4.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Washington County.

Jan. 19, 2017.

Jessica G. D'Varga, The Law Offices of Saia & Piatt, Inc., Columbus, OH, for Appellant.

Paul G. Bertram, III, Marietta City Law Director, and Daniel Everson, Marietta City Assistant Law Director, Marietta, OH, for Appellee.

McFARLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Victoria Matzinger appeals the journal entry of judgment entered on September 17, 2015 in the Marietta Municipal Court. On June 21, 2015, Appellant was stopped for operating her vehicle left of center and ultimately arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, pursuant to R.C. 4511.19. She subsequently filed a motion to suppress which came on for hearing on September 14, 2015, which the trial court overruled.

{¶ 2} On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in its finding that field sobriety tests were properly administered and documented. She also argues the trial court erred in its finding that there was reasonable suspicion to remove her from the vehicle and finding probable cause for her arrest. Upon review of the record and relevant Ohio law, we find no merit to the two assignments of error. Accordingly, we overrule both assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

{¶ 3} Here, the Appellant was traveling northbound on S.R. 7 in Washington County when Trooper Seabolt of the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed her failing to stay within marked lanes and weaving within her own lane of travel. He initiated a traffic stop which turned into an investigation as to whether Appellant was operating her vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Appellant was charged with a violation of R.C. 4511.19. She entered a not guilty plea and filed a motion to suppress.

{¶ 4} The suppression motion was heard on September 14, 2015. The State presented the testimony of Trooper Seabolt. The State also played relevant portions of the DVD video and audio recording which Trooper Seabolt identified as being a true and accurate copy of the DVD he submitted to the Marietta City Law Director's Office. Appellant did not testify or offer any evidence. On September 17, 2015, the trial court filed its journal entry of judgment denying Appellant's motion. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on January 14, 2016, was found guilty, and sentenced by the trial court.

{¶ 5} This timely appeal followed. Where relevant below, we cite to the transcript of the suppression hearing for additional facts.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WALK & TURN AND ONE LEG STAND WERE PROPERLY ADMINISTERED AND CLUE (SIC.) PROPERLY DOCUMENTED."

"II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO REMOVE MS. MATZINGER FROM THE VEHICLE TO PERFORM FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING AND PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HER ARREST FOR OVI."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 6} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Davis, 2016-Ohio-3539, 67 N.E.3d 33, ¶ 18 ; State v. Gurley, 54 N.E.3d 768, 2015-Ohio-5361 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100. At a suppression hearing, the trial court acts as the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Id.; State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Thus, when reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Gurley at ¶ 16, citing State v. Landrum, 137 Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (4th Dist.2000). However, "[a]ccepting those facts as true, we must independently determine whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case." Id., citing Roberts at ¶ 100.

Assignment of Error I—Should the Field Sobriety Tests Have Been Suppressed?

{¶ 7} R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) governs the admissibility of field sobriety tests and states:

"In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, * * * if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:

(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.

(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.

(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate. State v. Harrington, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 16CA2, 2016-Ohio-4930 [68 N.E.3d 171], ¶ 19."

{¶ 8} Thus, "the results of the field sobriety tests are not admissible at trial unless the state shows by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with NHTSA guidelines." Harrington, supra, quoting State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 11. If the state fails to introduce evidence of "a reliable field sobriety testing standard, either via testimony or through the introduction of the applicable manual, the state has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating [substantial] compliance."Harrington, supra, quoting State v. Aldridge, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9–13–54, 2014-Ohio-4537, 2014 WL 5141552, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Kitzler, 3rd Dist. Wyandot No. 16–11–03, 2011-Ohio-5444, 2011 WL 5029024, ¶ 13. As the Aldridge court explained:

" ‘It is only logical that in order to prove substantial compliance with a given standard, there must be at minimum some evidence of the applicable standard for comparative purposes. Accordingly, where the suppression motion raises specific challenges to the field sobriety tests, the state must produce some evidence of the testing standards, be it through testimony or via introduction of the NHTSA or other similar manual or both.’ [Kitzler at ¶ 13], quoting State v. Bish, 191 Ohio App.3d 661, 2010-Ohio-6604, 947 N.E.2d 257, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). ‘Testimony about how the trooper performed the field sobriety tests presents only half the picture.’ Id., quoting Bish, 2010-Ohio-6604 [947 N.E.2d 257], at ¶ 28. Without any standards to which to compare the trooper's procedure, it is impossible to determine whether those tests are admissible. Id. " Id. at ¶ 18.

{¶ 9} Prior to performing the field sobriety tests, Appellant notified Trooper Seabolt that she had a steel rod and several pins in one of her legs, and that performing any type of balancing or walking test could be difficult. However, the trooper proceeded to administer the tests. Appellant directs us to the Eighth District Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Gettings, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99556, 2013-Ohio-3536, 2013 WL 4244642, wherein the appellate court held that when an officer is advised of leg problems, the problems should be taken into consideration and failing to do so should lead to suppression of the field sobriety testing. Based on the analysis set forth in Gettings, Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg stand test in this case.

{¶ 10} The State of Ohio responds first by pointing out the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") manual was never made part of the trial court record or the record on appeal. As such, the State argues that regularity of the proceedings should be presumed. The State asks us to presume that the trial court substantially complied with the NHTSA standards and decline independent review of the administration and scoring of Appellant's field sobriety tests. However, while the State may show substantial compliance with standardized field sobriety tests by introducing the NHTSA manual, it need not necessarily introduce the NHTSA manual into evidence in every case. Harrington, supra, at ¶ 20, citing State v. Perkins, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP–924, 2008-Ohio-5060, 2008 WL 4416656, ¶ 16 ; State v. Barnett, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2006–P–0117, 2007-Ohio-4954, 2007 WL 2758579, ¶ 25. Instead, the state may demonstrate substantial compliance through witness testimony to explain the NHTSA standards and the officer's compliance with those standards. Harrington, supra; Barnett at ¶ 23. Thus, "[e]vidence of the NHTSA procedures, either by witness testimony or the manual itself, is sufficient." Id. at ¶ 25. Suppression of field sobriety tests is warranted when the State fails "to present any evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that the field sobriety tests were conducted in either substantial or strict compliance with the NHTSA standards." Harrington, supra, at ¶ 21, quoting Gates Mills v. Mace, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84826, 2005-Ohio-2191, 2005 WL 1048125, ¶ 24. As such, we proceed to consideration of whether or not the evidence at suppression demonstrates that Trooper Seabolt substantially complied with NHTSA standards when administering the field sobriety tests at issue.

{¶ 11} The State also points out that Gettings is persuasive, not mandatory authority, and urges reliance on State v. Hall, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 05CA0006, 2005-Ohio-6672, 2005 WL 3446279. The State argues: (1) there is no evidence...