State v. Maxfield

• Decision Date: 06 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 12026,12026
• Citation: 98 Idaho 356,564 P.2d 968
• Parties: The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cyrus MAXFIELD, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 968

564 P.2d 968

98 Idaho 356

The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cyrus MAXFIELD, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 12026.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 6, 1977.

Rehearing Denied June 20, 1977.

Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Alan D. Cameron, and William A. McCourdy, Deputy Pros. Attys. (Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen.), Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Stanley D. Crow, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.

Defendant-respondent Cyrus Maxfield is a naturopathic physician, ¹ charged by information with four counts of practicing medicine without a license. In a 'Motion to Dismiss or Quash Information and Complaint,' Maxfield sought to have the applicable statute, I.C. § 54-1803, declared unconstitutionally vague. The trial court granted the motion and the state has appealed. We reverse.

After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over to the district court on four counts of practicing without a license and one count of illegal possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; a corresponding information was filed, naming specific individuals, times and places. A 'Motion to Dismiss or Quash Information and Complaint' challenging the practicing without a license counts was filed by Maxfield on July 21, 1975. The trial court issued a memorandum decision and order granting the motion. The four counts of practicing medicine without a license were dismissed, and the state has perfected this appeal.

Count 1 of the information alleges that Maxfield performed a pap smear, blood pressure test, cardiogram test, and inserted a needle into the patient to withdraw blood. Count II alleges that he performed a pelvic examination and inserted a needle into the patient to withdraw blood. Count III alleges that he delivered a baby and made incisions and stitches on the patient. Count IV alleges that he performed a pelvic examination pap smear, cardiogram test, and inserted a needle to withdraw blood. All counts alleged that Maxfield, in performing the acts, did 'knowingly, wilfully, intentionally and unlawfully practice medicine,' by 'investigating, diagnosing and treating' ailments 'at is commonly done by physicians and surgeons.'

On appeal, the state contends that the actions of Maxfield may be, and are, proscribed by I.C. § 54-1803. ² It is the State's further position that there is no necessity at this time for this court to define the parameters of the practice of naturopathy. Ultimately, the State maintains that I.C § 54-1802(a) establishes the bounds of the practice of medicine, and that anyone who engages in the practices there defined must be licensed under I.C. § 54-1803.

On the other hand, the respondent asserts that under the ruling of this court in state v. Smith, 81 Idaho 103, 337 P.2d 938 (1959), the practice of naturopathy is a constitutionally protected right, and that one who practices naturopathy cannot be required to procure a license to practice medicine. In effect, we understand the respondent's position to be that if a particular technique is utilized by a naturopath, regardless of whether it would fall within the ambit of the practice of medicine as defined by the statute, that naturopath cannot be prosecuted.

The trial court took the position that the statute is unconstitutionally vague by reason of the fact the under State v. Smith, the practice of naturopathy is constitutionally protected. Absent a statutory definition of naturopathy, the trial court held that there is no way to determine where the protected practicce of naturopathy and the practice of medicine overlap.

State v. Smith articulated several principles previously propounded by this court. The right to follow a recognized occupation is a right protected by the constitutional guarantees of liberty. Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; Idaho Constitution, Art. I, sec. 13. A calling may not be prohibited unless it is inherently injurious to the public health, safety or morals, or unless it has a tendency in that direction. State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 P. 491 (1923); State v. Fite 29 Idaho 463, 159 P. 1183 (1916). Maxfield reasserts these propositions, and we agree that they remain viable. Maxfield then points to language in the opinion which provides that 'So far as Section 54-1802, I.C., affects the practice of naturopathy, the act is unconstitutional and void,' and contends that he is protected from regulation because he is engaged in the practice of naturopathy. If that language is taken at face value and is deemed controlling, then Maxfield's argument would be meritorious. However, we disagree with this proposition; careful analysis reveals that the cited language guage is overly broad, and is incorrect. ³

It should first be noted that although the cited sentence does seem to prohibit regulation of naturopahy, that is not the thrust of the case. The case also notes that

'Nothing is indicated which would justify prohibiting naturopathy. And appellant disclaims any such intention on the part of the legislature. Naturopathy does bear some relation to the public health, and there can be no question but that the legislature has power to regulate callings related to public health.'

The court concluded that the system of naturopathy described therein was not 'inherently injurious,' and did not have a tendency that way. Further, the court noted that

'To require one desiring to engage in the practice of naturopathy to meet the requirements prescribed for physicians and surgeons would be an unreasonable regulation of a recognized calling, unnecessary for the public's protection.'

This comment is based on the assumption engaged in by the court in Smith that naturopathy as described therein did not include techniques generally accepted as being a part of the practice reserved to physicians and surgeons. In the context of the instant case, we find this assumption to be unwarranted. It is thus the conclusion of the court that the broad conclusion reached in Smith that the application of I.C. § 54-1802 to naturopathy is unconstitutional is incorrect. If it can be shown that the practices which a naturopath uses are proscribed in I.C. § 54-1802 to anyone who is not a physician or surgeon, then that naturopath is in direct violation of the provisions of the statute unless he holds a license pursuant to the physician licensure statute. It should be noted that the court below did not conclude that I.C. § 54-1802 is vague standing alone, and we do not address that issue here.

The important difference between Smith and the instant case is that in Smith the court was confronted with an attempt to enjoin Smith from holding himself out and advertising that he was a naturopathic physician. The court ultimately held that the naturopath could not be so enjoined. In that case, there were no specific practices involved which might encroach upon the practices proscribed in I.C. § 54-1802. The court there looked to a dictionary definition and described naturopathy as:

'a system of physical culture and drugless treatment by methods supposed to simulate or assist nature or to the use of physical forces such as air, light, water, heat massage and...