State v. McCaw

Citation58 S.E. 145,77 S.C. 351
PartiesSTATE ex rel. SPENCER v. McCAW et al.
Decision Date11 July 1907
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Application by the state, on the relation of C. E. Spencer, for writ of mandamus against W. B. McCaw and others. Writ denied.

W. B McCaw, for respondents.

GARY A. J.

This is an application to the court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for an order of injunction restraining the respondent from ordering and holding an election in the school district of Yorkville. The said school district was incorporated by an act, entitled "An act to create the school district of Yorkville, in York county, and enable it to organize a system of free schools, and to levy a tax in support of the same, and to purchase and hold property," approved 22d December, 1888. 20 St. at Large, p. 246. This statute embraced an area of one mile, extending from the intersection of Congress and Liberty streets. On the 15th of February, 1907, an act was passed, entitled "An act to enlarge the area of the school district of Yorkville to two and one-half miles" (25 St. at Large, p. 731), which provides: "That after the approval of this act, the territory embraced within the area extending two and one-half miles, from the intersection of Congress and Liberty streets in the town of Yorkville, in said state, be declared a separate school district, and to be known as the 'School District of Yorkville,' and that it be invested with such corporate powers as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of its organization, as now declared by law heretofore creating the same, and acts supplementary or amendatory thereto."

The petitioner alleges that this act is unconstitutional on the following grounds, to wit: "(a) In that it is in violation of and is repugnant to article 3, § 34, subds. 4 5, 11, of the Constitution of South Carolina. (1) The school district of Yorkville, whose charter is hereby amended, is not an educational institution under the control of the state. (2) It is a new school district, the creation of which is expressly prohibited. (3) A special law has been enacted where a general law could have been made applicable. (b) In that it is in violation of and repugnant to article 9, § 2 of the Constitution of South Carolina, in that the Yorkville school district, the corporation whose charter has been amended by said act of the General Assembly, is not one of the excepted corporations enumerated in article 9, § 2, of the Constitution, namely, 'such charitable, penal, educational or reformatory corporations, as may be under the control of the state,' but, on the contrary, is a corporation whose charter cannot be amended by special law, save only under the proviso to article 9, § 2, of the Constitution, which provides 'that the General Assembly may by a two-thirds vote of each house, on a concurrent resolution, allow a bill for a special charter to be introduced, and may pass the same as other bills'; but in this connection petitioner avers and charges that no such two-thirds vote of each house was taken on a concurrent resolution allowing the introduction and passage of the bill into the act herein assailed."

We proceed to consider, first, the grounds upon which it is contended the statute is obnoxious to certain provisions of article 3, § 34, of the Constitution, which is as follows "The General Assembly of this state shall not enact local or special laws concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, to wit: (1) To change the names of persons or places. (2) To lay out, open, alter or work roads or highways. (3) To incorporate cities, towns or villages, or change, amend or extend the charter thereof. (4) To incorporate educational, religious, charitable, social, manufacturing or banking institutions not under control of the state, or amend the charters thereof. (5) To incorporate school districts. (6) To authorize the adoption or legitimation of children. (7) To provide for the protection of game. (8) To summon and empanel grand or petit jurors. (9) To provide for the age at which citizens shall be subject to road or other public duty. (10) To fix the amount or manner of compensation to be paid to any county officer, except that the laws may be so made as to grade the compensation in proportion to the population and necessary service...

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