State v. McBreairty

• Decision Date: 09 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96–049.,96–049.
• Citation: 142 N.H. 12,697 A.2d 495
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. William McBREAIRTY.

142 N.H. 12

697 A.2d 495

The STATE of New Hampshire

v.William McBREAIRTY.

No. 96–049.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

May 9, 1997.

Steven M. Houran, Acting Attorney General (John A. Stephen, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Law Office of David H. Bownes, P.C., Laconia (David H. Bownes, by brief and orally), for defendant.

BRODERICK, Justice.

The defendant, William McBreairty, was convicted for operating a motor vehicle after being adjudicated a habitual offender. See RSA 262:23 (1993). He appeals the Superior Court's (Galway , J.) determination that the investigatory stop of his vehicle was constitutionally permissible because it was based upon a reasonable suspicion that he had been speeding. We affirm.

At a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, Raymond Police Officer David Spinney testified that at 9:45 p.m. on April 27, 1995, while on routine patrol, he observed the defendant's vehicle as it proceeded west on Route 27. The officer, who had earlier received a report from the Deerfield police that they were looking for a similar vehicle, turned his cruiser around and followed the defendant. The officer followed the defendant at an even distance for approximately half a mile while noting his own speed. In this way he determined that the defendant's vehicle was traveling ten to fifteen miles per hour above the forty-five miles per hour speed limit as the vehicle entered a fifty-five miles per hour area. The officer continued to follow the vehicle for a short time while attempting to obtain information about its license plate. The defendant eventually turned off Route 27 and into the Leisure Village Trailer Park (Park), at which point the officer stopped the defendant. A motor vehicle record check revealed that the defendant was under suspension as a habitual offender. The officer arrested the defendant on that charge.

During his testimony, the officer acknowledged that two residents of the Park had told him, prior to April 27, of a vehicle with the defendant's license plate number, often driven by a male under suspension and while intoxicated. The defendant argued that he was not actually stopped for speeding because what the officer was "really trying to do [was] confirm some suspicion that he [had], a suspicion that he heard from two older ladies—who knows, weeks or months [before]—about a particular car and a particular operator." In denying the motion to suppress, the court concluded that the officer made the investigatory stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had been speeding; the court did not find the stop pretextual simply because the officer "made further observations and tried to verify the defendant's license before stopping the defendant for speeding."

On appeal, the defendant maintains that under both the State and Federal Constitutions, there existed no legitimate investigatory basis for the stop and, in the alternative, that the officer's claim that the defendant was stopped for speeding was pretextual. We analyze the defendant's State constitutional arguments first, relying upon federal cases only for guidance. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983). Because we conclude in this instance that the protections provided by the State and Federal Constitutions are equivalent, we decline to reach the defendant's federal constitutional argument. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Under part I, article 19 of our State Constitution, every citizen has "a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person." Consistent with this right, a police officer may stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes

provided that the stop is based on a reasonable suspicion that the person detained had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime and the officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.

State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 200–01, 665 A.2d 338, 339 (1995) (quotation and brackets omitted). In reviewing the trial court's ruling that the stop in this case was justified, we will defer to its factual findings on the events leading up to the stop, unless those findings are clearly erroneous; we review de novo , however, the ultimate determination of whether, in view of those findings of historical fact, reasonable suspicion existed. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, –––– – ––––, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662–63, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

Here, the trial court concluded that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant had been speeding. At the hearing on the suppression motion, the officer explained that by following the defendant's vehicle he determined that it was traveling above the permissible speed limit. The officer thus articulated a specific factual basis for believing the defendant had violated New Hampshire law, see RSA 265:60, II (1993) (concerning speed in excess of posted limits), which provided sufficient justification for stopping the defendant, see State v. Oxley, 127 N.H. 407, 411, 503 A.2d 756, 759 (1985).

The defendant nonetheless argues that speeding was merely a pretext for the officer's desire to investigate his suspicion that the defendant was the motorist identified by the two Park residents, a suspicion which itself would not justify the stop. To evaluate the allegedly pretextual nature of a search or seizure, ...