State v. McAllister
| Decision Date | 27 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20190188,20190188 |
| Citation | 939 N.W.2d 502 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Kelvin Antone MCALLISTER, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Wade G. Enget, Stanley, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Eric P. Baumann, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellant.
[¶1] Kelvin McAllister appeals from a criminal judgment and order for restitution after a jury found him guilty of assault. He raises various claims of error based on the proceedings at trial, and he asserts the district court erred when it ordered him to pay restitution. We affirm.
[¶2] The State charged McAllister with aggravated assault on September 19, 2018. The district court held a two-day jury trial in May of 2019. The jury reviewed video footage of a physical altercation that occurred at a grocery store in New Town, North Dakota, between McAllister and the victim. Both were employees of the grocery store. McAllister was on duty at the time of the incident; the victim was not. The jury also heard testimony from an officer who responded to the scene, the victim, an eye witness, and McAllister himself. The jury convicted McAllister of the lesser-included offense of assault. The court held a separate restitution hearing and ordered restitution in the amount of $32,063.68.
[¶3] McAllister asserts his right to an impartial jury was violated. He argues the district court erred when it denied various challenges for cause he made because jurors either knew the prosecuting attorney or had been the prosecuting attorney’s clients. He also claims that due to the aggregate effect of the jurors’ familiarity with the prosecutor the court should have granted his motion for a mistrial.
[¶4] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees those accused of a crime the right to a trial by an impartial jury. State v. Smaage , 547 N.W.2d 916, 919 (N.D. 1996). An impartial jury is one that is composed of individuals who are "indifferent" or "impartial" and willing to base their verdict solely on the evidence presented. Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 727, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992).
[¶5] McAllister first argues the district court erred when it denied his challenge for cause to various jurors who stated they either knew the prosecuting attorney or had been the prosecuting attorney’s client.
[¶6] We review a district court’s decision on a challenge for cause for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson , 552 N.W.2d 386, 388 (N.D. 1996). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner. Id.
[¶7] "An attorney-client relationship is one of the exclusive ‘causes’ of an implied bias that warrants dismissal of a juror." Thompson , 552 N.W.2d at 388 ; see also N.D.C.C. § 29-17-36(2). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a challenge for cause based on an attorney-client relationship unless the record shows "a direct and current client relationship of a juror with the attorney for the opposite party." Thompson , at 388; see also Smaage , 547 N.W.2d at 919-20.
[¶8] There is no evidence in the record that any of the jurors were clients of the prosecuting attorney at the time of trial. The jurors who stated they knew the prosecuting attorney or were familiar with him all affirmed they would be impartial. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied McAllister’s challenges for cause.
[¶9] McAllister next asserts he was prejudiced by the aggregate effect of the various jurors’ familiarity with the prosecuting attorney. McAllister moved for a mistrial pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 29-17-19, which allows for a challenge to the jury panel as a whole when there has been a material departure from the statutory process of drawing a jury. Whether a jury was impaneled according to statutory requirements is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Torgerson , 2000 ND 105, ¶ 3, 611 N.W.2d 182.
[¶10] Section 29-17-19, N.D.C.C., states:
A challenge to a panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms prescribed by law in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the intentional omission of the sheriff to summon one or more of the jurors drawn.
To show a material departure from the statutory requisites, the moving party must provide a factual basis showing the jury panel selection process "was prejudicial, actually excluded, systematically excluded, or statistically excluded a fair cross section of the population." State v. Palmer , 2002 ND 5, ¶ 6, 638 N.W.2d 18.
[¶11] McAllister claims a large number of the jurors were familiar with the prosecuting attorney, but he does not claim that characteristic is unrepresentative of the jurisdiction’s population. Nor does he assert that selection of the jury in this case strayed from the statutory requirements. The district court did not err when it denied McAllister’s motion for a mistrial.
[¶12] McAllister argues his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated because the district court limited his cross-examination of the victim. McAllister sought to question the victim about the victim’s interest in obtaining restitution. The court ruled the question would elicit confusing and misleading testimony.
