State v. Mayo

• Decision Date: 20 February 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 78298,78335,s. 78298
• Citation: 915 S.W.2d 758
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Kenneth L. MAYO, Respondent. Mary Kristen BECKER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 758

915 S.W.2d 758

STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Kenneth L. MAYO, Respondent.

Mary Kristen BECKER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.

Nos. 78298, 78335.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Feb. 20, 1996.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Judge Vernon E. Scoville, III.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Judge John C. Brackmann.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Jefferson City, Philip M. Koppe, Assistant Attorney General, Kansas City, James A. Chenault, III, Sp. Assistant Attorney General, Missouri Department of Revenue, Jefferson City, for appellant.

W. Stephen Nixon, Independence, Bob J. Hiler, Kansas City, for respondent Mayo.

Michael J. Gorla, St. Louis, for respondent Becker.

LIMBAUGH, Judge.

In these two cases, consolidated on the Court's own motion, the State appeals the dismissal of its criminal prosecution against respondent Kenneth Mayo for driving while intoxicated, and the Director of Revenue (Director), having suspended Mary Becker's driving privileges, appeals an order reinstating those privileges. The trial court in both cases ruled that the proceedings violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We now reverse and remand both cases.

The facts of these cases are not in dispute and need only to be stated briefly.

On September 16, 1994, respondent Kenneth Mayo was charged with the crime of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of § 577.010, RSMo 1994. The Director, in a separate administrative action, revoked Mayo's driver's license for one year effective December 4, 1994, pursuant to § 302.500, RSMo 1994, et seq. Thereafter, on March 3, 1995, Mayo filed a motion to dismiss the criminal proceeding. As grounds for the motion, Mayo contended that in view of the prior license revocation, the criminal proceeding violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The trial court sustained Mayo's motion and dismissed the action. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, Western District, and this Court granted transfer prior to opinion. Rule 83.06.

In the second case, respondent Mary Becker was also charged with DWI in violation of § 577.010. She entered a plea of guilty on September 7, 1994, and was placed on probation for two years. In a separate action, the Director suspended Becker's driving privileges according to § 302.500, et seq. Becker then filed a petition for a trial de novo in the Circuit Court of Franklin County to contest the suspension. Prior to trial, Becker filed a motion asserting that the suspension violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and requesting reinstatement of her license. When the trial court sustained the motion, the Director appealed to the Court of Appeals, Eastern District. This Court granted transfer prior to opinion. Rule 83.06.

The State and the Director raise two points on appeal: (1) that the revocation or suspension of a driver's license does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because it does not constitute additional punishment, and (2) that even if the revocation of a driver's license is punishment, it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because it is not imposed for the "same offense" under the test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Because this Court finds the first point dispositive, we do not reach the second point.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. Const., Amend. V. Three distinct abuses are prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause: (1) a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). Only the third of these protections is at issue in these cases. Obviously, the criminal sanctions imposed under § 577.010--incarceration and/or fine--are punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, to characterize the civil revocation of an individual's driver's license as "punishment" is problematic.

Whether a proceeding is labeled as civil or criminal is "not of paramount importance" because both criminal and civil sanctions may serve remedial and punitive goals at the same time. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. The determination of whether a particular sanction involves a punishment that violates the Double Jeopardy Clause "requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil ... sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment." Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. Those goals are "the twin aims of retribution and deterrence." Id.

The sanctions imposed in Halper are illustrative. Defendant was convicted under the criminal false-claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287, for submitting 65 falsified Medicare claims. Id. at 437, 109 S.Ct. at 1896. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. Id. The total amount that Halper had overcharged the government was $585. Id. Subsequent to his criminal conviction, the government brought a civil action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731, which mandated a fine against Halper of $130,000, a figure over 220 times greater than the government's measurable loss. Id. at 438-39, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the disparity between the District Court's approximation of the government's expenses and the mandated fine was so large that the fine constituted a second punishment. Id. at 452, 109 S.Ct. at 1904.

In reaching that conclusion, the Court set forth seemingly conflicting analyses for determining when civil sanctions constitutes punishment. First, the Court stated:

From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.

Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (emphasis added). In the very next sentence, however, the Court stated:

We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.

Id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (emphasis added). Respondents Mayo and Becker, drawing on the first sentence, contend that a civil sanction is punishment unless it serves solely a remedial purpose. The State and the Director rely on the second sentence for the proposition that a civil sanction is punishment if it serves only as a deterrent or as retribution. The difference is critical: If license revocation or suspension is both remedial and punitive, it is not solely remedial, and under respondents' version of Halper, the sanction is punishment.

The confusion is exacerbated by two subsequent United States Supreme Court cases that refer to Halper: Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993); and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). Neither case, however, expressly addresses the conflict shown above.

In Austin, the Supreme Court again confronted the issue of whether civil sanctions constitute punishment, this time in the context of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Defendant Austin pled guilty to state charges of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Id., 113 S.Ct. at 2803. Thereafter, the United States filed an in rem action seeking forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and auto body shop. Id. In response to the contention that the forfeiture was punishment, and therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court said:

In considering this question, we are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish. We said in Halper that 'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said to solely serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.'

Id., 113 S.Ct. at 2806. Applying the foregoing "solely remedial" analysis, the Court held that the forfeiture was punishment that was prohibited under the Excessive Fines Clause because it served not only a remedial purpose but also a deterrent purpose. Id. at 2810, 2812, and n. 14. ¹

In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994), a double jeopardy case, the Supreme Court briefly revisited Halper. The case involved the State of Montana's imposition of a tax on dangerous drugs. Id., 114 S.Ct. at 1941. Members of the Kurth family had pled guilty to criminal charges of possession of marijuana with intent to sell. Id. at 1942. The State then attempted to collect almost $900,000 in taxes on the marijuana. Id. at 1942-43. Despite Austin, which was handed down just a year earlier, the Supreme Court restated that under Halper, punishment means a "sanction [that] may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at 1945. Having acknowledged Halper, the Court then held its analysis was...