State v. McCaughey

• Decision Date: 29 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 21220,21220
• Citation: 904 P.2d 939,127 Idaho 669
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Walter McCAUGHEY, Defendant-Respondent. . Twin Falls, March 1995 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 939

904 P.2d 939

127 Idaho 669

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Walter McCAUGHEY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 21220.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Twin Falls, March 1995 Term.

Sept. 29, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1995.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Douglas A. Werth argued.

Roark, Rivers, Baxter & Phillips, Hailey, for respondent. R. Keith Roark argued.

SILAK, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court suppressing evidence in a criminal action against respondent for trafficking in marijuana. The evidence was obtained without a search warrant on the basis that respondent's wife consented to the search and that the officers reasonably believed she had authority to consent. We reverse the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of June 21, 1993, Respondent Joseph W. McCaughey (McCaughey) came home after a night of drinking and began beating his wife, Karen. Karen's eleven-year-old daughter called the police. Two deputies from the Jerome County Sheriff's Office, Randy Givens and Wayne Childers, responded to the 911 domestic violence call from the McCaughey residence. They arrived in separate vehicles and Childers' wife Mary was riding with Childers in his car.

Karen told Givens that she had been physically attacked and beaten by McCaughey. Givens observed bruising on her arms and a red face. Because Karen said that she had bruises on her chest, Givens asked Mary Childers if she would examine Karen more closely. While Mary Childers was examining Karen, Karen told her that she believed McCaughey had drugs but did not know if she should tell the police. She later told Givens she had reason to believe McCaughey had large amounts of marijuana in the basement and in the shed.

McCaughey was arrested at the scene for domestic battery and transported to jail by Givens. Around this time, Childers radioed the dispatcher to request a written consent to search form and to advise other police personnel that the situation involved marijuana.

Childers returned to get Karen's statement. At this time, Karen offered to let Childers look in the house. Childers asked Karen if she was married to McCaughey and if she lived there, and she responded affirmatively to both questions. At Karen's suggestion, Childers followed her to the basement door. According to Childers, Karen asked her daughter to go get the keys and the child returned a few seconds later with them. There were two padlocks on the door, which Karen opened. Childers observed scales and what appeared to be marijuana. Karen then led Childers to a detached shed, unlocked the door, and he again observed what appeared to be marijuana. After additional officers arrived on the scene, a written consent to search form was completed and signed by Karen.

McCaughey was charged by criminal complaint with trafficking in twenty-five pounds or more of marijuana pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(C), and failing to affix a tax stamp pursuant to I.C. §§ 63-4204--63-4206. McCaughey filed a motion to suppress, challenging the search of "areas and places not covered by a valid search warrant" on the date of his arrest. In November 1993, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Judge Wood, then a magistrate who was acting as interim district judge.

At the hearing, the following testimony was given regarding the relationship between McCaughey and Karen. They were married in August 1987, and lived in the residence at issue with Karen's daughter for about five years. In July 1992, Karen left for California because McCaughey had apparently beaten her three or four times by then. Karen and her daughter returned to the Jerome area in February 1993 and stayed for a short while with Karen's mother. When this arrangement did not work out, McCaughey offered to let them stay with him at the house near Jerome. According to both appellant and respondent, Karen did not intend to reconcile with McCaughey. Although Karen had planned to move to Utah and was slowly packing her things in anticipation of that move, she still had possessions throughout the house at the time of the incident, and was still legally married to McCaughey. Karen and McCaughey have since been divorced.

There was conflicting testimony regarding the nature of Karen and her daughter's authority to enter the basement and shed. Karen testified that McCaughey kept the keys to these locations on a ring that he hung on the wall or in his pants pockets, and that when she moved back in she was given a key to the house, but not a key to the basement room or shed. She testified that McCaughey had never told her she could not use the keys on his key ring, and that after moving back into the house she had access to all parts of the house but had never been down in the basement. Both Karen and her daughter testified that they had never been told not to go to the basement. She did testify that when she had left to go to California in 1992 there was only one padlock on the basement door and that when she returned there were two locks.

McCaughey testified differently. He said he told both Karen and her daughter to stay out of the basement and also told Karen to stay out of the shed or garage. He also testified that the house was owned by his father and that he worked on his father's farm in exchange for rent.

Deputy Childers also testified as to why he believed Karen had the authority to consent to the search of the basement room and shed.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Wood orally commented that he did not believe Karen had the authority to give the police permission to search the two locked rooms, and that in his view the evidence would have to be suppressed. Although Judge Wood gave the prosecution a week to produce additional authority to support its position and the state did not do so, Judge Wood changed his mind, and in a written order dated November 22, 1993, he denied the motion. Pursuant to Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), Judge Wood found that Karen had actual authority to consent to the search of the home because she lived on the premises with her daughter on a full time basis, she was married to McCaughey and because her property was located on the premises. Judge Wood also found that the officers reasonably believed Karen had authority to consent to the search.

On the morning McCaughey's trial was to begin, he agreed to enter a conditional plea of guilty to the trafficking charge in exchange for the dismissal of the tax stamp charge. He specifically reserved the right to appeal Judge Wood's decision. Judge Hart agreed to reconsider that ruling, and thereafter granted McCaughey's motion to suppress. Based upon State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), and State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (1993), Judge Hart ruled that this Court abolished the good faith exception principles which provided a partial basis for the holding in Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra, and that therefore Rodriguez should not be followed. He further found that the ruling in State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405, 744 P.2d 133 (Ct.App.1987), stands for the proposition that in order for a party to give consent to the search of a residence, the consenting person must have actual authority, and that the facts of this particular case did not meet the requirements of actual authority. The state appeals, limiting its basis for appeal to "whether Judge Hart erred in not finding the consent search lawful based upon Deputy Childers' objectively reasonable belief that Karen McCaughey had common authority over the premises searched." ¹

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in ruling that the holding and reasoning of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), do not apply to the search and seizure provisions of the Idaho Constitution, Art. I, § 17.

2. Whether Deputy Childers, at the time of the search, reasonably believed that Karen McCaughey had common authority over the premises searched.

III. ANALYSIS

A. BECAUSE THE HOLDING AND REASONING OF ILLINOIS V. RODRIGUEZ APPLY TO THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISIONS OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 17, THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING MUST BE REVERSED.

As a preliminary matter, we note our standard of review. In reviewing the district court's decision granting McCaughey's motion to suppress constitutionally challenged evidence, this Court will overturn the trial court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992). However we will undertake a free review as to whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-52, 776 P.2d 458, 460-61 (1989).

The issue in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), was "whether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so." 497 U.S. at 179, 110 S.Ct. at 2796. The United States Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The state argues that the issue presented in this case falls squarely within the reasoning of Rodriguez.

Rodriguez emphasized that the Fourth Amendment forbids only "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The Supreme Court held that what Rodriguez was assured by the Fourth Amendment was not that no government search of his property would occur unless he consented, but rather that no such search would occur that was "unreasonable". Id. at 183-84, 110 S.Ct. at 2799. The Court held:

It is apparent that in order to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many...