State v. McClain

• Decision Date: 23 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 36791.,36791.
• Citation: 154 Conn.App. 281,105 A.3d 924
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Tajah McCLAIN.

154 Conn.App. 281

105 A.3d 924

STATE of Connecticut

v.Tajah McCLAIN.

No. 36791.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 24, 2014.

Decided Dec. 23, 2014.

Daniel J. Krisch, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Katherine E. Donoghue, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ALVORD, MULLINS and WEST, Js.

Opinion

WEST, J.

The defendant, Tajah McClain, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of murder with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53–202k, assault in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–59 (a)(5) and 53–202k, and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35(a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly limited his cross-examination of an eyewitness, and (2) committed plain error by not instructing the jury on the doctrine of consciousness of guilt. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On July 17, 2010, a group of more than ten people were drinking alcohol in the area known as “the X,” located behind the Greene Homes Housing Complex in Bridgeport. Shortly before 5:22 a.m., the victim, Eldwin Barrios,¹ was sitting on a crate when all of a sudden the defendant and at least two other men jumped on him, and started punching and kicking him. The victim kept asking them why they were hitting him, but no one answered. The defendant then was passed a chrome or silver handgun and he fired one shot, intended for the victim. The bullet, however, struck one of the other men in the back of the leg. The man who had just been shot yelled, “you shot me, you shot me, why you shot me,” to which the defendant replied, “my bad.” As this was happening, the victim got up and tried to run away, but the defendant fired several shots at him. Three of the defendant's shots hit the victim—one in the leg, one in the arm, and one in the torso—at which point, the victim fell to the ground and died.

The defendant was arrested three days after the murder. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to a total effective sentence of sixty-five years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant's initial claim is that the court violated his right pursuant to the sixth amendment to the United States constitution to confront witnesses against him by improperly limiting his cross-examination of an eyewitness, Eduardo Martorony. The defendant argues that the court improperly precluded him from cross-examining Martorony about the benefits derived from the witness protection program. Specifically, where he was living while in the program—a hotel, motel, or apartment, and how the state paid for his food, housing, and expenses—cash, check, or otherwise. He argues that this limitation prevented the jury from accurately assessing Martorony's credibility. We disagree.

The following additional facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, are relevant to this claim. Martorony had lived in the Greene Homes Housing Complex since 1992 and was still living there in July, 2010. He was seated about fifteen to twenty feet away from the victim at the time the fight started, and testified at trial, on behalf of the state, as to what he witnessed. In an attempt to undermine Martorony's credibility, the defendant cross-examined him extensively about the criminal charges he had pending against him at the time of trial, whether he hoped those charges would be dropped in exchange for his testimony, whether he desired not to go to jail, and how much alcohol he had to drink on the night of the shooting.

The defendant also asked Martorony several questions about his participation in the witness protection program. Prior to being in the program, Martorony had been unemployed for nine years and was living off a monthly social security check. While in the witness protection program, however, the state was paying for his food, housing, and other expenses amounting to at least seven hundred and fifty dollars. The court limited the defendant's cross-examination to only some of the details of the witness protection program. Specifically, the court did not allow the defendant to question Martorony regarding the form of the payments provided by the state and where he was living while in the program.

After the jury exited the courtroom, the court stated for the record the substance of a prior sidebar conversation, and noted: “I permitted [defense counsel] to cross-examine [Martorony] on whether his lodging is paid for [by the state], whether his expenses are paid for [by the state] and the amount of that. What I am not going to permit and would not permit [defense counsel] to do is to ask any witness in the witness protection program what type of lodging they're being provided specifically and how they're being supported; whether it's cash payments, et cetera. So all the questions that I did not permit and sustained the state's objections [to] were questions that would lead to disclosures that, in this court's view, would compromise the integrity of the witness protection program and the security of the individuals.... [Defense counsel is] still permitted to cross-examine [witnesses] on the amount and how much the state is spending and what ... is being paid for, just not the how, where and when necessarily.” The court stated that allowing the defendant to ask whether Martorony was in a hotel or apartment could endanger the witness: “[Disclosing that information] will limit the areas in which somebody could search for a potential individual. So in the court's view, that would certainly provide some information as to where to locate the person, and it could potentially also have a chilling effect on the witness. [I]n the court's view, the defense's ability to inquire into ... what is being paid for and what benefits are received ... is sufficient to elicit the type of testimony that the defense would need to cross-examine relating to the witness' ... motive, bias, [and] ability to lie ... whether it's a house, apartment or hotel room, in this court's view, is not so significant that it would diminish the impact of the cross-examination. And the risk of potentially disclosing where somebody's location is, in this court's view, is far too great, and the probative value of that level of detail, in this court's view, does not outweigh the general interest of the state authorities in insuring the integrity of the program.”

We begin our review of the defendant's first claim by setting forth the governing legal principles. “The general rule is that restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial judge ... but this discretion comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment.... We must, therefore, conduct a two-step analysis, determining first whether the cross-examination permitted to defense counsel comported with sixth amendment standards ... and second, whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting the scope of that cross-examination.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reeves, 57 Conn.App. 337, 346, 748 A.2d 357 (2000).

“The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination ... and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying.... Cross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted.... In order to comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness....

“In determining whether a defendant's right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.... [T]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate area of inquiry fails to comport with constitutional standards under the confrontation clause.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 331, 618 A.2d 32 (1992).

“[T]he confrontation clause does not [however] suspend the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.... To the contrary, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 9–10, 1 A.3d 76 (2010). “The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination.... Thus, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling[s] [on these bases].... In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court ... reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 11, 1 A.3d 76.

With these standards in mind, we conclude that the defendant's cross-examination of Martorony satisfied constitutional requirements and, further, that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the questioning as it did. A review of the record discloses that the defendant was...