State v. McCoy
| Decision Date | 23 March 1945 |
| Docket Number | 31904. |
| Citation | 18 N.W.2d 101,145 Neb. 750 |
| Parties | STATE v. McCOY. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The purpose of the statutes creating juvenile courts was not to provide additional courts for the punishment of crime, but was to establish special tribunals having jurisdiction within prescribed limits, of cases relating to the moral physical, and mental well-being of children to the end that they may be directed away from paths of crime.
2. Juvenile courts do not have the sole or exclusive jurisdiction of children under eighteen years of age who have violated our laws.
3. The county attorney is not limited by the Juvenile Court Act in any way in his duty to file proper complaints against wrongdoers and prosecute the same.
Kelso Morgan, Co. Atty., and C. E. Walsh, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Omaha, for plaintiff in error.
Joseph M. Lovely and Edward T. Hayes, both of Omaha, for defendant in error.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and PAINE, CARTER MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ.
The county attorney for Douglas county filed a petition in error to review an adverse ruling in the district court on a motion to quash the information which he had filed against the defendant.
On June 9 1944, a state complaint was filed in the criminal branch of the municipal court in Omaha, charging Guy Edwin McCoy with receiving a stolen automobile, and thereupon the defendant was bound over to the district court by the judge of the municipal court under bond of $2,500.
On June 13, 1944, Kelso Morgan as county attorney filed an information in the district court, charging the defendant in error with the crime of receiving a stolen automobile. A copy thereof was served on the defendant in error on June 16. Thereafter, on July 31, while the said defendant was held in custody, a motion to quash said information was filed for the said defendant by Joseph M. Lovely, public defender for Douglas county, and Edward T. Hayes, his assistant, as attorneys for the defendant.
This motion to quash set out that there were three defects appearing on the face of the record, which may be concisely stated as follows: (1) Because exclusive jurisdiction over all persons under the age of eighteen years is given to the juvenile court of the district court for Douglas county, Nebraska; (2) that no concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon the criminal division of the district court over persons under the age of eighteen years; (3) that the defendant is improperly charged because the procedure against any person under the age of eighteen years must be by a petition rather than by information under the laws of Nebraska.
A hearing was held June 13, 1944. The bill of exceptions discloses that the county attorney first objected to the case being transferred to the juvenile court. Objection was overruled by the court on the ground that the case was not being transferred to the juvenile court, but that the judge of the juvenile court was sitting as a district judge in the district court. The county attorney then requested that the prisoner be present at the presentation of the case. 'The Court: I do not think it necessary for the prisoner to be here at all, if you will just make your record here.' Thereupon, Mr. Hayes, the assistant public defender, asked the county attorney to stipulate that the defendant charged with receiving a stolen automobile was over sixteen years and under eighteen years of age. The county attorney again requested that the boy should be present during the hearing, and objected to the court taking jurisdiction in the matter (1) because the juvenile court has no jurisdiction where an information has been filed in a criminal case; (2) because the act creating and giving authority to the juvenile court is unconstitutional and the Act has been declared partly void; (3) because the Act has not been reenacted after it was declared void; and (4) because the statutes of Nebraska take away from the juvenile court any authority to sentence to the industrial school, reformatory or penitentiary any child or person over sixteen years of age, and limits the juvenile court to sentence under sixteen years of age unless one over sixteen and under eighteen has pleaded guilty or been convicted of a crime. Such motion was overruled by the court for the reason that the presiding judge had transferred this case to Judge Herbert Rhoades, the duly appointed judge of the juvenile court division of the district court for Douglas county, and that the court in hearing the motion to quash is sitting as a criminal judge of the district for Douglas county, and not as a juvenile judge.
The county attorney was again asked to stipulate as to the age of the defendant, and agreed to stipulate if the defendant was present in court. The court said that the defendant might be put on the stand for that one purpose and no other. Thereupon the defendant was sworn, stated his name was Guy Edwin McCoy, and he resided at 7919 Cass street, and that he was 17 years of age December 25, 1943.
It was then stipulated that the defendant was committed to the Kearney Industrial School by Judge Rhoades, of the juvenile court, on October 5, 1943, and ran away from that school on May 29, 1944; that he was arrested June 2, 1944, in Omaha, and has been held since said date in the Douglas county jail, in the adult division of that jail, and is unable to raise the bond, and that jury term would not be held until October 16, 1944.
The matter was thereupon continued from June 13 to August 8, 1944, at which time it was stipulated that no petition had been filed in the juvenile court charging the defendant with delinquency, and it was further stipulated that no investigation had been made by the juvenile court of the case.
The arguments having been made, the court thereupon orally dictated his decision of five pages to the court reporter, and the same appears in the bill of exceptions, the conclusion being:
'In the judgment of this court, the filing of the information against the boy McCoy, is without authority of law, for the reason that the said statutes of the state have not been complied with and the complaint is, therefore, without force and effect.
In the petition in error, ten grounds are set out as prejudicial errors justifying a reversal of the order sustaining the motion to quash and dismissing the case. Said errors may be epitomized as follows: That the district court by sustaining the motion found that the exclusive jurisdiction over all persons under the age of eighteen years for the commission of a criminal offense is given to the juvenile court for Douglas county, Nebraska, which is contrary to the law; that by so sustaining the motion to quash, the court held that all persons under the age of eighteen years who are alleged to have committed a crime cannot be tried in the criminal division of the district court for Douglas county, and that the only procedure to punish a person under the age of eighteen years for the alleged commission of the criminal offense must be by a petition, rather than by complaint and information, which is contrary to law, thereby holding that a person under eighteen years of age is not subject to the criminal laws of the state of Nebraska; that the court, over the objection of the county attorney, dismissed the cause of action and sustained the motion to quash the information, whereas said court has no jurisdiction to dismiss a criminal case except where trial is had, or upon motion of the county attorney; and charged lastly that the judicial department thereby exercised the prerogative of the executive department of the government of the state of Nebraska, in violation of the laws thereof.
Serious differences have thus arisen between the county attorney of Douglas county and the judge of the juvenile court in Omaha as to the proper proceedings in handling a youth under the age of eighteen years who has allegedly committed a crime.
It being necessary to examine our laws relating to this matter, we find that the first reference is in the Constitution of 1875, under article VIII, on the subject 'Education'. Section 12 thereof provides: 'The legislature may provide by law for the establishment of a school or schools for the safe keeping, education, employment and reformation of all children under the age of sixteen years, who, for want of proper parental care, or other cause, are growing up in mendicancy, or crime.'
The first act of the legislature in reference thereto is found in an Act to locate a state reform school for juvenile offenders, beginning on page 413, Laws 1879. Section 6 is entitled 'Juvenile convicts,' and reads:
The following sections provide that, when such a youth shall be convicted in an inferior court, of being a disorderly person, the...
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Neb. Const. art. VII § VII-12 Education and Reform of Minors
...courts do not have the sole or exclusive jurisdiction of children under eighteen years of age who have violated the law. State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N.W.2d 101 (1945). Under former section Legislature was without power to authorize commitment to state industrial school of children over......