State v. McCoy
| Decision Date | 02 April 1953 |
| Citation | 94 Ohio App. 165,114 N.E.2d 624 |
| Parties | , 51 O.O. 334 STATE v. McCOY. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause.
2. A Municipal Court is a creature of statute, is a court of limited jurisdiction, and is vested with such power only as is conferred on it by the General Assembly.
3. There is no statute in Ohio conferring county-wide jurisdiction over violations of the Uniform Traffic Act, Sections 6307-1 to 6307-110, General Code, on the Municipal Court of Portsmouth, except under the conditions set forth in Section 13422-2, General Code.
William H. Harsha, Pros. Atty., Portsmouth, and John B. Marshall, for appellant.
Edgar Hale, Portsmouth, for appellee.
This is an appeal on questions of law from an order of the Common Pleas Court of Scioto County, releasing from custody the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding. The case was submitted to the trial court upon an agreed statement of facts, which, briefly, are as follows:
The petitioner, William McCoy, was charged by affidavit in the Municipal Court of Portsmouth on June 11, 1952, with a violation of Section 6307-20, General Code upon the highways of Scioto county, but outside the city limits of Portsmouth. The petitioner objected to the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court over the subject matter for the reason that the alleged crime was not committed within the territorial limits of such court.
The objection was overruled and the petitioner was tried, convicted, fined $50, and assessed the costs. In default of payment of the fine and costs, he was committed to the Scioto county jail. Thereupon he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Common Pleas Court of Scioto County, which was allowed, and the petitioner was released from custody.
The state claims that the Municipal Court of Portsmouth has county-wide jurisdiction over violations of the Uniform Traffic Act, of which Section 6307-20, General Code, is a part. The petitioner contends that said court has no such jurisdiction, and, therefore, that the proper disposition of this case turns entirely on this one legal question.
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause. If the Municipal Court has no such power, then the petitioner was unlawfully detained, and was properly released from custody under the writ of habeas corpus; if the Municipal Court possesses such power, the petitioner should have been remanded to custody.
The Municipal Court is a creature of statute, and, therefore, has only such powers as are conferred on it by the Legislature; it is a court of limited jurisdiction. Our Supreme Court, in the case of State ex rel. Talaba, v. Moreland, Judge, 132 Ohio St. 71, 5 N.E.2d 159, 160, held, as disclosed by the third paragraph of the syllabus:
'In the state of Ohio the jurisdiction of municipal courts is statutory.'
The Municipal Court Act, Section 1598, General Code, expressly defines the county-wide criminal jurisdiction of the Portsmouth Municipal Court in this language 'The court shall also have jurisdiction within the limits of the county or counties in which its territory is situated of those crimes and offenses which are now or may hereafter be within the county wide jurisdiction of justices of the peace.'
Since the Municipal Court has the same county-wide jurisdiction of crimes as justices of the peace, the question then arises, when does a justice of the peace have county-wide jurisdiction? The only statute granting such power of which we are aware is Section 13422-2, General Code, which reads, in part, as follows:
'A justice of the peace shall be a conservator of the peace and have jurisdiction in criminal cases throughout the township in...
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Bowman v. Bowman
...is authorized to hear, determine and render final judgment in an action, and to enforce its judgment by legal process. State v. McCoy, 94 Ohio App. 165, 114 N.E.2d 624. In the instant case, when originally heard, both parties were before the court. Stalma Bowman, by her petition filed in th......
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Lyttle v. State
...charge, including the sentencing of a defendant following conviction and any other penalties imposed. State v. McCoy (1953), 94 Ohio App. 165, 166, 51 O.O. 334, 114 N.E.2d 624. See also Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton (1854), 3 Ohio St. 494, 499. The penalty challenged by appellant in this case ......
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Joanne Lewis v. Ann Romans, 81-LW-0740
... ... well settled that municipal courts can exercise only such ... powers as are conferred upon them by statute. State ex ... rel. Foreman v. Bellefontaine Municipal Court (1967), 12 ... Ohio St. 2d 26; State ex rel. Talaba v. Moreland ... (1936), ... 442; Soul v ... Lockhart (1928), 110 Ohio St. 393; Jacubenta v ... Dunbar (1964), 120 Ohio App. 249; State v ... McCoy (1953), 94 Ohio App. 165; Lynam v ... Schueler (1946), 79 Ohio App. 101. Revised Code 1901.18 ... delineates those matters over which a ... ...
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Lyttle v. State, CASE NO. CA2010-04-089
...criminal charge, including the sentencing of a defendant following conviction and any other penalties imposed. State v. McCoy, 94 Ohio App. 165, 166 (4th Dist.1953). See also Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854). The penalty appellant challenges involves the registration r......