State v. May

• Decision Date: 08 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 57978,57978
• Citation: 339 So.2d 764
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie Carl MAY.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 764

339 So.2d 764

STATE of Louisiana v. Lonnie Carl MAY.

No. 57978.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 8, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1976.

R. Bradley Lewis, Talley, Anthony, Hughes & Knight, Bogalusa, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Woodrow W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., John N. Gallaspy, Second Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

DENNIS, Justice.

Lonnie Carl May was charged by bill of information with having participated in the April 27, 1975 armed robbery of Virginia Duncan, an employee of the Quick Shop Grocery located in Bogalusa, Louisiana, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. May pleaded not guilty to the charge, and was subsequently convicted by the unanimous verdict of a twelve-man jury. The trial jduge sentenced defendant to serve sixteen years at hard labor. May relies on fifteen of sixteen assigned errors for reversal of his conviction and sentence, having abandoned one of his assignments of error.

Two co-indictees, Joe Louis and Charles Sims, Jr., pleaded guilty to armed robbery, and were sentenced to serve twelve and nine years respectively. According to the State's theory of the case, Joe Louis entered the store armed with a gun, and robbed Virginia Duncan, an employee at the store; Charles Sims, Jr., also armed, stayed outside as a lookout, and Lonnie Carl May, the present defendant, drove the getaway car, in an attempt to make good their escape. At trial, defendant took the stand and testified that, although he was with Louis and Sims both before and after the robbery, he did not agree to or participate in the commission of the crime. May claimed he left Sims and Louis before they went to the Quick Shop Grocery, in order to purchase some fried chicken at a nearby fast-food store and that when he returned to the car he merely waited for Sims and Louis, not knowing they were engaged in a robbery. Once they returned, May asserted, he drove away, not even aware that a robbery had occurred.

To establish May's complicity in the offense, the State relied principally on the testimony of May's alleged co-participant, Joe Louis. Louis testified that prior to the robbery, he, Sims and May had discussed robbing a store, though not specifically the Quick Shop Grocery. In Louis' words, 'we're going out and make some money.' When Louis and Sims returned from the store, May was waiting, with the motor running. And according to Louis' testimony, after the robbery the money was divided among all three.

The State produced a witness, fourteen year old Joseph Magee, who claimed to have seen the defendant near the car by the Quick Shop Grocery, holding a gun and a bag. Two other unidentified men were, according to Magee's testimony, sitting in the car, and the car's motor was running.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his motion for bill of particulars, defense counsel asked the prosecutor to '* * * state specifically the facts which show the nature and causes of the charge or charges against the defendant.' The State responded that no answer was required. The trial court found the State's response sufficient.

Defendant urges that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to respond to his request, citing Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 484. Of course, these provisions entitle an accused to be informed of the 'nature and cause' of the charges brought against him.

While there is no doubt that an accused is to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges lodged against him, e.g., State v. Miller,319 So.2d 339 (La.1975), the rights vouchsafed by the foregoing provisions do not include discovery of the State's evidence or of the details of the State's case. State v. Jenkins, 338 So.2d 276 (La.1976); State v. Huizar, 332 So.2d 449 (La.1976); State v. Nix, 327 So.2d 301 (La.1976); State v. Knight, 323 So.2d 765 (La.1975); State v. Major, 318 So.2d 19 (La.1975).

In the present case the bill of information together with the bill of particulars informed the defendant of the crime charged, the identity of the alleged victim, and the place and approximate time that the offense allegedly occurred. Defendant was adequately informed of the nature and cause of the charges brought against him. Thus, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to compel the State to respond to defendant's request by furnishing him additional details and facts relative to his participation in the commission of the crime. State v. Alexander, 334 So.2d 388 (La.1976); State v. Vince, 305 So.2d 916 (La.1974).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for the production of all exculpatory evidence and information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The State disclaimed possession of exclupatory evidence. Defendant argues that '(l)eaving the decision as to what (evidence) is favorable and what is unfavorable to the prosecutor simply is not sufficient to implement the requirements of Brady.' Defendant urges that the trial court be required, either to conduct an in camera examination of the State's files, as suggested by the United States Court of Appeals in Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974) and Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968), or allow the defendant through counsel to examine them. These same arguments were rejected by this Court in State v. Major, 318 So.2d 19 (La.1975), wherein we held:

'* * * (A) criminal conviction is not subject to reversal merely because the State did not, before, during or after trial, open its evidence file to defense or court scrutiny.' 318 So.2d at 21.

A more serious question is presented by this defendant's assignment of error, for not only did defendant generally ask for exculpatory material which Might be in the State's possession, defendant also asked with particularity for a letter allegedly authored by Charles Sims, Jr., a co-indictee, which defendant claimed contained statements by Sims that he and Louis were the robbers and that Lonnie Carl May did not participate in the crime. The State never specifically denied having this letter. The State's sole response to defendant's entire 'Brady motion' was the general assertion that it had no exculpatory evidence. The trial judge felt constrained to believe the prosecutor's assertion, and therefore overruled defendant's motion for production of exculpatory material in its entirety.

In Brady v. Maryland, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. However, in determining what is material evidence in the myriad fact situations in which suppression claims arise, courts and scholars have experienced great difficulty in defining a standard of general applicability. See cases cited in Annotation, Withholding or Suppression of Evidence by Prosecution in Criminal Case as Vitiating Conviction, 34 A.L.R.3d 16 (1970); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to Defense, 74 Yale L.J. 136 (1964); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 112 (1972). In response to these gropings the United States Supreme Court has again spoken and, in doing so, has enunciated some principles applicable to the instant case.

The high court, in United States v. Agurs, --- U.S. ---, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) held that

'* * * Although there is, of course, no duty to provide defense counsel with unlimited discovery of everything known by the prosecutor, if the subject matter of such a request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge. When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.' 96 S.Ct. at 2399.

If the letter requested by defendant exists and contains statements of the nature he claims, there is at least 'a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists,' and the prosecutor should have either furnished the letter or have submitted the problem to the judge, instead of making the general response that he held no exculpatory evidence. In addition to Brady v. Maryland itself, there are many cases in which courts have held improper the non-disclosure of a statement exculpating the defendant given to the prosecution by a participant in the crime charged. E.g., People v. Kucala, 7 Ill.App.3d 1029, 288 N.E.2d 622 (1972); Nash v. Purdy, 283 F.Supp. 837 (D.C.Fla.1968); Smith v. Urban, 245 Ark. 781, 434 S.W.2d 283 (1968); People v. Cotto, 28 App.Div.2d 1116, 285 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1967); Wiman v. Powell, 293 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1961). Cf. State v. Cahill, 125 N.J.Super. 492, 311 A.2d 760 (1973); Nelson v. State, 59 Wis.2d 474, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973). Although admissibility of the evidence sought alone does not determine whether 'a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists' it is at least a factor to be considered. Under Louisiana law there are several instances in which a confession or statement by an alleged confederate exonerating a defendant could be used as admissible evidence by the defense: for impeachment purposes if the author of the statement is called by and testifies favorably for the State; for purposes of impeachment if the witness is called by defense and gives testimony that surprises or displays hostility toward defendant as provided by La.R.S. 15:487; for corroboration of the witness's testimony, in the event the State attempts to impeach him, in accordance with La.R.S. 15:496; for purposes of calling the witness on cross-examination under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93...