State v. McAleese
Decision Date | 25 March 2022 |
Docket Number | S-21-255. |
Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Andrew MCALEESE, appellant. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Shon T. Lieske, Minden, of Lieske, Lieske & Ensz, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Jordan Osborne, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Nearly 9 years after the county court sentenced him for driving under the influence, third offense, Andrew McAleese filed a motion seeking to vacate and correct his sentence to add an ignition interlock provision. The county court concluded it had no legal authority to consider such a motion, and it denied the motion on that basis. McAleese appealed, and the district court affirmed. McAleese appeals again, and we granted the State's petition to bypass. We likewise affirm.
In 2008, McAleese was convicted in the county court for Adams County of driving under the influence of alcohol, third offense, a Class W misdemeanor. McAleese was sentenced to a 60-month term of probation, which included a 30-day jail term, a $600 fine, and a 2-year license revocation.
In September 2010, McAleese's probation was revoked, and he was resentenced to a jail term of 120 days, a $600 fine, and a 15-year license revocation. McAleese was ordered not to drive a motor vehicle during the 15-year period of revocation, and the court impounded his operator's license during that period.
Although neither party brought it to the attention of the sentencing court at the time, the parties agree that in addition to the statutory penalty for driving under the influence,1 the statutory scheme governing the crime of driving under the influence also requires a sentencing court to issue an order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.01 (Reissue 2021).2 The version of § 60-6,197.01 in effect when McAleese was arrested required the court to impose one of two restrictions on all motor vehicles owned by the convicted person; it could either (1) order the motor vehicles immobilized for a period not less than 5 days nor more than 8 months or (2) order "installation of an ignition interlock device ... if [the defendant] was sentenced to an operator's license revocation of at least one year and has completed at least one year of such revocation."3
It is undisputed that neither the 2010 sentencing order, nor any other order in our record, imposed either of the statutory restrictions on motor vehicles owned by McAleese. No appeal was taken, and the conviction and sentence became final 30 days later.4
Nine years later, McAleese filed what he titled as a "Motion to Re-Open the Case [and] Vacate the Previous Sentencing Order and to Resentence the Defendant to Authorize an Ignition Interlock Device During Revocation." The motion asserted that the 2010 sentencing order failed to include an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01, and it requested that the criminal case be reopened so the sentencing order could be vacated and "corrected to order [McAleese] to obtain [and] install an ignition interlock device in his vehicle ... for the remainder of his revocation period."
The county court denied the postjudgment motion. It acknowledged that the 2010 sentencing order was "flawed" in that it failed to include an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01. But the court observed that the 2010 sentence had not been appealed, and "now, more than nine years later, any recognized flaws are well past that point in time that may have allowed the authority of this court to rectify the same." Concluding that it had no "legal authority" to reopen the case or grant the requested relief by correcting the sentence, the court denied the motion.
McAleese appealed. The district court, sitting as an appellate court, agreed the 2010 sentencing order was erroneous in that it failed to include an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01. But the district court also agreed with the county court's recognition that it lacked jurisdiction to vacate and correct McAleese's sentence, which had long ago become a final judgment. The district court therefore affirmed the county court's order denying the motion based on a lack of jurisdiction.
McAleese filed a timely appeal, and we granted the State's petition to bypass.
McAleese assigns that the district court erred in affirming the county court's denial of his motion to vacate and correct his sentence.
Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial court.5 Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court's decision.6
The court's failure to issue an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01 when imposing the 2010 sentence is something McAleese could have brought to the attention of the county court at the time of sentencing or could have assigned as error on direct appeal.7 He did neither. Instead, 9 years after his criminal judgment became final, McAleese filed a motion asking the sentencing court to reopen his criminal case, vacate his sentence, and impose a "corrected" sentence. McAleese directs us to no statutory authority for such a motion, and we are aware of none.
We have long recognized the general rule that where a criminal procedure is not authorized by statute, it is unavailable to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.8 And we have said that when an unauthorized motion is filed in a criminal case, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate it.9 Similarly, we have said that when a collateral attack on a criminal judgment is not raised in a recognized proceeding, the court lacks jurisdiction over the claim.10
Here, the county court concluded that it lacked "legal authority" to reopen the criminal case or vacate and correct the sentence, and on that basis, it denied the motion. On appeal, the district court agreed that the county court lacked jurisdiction to vacate and correct McAleese's sentence, which had long ago become a final judgment, and therefore, it affirmed the county court's order denying the motion. We likewise conclude the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion filed by McAleese, as there is no recognized criminal procedure which authorizes a sentencing court to reopen a criminal case after the judgment has become final in order to vacate and correct an alleged sentencing error.
Whether McAleese's motion is viewed as an unauthorized motion to modify a sentence11 or as an unauthorized collateral attack on his criminal judgment,12 the sentencing court had no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion, and the district court did not err in affirming the county court's order based on a lack of jurisdiction.
For the sake of completeness, we note that McAleese contends that his 2010 sentence was "void, at least in part, due to its failure to comply with ... § 60-6,197.01."13 We soundly reject this characterization.
It is well-established that a criminal judgment is void when the court rendering it lacks jurisdiction or a legal basis to impose judgment.14 Here, there is no dispute that in 2010, the sentencing court had jurisdiction over McAleese and had subject matter jurisdiction over the crime for which he was sentenced. The alleged sentencing error raised by McAleese does not pertain in any respect to the court's jurisdiction to impose the sentence. Instead, it involves only the court's failure to issue an order pursuant to § 60-6,197.01 when it imposed the sentence. This alleged error or irregularity is not one which rendered the judgment and sentence void,15 and McAleese's claim to the contrary is meritless.
The district court correctly concluded that 9 years after the judgment and conviction became final, the county court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate McAleese's motion to vacate and correct his sentence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED .
1 See, generally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,196(2) (Reissue 2021) (providing anyone who is convicted of driving under the influence shall be "punished as provided in sections 60-6,197.02 to 60-6,197.08").
2 See, generally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.03(4) (Reissue 2021).
3 See §§ 60-6,197.01(1)(a) and (b) and 60-6,197.03(4) (Cum. Supp. 2006). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.02(4) (Cum. Supp. 2010) ().
4 See, State v. Beyer , 260 Neb. 670, 619 N.W.2d 213 (2000) ( ); Caradori v. Hamilton , 193 Neb. 500, 227 N.W.2d 850 (1975) (same). See, also, State v. Jonsson , 192 Neb. 730, 224 N.W.2d 181 (1974) ( ).
5 State v. Coble , 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018). See State v. Greer , 309 Neb. 667, 962 N.W.2d 217 (2021).
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Boone
... ... court lacked authority to allow Boone to withdraw his pleas ... Generally, ... where a criminal procedure is not authorized by statute, it ... is unavailable to the defendant in a criminal proceeding ... See, e.g., State v. McAleese, 311 Neb. 243, 971 ... N.W.2d 328 (2022). Relatedly, we have said that when an ... unauthorized motion is filed in a criminal case, the court ... lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate it ... Id. These rules apply with particular force to ... motions filed after sentencing. See, ... ...
-
State v. Tucker
... ... the district court to grant a new trial or release the ... defendant without first conducting an evidentiary hearing, ... the court was not empowered to award a default judgment. See ... State v. McAleese, 311 Neb. 243, 971 N.W.2d 328 ... (2022) (general rule is that where criminal procedure is not ... authorized by statute, it is unavailable to defendant in ... criminal proceeding). Tucker's claim that the district ... court erred in failing to award him a default judgment ... ...