State v. McClenton, No. A09-389.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. A09-389.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Roosevelt McCLENTON, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

781 N.W.2d 181

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Roosevelt McCLENTON, Appellant.

No. A09-389.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 20, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by CONNOLLY, Presiding Judge; HUDSON, Judge; and JOHNSON, Judge.

OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge.

Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2006), and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.01, subd. 16a, .025, subd. 2(1), 609.101, subd. 3 (2006). Appellant contends the district court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of theft from person and fifth-degree assault; abused its discretion in precluding evidence on the defense of involuntary intoxication; and erroneously admitted criminal complaints during the Blakely trial. Because we conclude that (1) there was no rational basis to convict appellant of the requested lesser-included offenses while acquitting him of the greater charge of aggravated robbery; (2) appellant was not entitled to an involuntary-intoxication defense as a matter of law; and (3) appellant was not prejudiced by the admission of the complaints, we affirm.

FACTS

Around 7:15 p.m. on October 30, 2007, T.G. was walking down Portland Avenue South in Minneapolis. At the corner of Portland Avenue and 24th Street, a man, later identified as appellant Roosevelt McClenton, approached T.G. and asked him for money in an aggressive and hostile manner. According to T.G., appellant looked "like he was on drugs" and was "very unstable." T.G. told appellant that he did not have any money. However, appellant "kept on pressing him" and told T.G. "he was going to kick his ass," so T.G. reached into his pocket and gave appellant a $20 bill. Appellant persisted and T.G. gave him another $20 bill and some $1 bills. After T.G. handed over the money, appellant punched him in the head. T.G. fell to the ground. The ordeal ended when appellant told T.G. to "run" and T.G. got up and ran down 24th Street. T.G. suffered a split lip, a knot on his head, and a knot on his cheek bone.

Minneapolis police officers Kenneth Awalt and Christopher Humphrey responded to the scene first. Officer Awalt observed appellant lying on the grass on the corner of Portland and 24th. Appellant was not wearing a shirt and his pants were down around his thigh area. Appellant got up off the ground and was shaking his arms, ranting and raving, and "saying biblical homages." Appellant refused to comply with the officers' orders to get down on the ground. Officer Awalt thought appellant was in a "cocaine psychosis," and called Officer Jeffrey Werner, who had a taser, because people in this situation are "super strong" and "don't have any pain tolerance, and it just would be an all out fight." Officer Werner observed the other officers attempt to mace appellant to no avail. Appellant wandered onto Portland Avenue into traffic. Officer Werner subsequently tased appellant.

Appellant, still struggling and speaking incomprehensibly, was loaded into an ambulance. Inside the ambulance, a paramedic observed appellant "spitting and turning his head a lot." Next to the side of appellant's mouth, she saw a baggie containing a substance she believed to be crack cocaine. The substance was later identified as crack cocaine.

Appellant was charged with first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1. Prior to trial, defense counsel¹ gave notice of appellant's intent to rely upon the defenses of "Mental Illness or Deficiency" and "Intoxication." The parties appeared before the district court on May 5, 2008. Appellant had previously undergone a Rule 20.02 evaluation by a court-appointed psychologist. The district court noted that while the psychologist found appellant was in a "drug-induced psychosis" at the time of the alleged offense, the psychologist "did not give an opinion" on whether appellant had a viable mental-illness defense "because she believed that a psychosis caused by a voluntary injection of drugs doesn't qualify for a mental-illness defense." (Emphasis added). Based on appellant's assertion of an involuntary-intoxication defense, the district court requested an updated opinion.

However, on May 12, 2008, the district court issued an order requiring appellant to "make an offer of proof constituting prima facie evidence that an involuntary-intoxication defense exists in this case" before an updated Rule 20.02 evaluation would be ordered. In the accompanying memorandum, the district court stated:

On May 5, 2008, defense counsel proffered to the Court that the drug-induced psychosis from which Defendant was suffering at the time of the offense was caused by involuntary intoxication. Specifically, defense counsel proffered that in addition to the Defendant's use of cocaine during the days leading up to the date of offense; the Defendant also smoked marijuana which, the Defendant believes, was "laced" with an unknown substance. According to defense counsel, the Defendant will assert at trial that the psychosis from which he was suffering at the time of the crime was caused by an unanticipated reaction to the drugs he ingested.²

(Citation omitted). The district court observed that the availability of an involuntary-intoxication defense based on the voluntary ingestion of an illegal street drug appears to be an issue of first impression in Minnesota and noted that other jurisdictions have "uniformly" rejected the defense "even if, unknown to the defendant, the illegal drug was `laced' with another substance which caused the defendant to have an unanticipated reaction." Accordingly, appellant was given until May 28, 2008, to make an offer of proof in support of his defense and provide a "memorandum of law citing legal authority for the availability of the defense. Failure to submit this offer of proof and supporting memorandum will result in preclusion of a mental-illness defense at trial." The district court record does not reflect that any such offer of proof or memorandum was ever filed.

An amended complaint was filed, adding one count of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.01, subd. 16a, .025, subd. 2(1), 609.101, subd. 3. The case was subsequently reassigned to a different district court judge for trial. On the first day of jury selection, the parties discussed the previous order. Defense counsel stated that he viewed the order as precluding the involuntary-intoxication defense. Defense counsel added that he had an expert witness ready, but the expert did not prepare a report in light of the prior order. The district court said it would follow the order as "the law of the case" and "it's also, I believe, a carefully researched and well-thought-out and correct decision in the case, that I believe I would have made ... as the record stands at this point, there is insufficient evidence, both factually and legally to provide testimony on the issue of involuntary intoxication in this case."

The next day, appellant raised questions to the district court about his representation and the ability to present his defense. With the assistance of counsel, it became clear that appellant was talking about testimony by an individual, who was with appellant "immediately before" the alleged offenses and was to testify about appellant's drug use in connection with the involuntary-intoxication defense, and the expert retained by defense counsel. Defense counsel stated these witnesses would not be called in light of the prior preclusion. After a brief inquiry, appellant was content to proceed. The district court also explained that it was not that defense counsel had failed to raise the involuntary-intoxication defense, but that "he was not successful in convincing the previous judge or myself that it should be raised, and I think that any attorney would have a hard time, just as your attorney did, would have a hard time getting that raised in a case with these facts."

A jury trial was held and appellant was found guilty of first-degree aggravated robbery and fifth-degree possession. A subsequent Blakely trial took place on the aggravating factor of whether there was a pattern of criminal conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (2006). Among other things, seven criminal complaints were admitted in connection with appellant's prior offenses. Defense counsel objected to each document, although the record is not entirely clear on the specific grounds for defense counsel's objections.³ The jury subsequently found a pattern of criminal conduct. In arguing for leniency at sentencing, defense counsel stated:

We had an expert who we could not use who would say that Mr. McClenton had PCP in his blood. And he had the PCP in his blood not because he wanted to take PCP, but he was taking a different illegal substance, and it was most likely laced with PCP, and it caused an adverse reaction, a reaction that was not—Mr. McClenton wasn't used to. He wasn't planning on having such a drug in his system, and he behaved in a way that he hadn't planned on.

Appellant was sentenced to 180 months in prison, an upward departure from the 111-month presumptive sentence. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court commit prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of theft from person and fifth-degree assault?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in precluding appellant from presenting evidence on the defense of involuntary intoxication?

III. Were appellant's...