State v. Mayo

• Decision Date: 01 October 1909
• Citation: 106 Me. 62,75 A. 295
• Parties: STATE v. MAYO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

75 A. 295

106 Me. 62

STATE

v. MAYO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 1, 1909.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Hancock County.

S. H. Mayo was convicted of violating a town ordinance, and appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court. The case was reported to the law court for decision upon an agreed statement of facts. Judgment for the state.

This case was reported to the law court for decision upon an "agreed statement of facts," which states the case as follows:

"This is a criminal prosecution for breach of a town ordinance passed by authority of a special act of the Legislature of Maine, A. D. 1903, approved March 28th, A. D. 1903. Entitled 'An act in regard to use of the roads in town of Eden.' Said ordinance having been passed at a special town meeting, legally called and held in Bar Harbor, town of Eden, Hancock county, Me., on the 1st day of July, A. D. 1903.

"The respondent, S. H. Mayo, was arrested on a warrant duly issued by the Bar Harbor municipal court on the 5th day of April, A. D. 1909, entered a plea of not guilty, was found guilty by said court, and sentenced to pay a fine of $5 and costs of prosecution, from which sentence he appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court for Hancock county.

"All the requirements of the special act and the ordinance passed by the town of Eden have been complied with on the part of the town by its municipal officers. The warrant was properly drawn, served, and returned. The respondent came in over the Eagle Lake road, from Eagle Lake to the head of Jit. Desert street, in said Eden, being one of the roads specified in said special act and ordinance, in a motor vehicle propelled by its own power, with full knowledge of the existence of said ordinance prohibiting the use of automobiles and motor vehicles on said road.

"The Ocean Drive, Bay View Drive, from Buck Brook bridge to Hull's Cove bridge, the Eagle Lake roads as far as Eagle Lake, and the Green Mountain Drive are the only entrances by land into that part of the town of Eden known as the village of Bar Harbor. Closing the above roads make the entrance into Bar Harbor by motor vehicles over existing roads impossible. The said Eagle Lake road from Eagle Lake to head of Mt. Desert street is a crooked and hilly road."

Chapter 420, Priv. & Sp. Laws 1903, provides as follows:

"Section 1. The town of Eden in the county of Hancock, at any legal meeting of the voters thereof may close to the use of automobiles the following streets within its limits: Ocean Drive, Bay View Drive, from Duck Brook bridge to Hull's Cove bridge, the Eagle Lake roads as far as Eagle Lake and the Green Mountain Drive. Any street so closed shall be marked at the entrance thereof by signboards in large letters 'No automobiles allowed on this road.'

"The term 'automobile' as used in this section applies to all motor vehicles propelled by power. For the violation of this act the town of Eden may vote at said meeting what punishment shall be inflicted for the violation thereof, but for the first offense, not over twenty-five dollars and cost of prosecution; for the second offense, not over twenty-live dollars or thirty days' imprisonment, or both and cost of prosecution.

"Sec. 2. This act shall take effect when approved."

At the special town meeting held in the town of Eden July 1, 1903, the following votes were passed:

"Article 1.—B. E. Whitney was elected moderator and was sworn by the clerk.

"Article 2—Voted—That the following streets be closed to the use of automobiles in the town of Eden: Ocean Drive, Bay View Drive from Duck Brook bridge to Hull's Cove bridge; both Eagle Lake roads, as far as Eagle Lake, and the Green Mountain Drive.

"The following amendment was offered and carried: Any street so closed shall be marked at the entrance thereof by signboards in large letters, 'No automobiles allowed on this road.'

"Article 3.—For the violation of the foregoing act the person so offending for the first offense shall be punished by fine not exceeding $20 and costs of prosecution; for the second offense by a fine not exceeding $25 or 30 days' imprisonment or both and costs of prosecution."

Argued before WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, PEABODY, CORNISH, KING, and BIRD, JJ.

Wiley C. Conary, Co. Atty., for the State.

Herbert L. Graham, for defendant.

KING, J. The question presented is this: is the ordinance of the town of Eden, passed under express legislative authority, closing to the use of automobiles certain public streets in said town, constitutional?

The contention of the defendant is that it violates the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which deClares among other things, that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and that it also denies him that equality of right guaranteed under section 1, art. 1, of the Constitution of Maine, "of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."

It is an equal right of all to use the public streets for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others; and it is also too well recognized in judicial decisions to be questioned that an automobile is a legitimate means of conveyance on the public highways. But the right to so use the public streets, as well as all personal and property rights, is not an absolute and unqualified right. It is subject to be limited and controlled by the sovereign authority—the state—whenever necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, health, morals, and general welfare of the people. To secure these and kindred benefits is the purpose of organized government, and to that end may the power of the state, called its police power, be used. By the exercise of that power, through legislative enactments, individuals may be subjected to restraints, and the enjoyment of personal and property rights may be limited, or even prevented, if manifestly necessary to develop the resources of the state, improve its industrial conditions, and secure and advance the safety, comfort, and prosperity of its people And it is fundamental law that no constitutional guaranty is violated by such an exercise of the police power of the state when manifestly necessary and tending to secure such general and public benefits. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; Thorpe v Rutland R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 150, 62 Am. Dec. 625; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 28 Am. Dec. 188; Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. County Com., 79 Me. 380, 10 Atl. 113; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 Atl. 874; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643.

That reasonable regulations for the safety of the people while using the public streets are clearly within this police power of the state is too plain to admit of discussion. Such is and has been the law everywhere.

Since the introduction of automobiles as vehicles of conveyance many cases have arisen and been decided by the courts of last resort in different states respecting the validity and construction of statutes and ordinances regulating their use upon the public highways, and it has been uniformly held that the state, in the exercise of its police power, may regulate their speed and provide other reasonable rules and restrictions as to their use. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79, 74 N. E. 255, 108 Am. St. Rep. 464; Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 X. E. 848. 127 Am. St. Rep. 513; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 198; People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N. W. 172, 89 L. R. A. 345; People v. MeWilliams, 91 App. Div. 178, 86 N. Y. Supp. 357; Fletcher v. Dixon, 107 Md. 420, 68 Atl. 875; State V. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 483, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801, 120 Am. St. Rep. 671. See note and cases collected therein volume 12, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. p. 291.

The defendant, however objects against the validity of the ordinance in question here that it applies to automobiles only, and not to all other vehicles that use those streets. He contends that it "operates against a class only," and is therefore special legislation which the Constitution inhibits. That contention cannot prevail. This same objection to the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances regulating the use of automobiles that they apply only to one particular class of vehicles has been repeatedly raised in recent cases and as repeatedly decided to be without merit. In Barbier v. Connolly, supra, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: "Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which in carrying out a public purpose is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons...