State v. McClain
| Decision Date | 22 June 1921 |
| Docket Number | 33663 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM MCCLAIN et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--JOHN W. ANDERSON, Judge.
BY verdict of the jury and judgment of the court thereon, the defendant was convicted of robbery, and was duly sentenced therefor. He has appealed.
Affirmed.
George C. Yeaman, for appellants.
Ben J Gibson, Attorney General, and John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I.
The evidence on behalf of the State tended to show that the defendant McClain and seven others pretending to act as police officers robbed William Pavluchik and Phelix Veriha on the night of July 9, 1919. The robbery occurred upon a farm a few miles out of Sioux City, which was occupied and farmed by the parties named. The fact that a robbery occurred was proven by indisputable evidence. The defendant denied that he had any part in it, and offered evidence, including his own tending to show an alibi. This was the nature of his defense. In other words, the disputed fact under the evidence was one of identity.
II. One of the grounds of reversal urged for defendant is that the trial court permitted an improper cross-examination of the defendant as a witness. In support of his alleged alibi, he testified that he was at a certain place on the night of the alleged robbery. There is some doubt in the State's evidence as to whether the robbery occurred on the night of July 8th or July 9th. One witness testified that it was three or four days after July 4th. The manifest tendency of the cross-examination complained of was to discredit the alleged alibi. The evidence for the State not only tended to identify the defendant as one of the robbers, but also to identify one or more of his companions. He denied acquaintance with such alleged companions. Prior to the time of the present trial, the defendant had been convicted of another felonious crime, committed immediately after the time of the alleged robbery, in conjunction with the same persons whose acquaintanceship he denied. He was interrogated on cross-examination as to some of the circumstances testified to by him on his trial for such offense. These circumstances were, on their face, apparently inconsistent with his present story of an alleged alibi. We think that they came fairly within the range of proper cross-examination, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the same.
III. Defendant also complains of certain leading questions permitted by the court to be put to the witness Pavluchik, he being the injured party and the purported prosecuting witness. This witness was a foreigner, and spoke the English language imperfectly. The trial court has a large discretion in such a case, within appropriate limits, to permit so-called leading questions. In the later examination of this witness, an interpreter was used, and with the aid of such interpreter a full examination and cross-examination were had. We discover no abuse of the prerogatives of the trial court at this point.
IV. The question most urgently argued by counsel for appellant pertains to the jury panel and to the method whereby it was made. The trial was had at Sioux City, where several district judges hold court in separate court rooms at the same time. The courthouse contains four court rooms, three of which were in actual use for the trial of cases by three district judges at the time of the trial of the defendant. The fourth room was, at that time, used as an assembly room for jurors, and was used by the district judges severally for miscellaneous business. In advance of the term, a list of 150 names had been drawn for the jury panel. They had all assembled in this particular court room and had all been sworn in the presence of one of the district judges to answer truthfully all questions touching their qualifications to sit as jurors. It appears also that many of them had been excused from jury service, for reasons not appearing in this record. Approximately 75 of them remained for service. For the purpose of apportioning these to the different court rooms where trials were proceeding, the clerk drew out of the box the names of the appropriate number for each court room, and these appeared in the respective court rooms for service. The number thus sent to each court room in the first instance was from 16 to 20. The names of all such were put into a box in such court room substantially in the manner provided by statute. For the trial of a case, the names of jurors were drawn from such box in the usual manner. It will be seen, however, that such box in any court room did not contain the names of the entire jury panel. The complaint of the defendant is that he was not present at the fourth court room at the time when the 16 or 20 jurors of the panel were allotted to the court room where his trial was held. The argument is that he had a constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial, and that this allotting of 16 to 20 jurors for use in the court room where his trial was had was a part of his trial.
The question thus raised involves a consideration of Code Sections 3693, 3694, 3695, and 3696, which are as follows:
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