State v. McCahill

Decision Date21 June 1887
Citation72 Iowa 111,33 N.W. 599
PartiesSTATE v. MCCAHILL.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Green county.

Supplemental opinion upon rehearing. For original opinion see 30 N. W. Rep. 553.A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen.,for appellee.

W. W. Phillips and McDuffie & Howard, for appellant.

BECK, J.

An opinion was filed in this case at a prior term affirming the judgment of the court below. No abstract, assignment of errors, or argument in behalf of defendant having been presented, a rehearing was granted, with the assent of attorney general; and the cause has been again submitted upon an abstract and argument, both oral and printed, on behalf of defendant.We proceed to the further consideration of the case, so far as to dispose of all questions raised by counsel in their arguments.

1. The facts in the case are clearly, fully, and correctly stated in our former opinion, and no further statement thereof need be attempted. This opinion, it cannot be denied, shows that, although the case was before submitted without argument, it had careful, deliberate, and thorough consideration by this court.

Counsel for defendant begin the discussion of the case with this frank admission, which is a correct statement of a controlling rule of the law applicable to the case: We concede that if the defendant was present at Keystone No. 2 (the locality of the homicide) on the night of the seventh of January, and acting in concert with the body of men who were there for the purpose of frightening or driving Munson and his co–laborers from the mine, his conviction is right, although he did not fire the shot which killed Munson.” But counsel maintains that the evidence fails to support the facts on which this admission is based. It surely cannot be said that there is no evidence tending to show defendant's presence at the place of the homicide, and his action in concert with others for the purpose of driving away Munson and the other laborers. The evidence tends to show that defendant, from the beginning, co–operated actively in efforts to drive away these men; that he was associated in sympathy and interest with those engaged in the unlawful purpose, and was among the leaders in the enterprise; that there was a prearrangement as to the purpose, and action in concert to accomplish it; and that defendant was present at the place of the homicide, acting with the other conspirators. It is true that there was evidence, on the part of defendant, in conflict with the testimony introduced by the state tending to establish these facts.

It cannot be said that, upon this conflicting evidence, the jury, in the honest, intelligent, and unbiased exercise of their discretion, could not have found the facts in question which established defendant's guilt. We cannot, therefore, under familiar rules prevailing in this court, interfere with the judgment on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

2. Evidence was introduced by the state, against defendant's objection, tending to prove the acts of violence and threats of the strikers, with whom defendant was associated, at a time preceding the homicide. We think the evidence competent to show the purpose of the strikers to use violence, in order to accomplish their unlawful purposes. As defendant acted in concert with the other strikers to effect the purpose common to all, the evidence was competent to establish that purpose.

3. Certain evidence was introduced showing a conversation between two employes connected with the coal miners, at the time of the troubles, in which the opinion was expressed to the effect that there was danger of the violence resulting in bloodshed. We confess that the pertinency and relevancy of the evidence does not plainly appear. It may be possible that it would serve to show the nature and extent of the violence. But we are unable to discover any prejudice that could have resulted to defendant from the admission of the evidence, and therefore we cannot regard it as reversible error.

4. A witness for defendant, upon his cross–examination, was asked certain questions tending to show the feelings, as to the strikers, of one who accompanied him to the scene of the homicide shortly after it occurred. As in the case of the evidence just noticed, we are unable to discover its pertinency. But it appears that no prejudice to defendant resulted therefrom. It is not, therefore, a ground for reversing the judgment.

5. The state was permitted to show an assault upon the new miners, made an hour and a half before the homicide, by striking miners in whose company defendant was. This violence was at a mine a mile...

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21 cases
  • State v. Davison
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 15, 2022
    ...out the unlawful design, even though the particular crime committed was not a part of that design." (citing State v. McCahill , 72 Iowa 111, 33 N.W. 599, 601–02 (1887) )). United States v. Garcia-Castillo is illustrative. There, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to rob a train, and ......
  • State v. Cummings
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • January 20, 1967
    ...natural consequences.' To like effect see State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 400, 20 S.E.2d 360, 363; State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa 111, 30 N.W. 553, 33 N.W. 599; State v. Powell, 168 N.C. 134, 83 S.E. Defendant, Enoka and the juvenile driver, prior to picking up Perillo, agreed 'to look for trouble wit......
  • State v. Hairston
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1972
    ...13, 164 S.E. 747); State v. Stewart, 189 N.C. 340, 127 S.E. 260. In the McCahill case, supra (State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa 111, 30 N.W. 553, 33 N.W. 599), it was held that where a large number of persons combined to drive employees from premises, and in carrying out the conspiracy, one commit......
  • State v. Knotts
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 23, 1914
    ... ... * and the means are not specifically agreed upon or ... understood, each conspirator becomes responsible for the ... means used by any co-conspirator in the accomplishment of the ... purpose in which they are all at the time engaged." ... State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 N.W. 553, 33 ... N.W. 599 ...          It ... makes no difference at what time any one entered into the ... conspiracy. 1 Greenleaf, Ev. § 111. It may be, as we have ... seen, at any time before it is fully executed. But Stamey was ... a part of this assemblage ... ...
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