State v. McClain, 4-86-1425

Decision Date20 May 1987
Docket NumberNo. 4-86-1425,4-86-1425
Parties12 Fla. L. Weekly 1290 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. John McCLAIN, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Robert A. Butterworth, Jr., Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael M. Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Michael J. Doddo of Michael Doddo, P.A., Plantation, for appellee.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

The state appeals an order in the criminal division of the Broward County Circuit Court granting suppression of evidence of a small quantity of cocaine in the defendant's blood. We affirm.

On December 31, 1984, appellee/defendant John Charles McClain was charged by information with manslaughter by operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, contrary to section 316.1931(2), Florida Statutes, and with operating a motor vehicle while his driver's license was suspended or revoked, contrary to section 322.34, Florida Statutes.

After substantial discovery by both sides, a hearing was held April 8, 1986, on McClain's motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol level at the time of the accident. The motion was denied, but with leave to renew at the time of trial as a motion in limine. Subsequently McClain moved to exclude all reference to the presence of a small quantity of cocaine found in his blood during a post arrest blood test. A hearing was held May 20, 1986. Following hearing, McClain's motion was granted. The state timely appealed.

At the hearing on McClain's motion in limine, defendant/appellee introduced the deposition of a chemist in the Broward County Medical Examiner's office, Dr. Gene Detashkin. The substance of the deposition was that the amount of cocaine was below a recordable level. It was not possible to tell within a tolerance of 24 hours when the cocaine was ingested, or whether its presence affected the person's manner of driving. The gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test did not reflect the presence of the cocaine. The court, in discussing its grant of the motion, indicated that the only function such information would serve when the amount of cocaine was a trace, when the effect of such an amount could not be stated and when there was no drug charge, was that of showing bad character. This is not permitted. The court found the prejudicial impact of such information was not outweighed by its relevance.

The issue here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellee's motion in limine to exclude all evidence of the presence of cocaine in appellee's blood when tested shortly after the vehicular accident that gave rise to these criminal proceedings. We conclude it did not.

It is clear that admissibility of evidence is in the discretion of the trial judge, and rulings thereon will not be disturbed absent abuse of that discretion. E.g., Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984); Booker v. State, 397 So.2d 910 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 493, 70 L.Ed.2d 261 (1981).

The state analogizes to Delap v. State, 440 So.2d 1242 (Fla.1983), to show that because the presence of the cocaine in McClain's bloodstream could be described by the expert witness as having an effect, albeit an indeterminate one, on the manner of driving, the evidence should have been put before the jury, and they would decide whether the cocaine affected the defendant/appellant's conduct. In Delap it was held that an expert witness giving testimony on the cause of death is not required to express opinions to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty in order for his opinion testimony to be admissible. "Such testimony is competent if the expert can show that, in his opinion, the occurrence could cause death or that the occurrence might have or probably did cause death." Id. at 1253; and see authorities cited therein. Such testimony is admissible, but the jury is to determine the weight to be given it. Id.

Assuming the analogy to Delap is a fair one--and that is problematic--we must note that the issue we are dealing with in the present case is not whether the particular evidence the state wishes admitted is admissible, but whether excluding it is an abuse of discretion. In Delap, the trial court's admission of expert opinion not expressed in terms of reasonable medical certainty was affirmed. That sets up quite a different appellate issue from exclusion of certain evidence.

The state thinks the fact Dr. Detushkin could testify that the cocaine may or may not have had an effect on appellee's driving the night of the accident is apposite to the assertion made in the Delap holding quoted above. The Delap statement, if applicable, surely requires that the witness be in a position to state there was a probability the substance affected McClain's driving. If his testimony was to be that the substance did not affect McClain's driving, the testimony would be wholly irrelevant.

We think from what we have seen of the chemist's deposition it was not possible for him to state any likelihood the trace amount of cocaine found in McClain's blood affected the manner of his driving. Dr. Detushkin was not merely uncertain about the effect; he did not have any idea of whether there could have been one. The amount of cocaine was merely a trace, so little...

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4 cases
  • Norstrom v. State, 89-1966
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 7, 1991
    ...West, the evidence concerning alcohol had no probative value or relevance to the charges brought against him. See also State v. McClain, 508 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), aff'd, 525 So.2d 420 However, evidence that appellant drank about four beers is relevant on the issue of reckless driv......
  • State v. Tagner
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 20, 1996
    ...to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and that it was unduly prejudicial. In West, we relied on State v. McClain, 508 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), approved, 525 So.2d 420 (Fla.1988). In McClain, this court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence that there was ......
  • West v. State, s. 88-2561
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 22, 1989
    ...of driving under the influence of alcohol and it was unfairly prejudicial. Thus, it should have been excluded. See State v. McClain, 508 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), aff'd. 525 So.2d 420 West correctly asserts that the admission into evidence of his prejudicial statements and admissions ......
  • State v. McClain
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 19, 1988
    ...Michael Doddo, Plantation, for respondent. GRIMES, Justice. This is a petition for review of the decision in State v. McClain, 508 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), which is in apparent conflict with State v. Weitz, 500 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We have jurisdiction under article V, sect......

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