[¶13] A defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him is constitutional in nature. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ; N.D. Const. art. 1 § 12. The right of confrontation is satisfied if the defendant "has the opportunity to expose weaknesses in the witness’ testimony." State v. Velasquez , 1999 ND 217, ¶ 8, 602 N.W.2d 693. Although the right of confrontation is of a constitutional magnitude, "the latitude and extent of cross-examination has always been held to be within the trial court’s reasonable discretion." State v. Haugen , 458 N.W.2d 288, 291 (N.D. 1990). We review the district court’s determination regarding the admissibility of testimony for an abuse of discretion. Id.
[¶14] This Court has not previously considered whether a district court abuses its discretion in precluding cross-examination of a victim’s potential interest in restitution. There is conflicting case law from other jurisdictions on whether cross-examination concerning a victim’s financial interest in obtaining a conviction should be allowed. At least one jurisdiction has reasoned that it is not necessarily prejudicial to preclude such questions because a victim’s motivation to testify against a defendant who allegedly caused the victim injuries is apparent. See State v. Gunther , 39 Conn.Supp. 504, 466 A.2d 804, 807 (1983) (). Another court has concluded that such testimony is relevant and should be allowed. See Bowen v. State , 252 Ga.App. 382, 556 S.E.2d 252, 254 (2001) ().
[¶15] In the present case, the district court recognized the evidence of the victim’s interest in restitution was relevant. In summarizing its ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, the district court noted the following: N.D.R.Ev. 403.
[¶16] The admissibility of the evidence of the victim’s interest in restitution is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Evidence of a victim’s interest in restitution is relevant. However, given the district court’s holding the evidence would be misleading and confusing to the jury, the extent of cross-examination that was permitted, and the impeachment testimony elicited, we conclude the district court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
[¶17] McAllister argues the district court erred when it instructed the jury. He claims the court should have given his proposed instructions on various defenses and that it should have instructed the jury to construe ambiguous jury instructions against the State.
[¶18] This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was fairly and adequately informed of the applicable law. City of Fargo v. Nikle , 2019 ND 79, ¶ 6, 924 N.W.2d 388. The district court errs if it fails to instruct the jury on an issue that has been adequately raised. Id. This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support an instruction. Id. "Reversal is appropriate only if the jury instructions, as a whole, are erroneous, relate to a central subject in the case, and affect a substantial right of the accused." State v. Thorsteinson , 2019 ND 65, ¶ 17, 924 N.W.2d 376 (citing State v. Huber , 555 N.W.2d 791, 793 (N.D. 1996) ).
[¶19] McAllister argues the district court should have instructed the jury on the following defenses: duress, excuse, use of force to protect property, and use of deadly force based on fear of death or serious injury. McAllister also argues the court should have instructed the jury to construe ambiguous instructions against the State and that the court’s instruction regarding circumstantial evidence was flawed.
[¶20] The evidence presented at trial shows this case arose from a dispute between coworkers that turned into a physical altercation. There was a question as to who the aggressor was, and the district court instructed the jury on self-defense and defense of others. The court also instructed the jury it must treat McAllister fairly and the State had a burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to McAllister, does not support his proffered defense instructions. Taken as a whole, we conclude the court’s instructions fairly informed the jury of the applicable law.
[¶21] McAllister also argues ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. McGowen
...N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08 to determine whether the court acted within the limits set by the statute." State v. McAllister , 2020 ND 48, ¶ 33, 939 N.W.2d 502 (citing State v. Strom , 2019 ND 9, ¶ 3, 921 N.W.2d 660 ). "This is similar to our abuse of discretion standard." Id. "Under § 12.1-32-08(......
-
State v. Davis
...not set aside a court's finding of fact in a restitution hearing unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. McAllister , 2020 ND 48, ¶ 33, 939 N.W.2d 502. We will determine a finding of fact to be clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by a......
- State v. Mohammed
-
State v. Davis
...not set aside a court's finding of fact in a restitution hearing unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. McAllister, 2020 ND 48, ¶ 33, 939 N.W.2d 502. We will determine a finding fact to be clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by any e......