State v. McBryde
Decision Date | 04 April 1887 |
Citation | 1 S.E. 925,97 N.C. 393 |
Parties | STATE v. McBRYDE. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Robeson county.
Where one enters the house of another in the nighttime, through an open window, and, on discovery by an inmate, flees, these facts afford some evidence of guilty intent, and warrant the court in giving the case to the jury, in the absence of any other proof, or evidence of other intent.
The Attorney General, for the State.
French & Norment, for defendant.
This was an indictment for entering the dwelling-house of one Hornaday, in the night-time, otherwise than by a burglarious breaking, to-wit, through an open window, with a felonious intent, tried before GILMER, J., at August term, 1886, of Robeson superior court. There were two counts in the indictment; the first charging the entry to have been with intent to steal the goods of J. A. Hornaday, and the second with intent to commit a rape upon Mary E. McQuagin.
The state introduced the said Mary as a witness, who testified in substance, There was no evidence as to whom the dress belonged, or who removed it, or whether the witness or other lady retired first.
J. A. Hornaday was then put upon the stand, and testified as follows: "That he was sleeping in the house on the night of July 22, 1886, in a different room from the ladies, and he heard the screaming, and jumped up and got his gun, and went into the room where they were, and when he got there the person who had entered the room had gone, and that the witness Mary E. McQuagin informed him that Daniel McBryde was the person who had been in the room; that the moon rose that night about eleven o'clock." The defendant offered no evidence.
His honor, in response to the first prayer for instruction for the defendant, charged the jury "that the evidence in this case is not reasonably sufficient to maintain the charge against the defendant of an intent feloniously to ravish and to have carnal knowledge of Mary McQuigin, forcibly and against her will." And, in response to the third prayer by the same, he charged the jury "that, even if they should believe from the evidence that the prisoner entered the house for an unlawful purpose, they could not convict him, unless that purpose was with the intent to feloniously steal, take, and carry away the goods and chattels of J. A. Hornaday; and if the jury, from the evidence, are left in doubt as to the intent with which he entered the dwelling-house, they could not convict, as the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of all doubts." The second prayer for instruction was as follows: "That the evidence in this case is not reasonably sufficient to maintain the charge against the defendant that he did unlawfully and feloniously, otherwise than by a burglarious breaking, to-wit, did then and there feloniously enter the dwelling-house of J. A. Hornaday, in the night-time, through an open window, with the felonious intent then and there of the goods and chattels, money and other property, of the said J. A. Hornaday, in the said dwelling-house then and there being, feloniously to steal, take, and carry away." His honor refused to give this charge; and, in addition to the charge given as above, charged the jury "that there was no evidence as to who removed the dress, or whose property it was; and if they were fully satisfied that prisoner entered the house of the said J. A. Hornaday with the felonious intent to steal, take, and carry away any of the goods, chattels. money, or other property of J. A. Hornaday in the said dwelling, that they would find him guilty, and that if they were not so satisfied they would find him not guilty." There was a verdict of guilty. Judgment and appeal to this court.
It was insisted for the defendant that there was no evidence that should have gone to the jury, and that the court should have directed an acquittal. Whether there is any evidence is a question for the court. What weight is to be given to it where there is any, is for the jury. "Where there is no evidence, or if the evidence is so slight as not reasonably to warrant the...
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